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ABSTRACT
Alongside existing research into the social, political and eco-
nomic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web
from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particu-
larly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature
of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming
the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by
the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches
to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive sig-
nificance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on
forces and factors that reside at the level of agent–world in-
teractions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological
approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance
of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied,
extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The
results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary
configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and
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Interface between Web Science, Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind”,
Foundations and TrendsR© in Web Science: Vol. 6, No. 1-2, pp 1–232. DOI:
10.1561/1800000026.
2empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive
science and the philosophy of mind.
1
Introduction
Ever since its inception as a specialized area of scientific enquiry, Web
Science has been conceived as a discipline that benefits from (and per-
haps depends upon) various forms of interdisciplinary engagement [44,
45, 235, 428]. Although it is perhaps easy to think of the World Wide
Web (hereafter simply the Web) as a purely technological system—one
which involves the use of protocols, formalisms and software algorithms
to support the exchange of information across a global computational
network—there is clearly a sense in which the Web is more than just a
collection of technological elements. In particular, the Web is as much
a social phenomenon as it is a technological one,1 and this alters the
theoretical and empirical remit of Web Science, expanding its scope to
include topics that fall within the orbit of the social, psychological and
1It is perhaps more appropriate to see the Web as a socio-technical phenomenon,
rather than a purely social or technological one. From the perspective of Web Science,
the Web is typically conceived as a socio-technical system: one that features complex
forms of interaction and inter-dependence between individuals, technology and
society [368]. Web Science recognizes that technological innovation on the Web may
impact society, perhaps giving rise to new forms of social interaction and engagement.
However, it also recognizes that technological innovation occurs against a sociological
and psychological backdrop: a backdrop that includes, among other things, moral and
ethical codes, legal constraints, social conventions and human cognitive capabilities.
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Figure 1.1: The Web Science Butterfly Diagram (http://www.webscience.org/).
cultural sciences. Some insight into the interdisciplinary nature of Web
Science is provided by the so-called Web Science Butterfly Diagram,
which represents an early attempt to map out those areas where the
interests and concerns of Web Science converge with those of other
disciplines (see Figure 1.1).
A particular set of disciplines are typically seen as relevant to Web
Science. Writing in 2008, for example, Hendler et al. [235] suggest that
Web Science establishes contact with the disciplines of mathematics,
computer science, artificial intelligence, sociology, psychology, biology
and economics. Interestingly, philosophy and cognitive science—the
disciplinary targets of the present review—are absent from this list.
This does not, of course, mean that philosophy and cognitive science
are irrelevant to Web Science. Indeed, Hendler et al. [235] encourage
researchers to expand the disciplinary reach of Web Science by expli-
cating the links with other disciplines. This is, in fact, one of the aims
of the present review. In particular, we seek to highlight areas where
5the interests of cognitively-minded scientists and philosophers start to
converge with those who seek to study and understand the Web.
From a cognitive science perspective, the Web raises important
issues concerning the nature of both human and machine intelligence.
A particular focus of interest relates to the effect of the Web on human
cognitive capabilities [81], especially those that relate to mnemonic func-
tioning [472], reading [174], and social cognition [160]. Another point of
interest concerns the Web’s ability to support the emergence of hybrid
information processing ensembles that combine the capabilities of both
humans and machines. This is where the recent interest in a number of
Web-based socio-cognitive phenomena—e.g., collective intelligence [322],
collective problem-solving [350], collective sensemaking [284] and col-
lective creativity [557]—start to converge with well-established areas
of cognitive scientific research, especially with the study of distributed
cognitive systems [254].
In addition to the points of contact with cognitive science, the Web
has also begun to attract the attention of the philosophical commu-
nity [215, 216, 217, 382]. This is particularly apparent when it comes to
those areas of philosophy that deal with mental or cognitive phenomena,
such as the philosophy of mind and the philosophical study of knowledge
(i.e., epistemology) [314, 447, 450, 452]. Work in these areas is relevant
to our conceptual understanding of the Web, especially as it relates to
our status as cognitive and epistemic agents. At the present time, the
epistemic implications of the Web are very much in the media spotlight,
with terms such as “post-truth,” “fake news,” “filter bubbles,” and
“alternative facts” dominating public discourse [see 390]. The cognitive
implications of the Web have also been the subject of much debate,
with prominent public figures voicing concern about the effect of the
Web on cognitive performance [81, 206]. In view of the potential policy
implications of these debates, it is imperative that we have a better
understanding of the nature of the relationship between the Web and
that wondrous (albeit beguiling) organ that we refer to as the human
mind. In particular, it is important that the scope of current debates be
broadened to accommodate the wealth of work that has been undertaken
to improve our conceptual understanding of cognitive phenomena.
6 Introduction
The present review represents an attempt to heed the call of the early
Web Science pioneers by expanding the interdisciplinary scope of Web
Science. In essence, we seek to expand the reach of the butterfly’s wings
(see Figure 1.1) to accommodate the disciplines of cognitive science and
the philosophy of mind. As is evidenced by the present review, there is
a substantial literature to support this expansionist agenda. Given the
centrality of cognition to our species-specific capabilities, as well as the
level of public and scientific interest in the Web, now is arguably a good
time to review this literature and explicate the nature of the linkages
that connect the science of the Web to the sciences of the mind.
2
Cognition, Cognitive Science
and Cognitive Ecologies
2.1 What is Cognition?
The main goal of cognitive science is to advance our understanding of
cognition and the mind. For the most part, the same is true of the phi-
losophy of mind. Despite some rather obvious methodological differences
between the disciplines, the goal of cognitive science and philosophy
of mind remains the same: to improve our understanding of cognition
and the mind. But what is it, exactly, that lies within the intellectual
cross hairs of these disciplines? What exactly is cognition? What is the
mind? And why should Web Science be concerned with either of them?
These are important questions, the discussion of which would no
doubt provide the basis for a monograph (or monographs) several times
the length of the one you are now reading. For the moment, we will
focus our attention on the first (and undoubtedly much more vexed)
issue of what is meant by the terms “mind” and “cognition.”1 (The
relevance of cognition to Web Science is something that will become
1For the most part, the present review talks of “cognition” more than it
does the “mind.” We treat the mind as that entity or system that performs or
engages in cognition.
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clearer during the course of the present review, although something of
a cursory response can be found in Section 2.2.)
So, what is cognition? Unfortunately, there is, as yet, no definitive
answer to this question. This does not mean that philosophers and
cognitive scientists (as well as the rest of us) have no understanding of
what cognition is. Neither does it mean that philosophers and cognitive
scientists have no idea as to what cognitive scientists should be studying.
It simply means that there is, as yet, no commonly agreed linguistic
formula for specifying what it is that makes something a bona fide
cognitive process, or (more broadly) what it is that makes something a
bona fide cognitive phenomenon.
Within philosophical circles, the problem of identifying the charac-
teristic features of cognitive phenomena (e.g., the things that make a
particular process a cognitive process) is referred to as the attempt to
resolve the “mark of the cognitive” [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The aim, in essence, is
to determine what it is that enables us to subsume things like memory,
attention, problem-solving, perception, and so on, under the cognitive
umbrella. As is noted by Adams and Garrison [3], a mark of the cogni-
tive would enable us to determine what it is that makes a seemingly
diverse set of processes instances of the same type—that is cognitive:
It is easy to give a list of cognitive processes. They are things
like learning, memory, concept formation, reasoning, maybe
emotion, and so on. It is not easy to say, of these things
that are called cognitive, what makes them so. Knowing the
answer is one very important reason to be interested in the
mark of the cognitive. [3, p. 340, original emphasis]
There have been many important and interesting attempts to dis-
cover the mark of the cognitive. Adams and Aizawa, for example,
attempt to limn the realm of the cognitive by appealing to the idea
that “cognition is constituted by certain sorts of causal processes that
involve nonderived content” [2, p. 67]. Such a view leads Adams and
Aizawa to countenance a form of contingent intracranialism about the
(human?) mind. They suggest that only neural processes, as a matter
of contingent fact, are able to give rise to cognitive phenomena.
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Other attempts to resolve the mark of the cognitive include accounts
that appeal to reason-guided behaviors [3], characteristic sets of causal
processes [1], and the presence of conscious experiences [see 152]. Unfor-
tunately, none of these proposals has received widespread philosophical
assent. The problem, in most cases, is either that a specific proposal
places too many restrictions on cognition (e.g., it equates cognition with
consciousness), or that it appeals to concepts that are no less enigmatic
that is the notion of cognition itself [see 8]. Consider, for example, the
following attempt by Mark Rowlands [414, pp. 110–111] to specify a
set of criteria that are deemed to be jointly sufficient in determining
whether a particular process P should be counted as a cognitive process:
1. P involves information processing—the manipulation and trans-
formation of information-bearing structures.
2. This information processing has the proper function of making
available either to the subject or to subsequent processing opera-
tions information that was, prior to this processing, unavailable.
3. This information is made available by way of the production, in
the subject of P, of a representational state.
4. P is a process that belongs to the subject of that representa-
tional state.
As is noted by Adams and Garrison [3], none of these criteria are
entirely unproblematic. What, for example, is the precise meaning of
the term “representational state?” What counts as a “proper function?”
And what does it mean to say that a process “belongs to” the subject
that is the bearer of a representational state? None of these questions,
it seems, are likely to yield a straightforward answer (or at least none
are likely to yield an answer that would be unequivocally accepted by
the philosophical community).
In response to the lack of philosophical progress concerning the
mark of the cognitive, some theorists have questioned the need to define
the term “cognition.” Allen [8], for example, advocates “a pluralistic
stance towards uses of the term ‘cognition’ that eschews the urge to
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treat cognition as a metaphysically well-defined ‘natural’ kind” (p. 1).
Cognitive science, Allen suggests, requires a concept of cognition that
is able to accommodate the diversity of systems that are the focus of
cognitive scientific investigations. In view of this diversity, Allen suggests
that there is little reason to assume that the realm of the cognitive
can be neatly delineated with respect to essentialist criteria. Neither is
there any reason, he argues, for cognitive scientists to be overly worried
about the absence of a discipline-fixing definition that determines the
scope of their scientific efforts:
Cognitive scientists should no more be embarrassed about
their lack of an all-purpose definition or categorical descrip-
tion of cognition than biologists are about their inability
to define “life,” “species” or any other number of terms, or
for physicists to be able to give a unified account of such
fundamental notions as “force” and “matter.” [8, p. 14]
For the purposes of the present review, we will embrace a view
of cognition that emphasizes its role in the genesis and organization
of intelligent behavior. This is, in fact, a view that dates back to the
earliest days of cognitive science [see 223]. It is also a view that has
managed to survive the upheaval caused by seismological shifts in the
scientific and philosophical landscape over the past several decades.
As noted by Hatfield [223], the notion that “cognition is information
processing that explains intelligent behaviour” (p. 361) is one that has
been largely unaffected by traditional dialectics, such as the distinction
between symbolic vs. sub-symbolic processing and the representational
vs. non-representational character of cognition. Such a view is also
able to accommodate the sort of distinctions that have been made
regarding what might be called ‘cognitive kinds’, i.e., particular forms
of cognition (see Section 2.3). (This is of particular relevance in the
context of the present review; for much of the review is based around a
particular subset of these cognitive kinds, e.g., extended, embodied and
collective cognition). In support of this compatibility, Andy Clark, one
of the leading proponents of a particular form of cognition known as
extended cognition, suggests that perhaps the best way to conceive of
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cognition is to take a “cognition is as cognition does” approach. In this
case, issues of cognitive status are fixed by an attempt to account for
certain kinds of behavior. “The notion of a cognitive process,” Clark
suggests, “is best unpacked as the notion of a process that supports
certain kinds of behavior (actual and counterfactual)” [104, p. 93]. A
similar position is adopted by another affiliate of the extended cognition
camp: Michael Wheeler [542]. He too regards cognition as something
that is individuated with respect to certain kinds of behavior:
. . . behaving appropriately (e.g., adaptively, in a context-
sensitive fashion) with respect to some (usually) external
target state of affairs, should be counted as displays of intel-
ligence and as outcomes of cognitive processing. [542, p. 3]
This, then, provides us with a view of cognition that we will refer
to as the intelligent behavior view of cognition:
Cognition (Intelligent Behavior View)
Cognition refers to whatever it is that gives rise to intelligent
behavior. What makes (e.g.) a process a cognitive process is
the role that the process plays with respect to the generation
of intelligent behavior, where the notion of intelligent behav-
ior is to be understood as behavior that is appropriate, adap-
tive, flexible and coordinated with respect to environmental
and organismic circumstances (i.e., context-sensitive).
This is the view of cognition that we will adopt throughout the
remainder of the review. It is a view that is sufficiently generic to
accommodate the various kinds of cognition that we will encounter
in subsequent sections. It is also, it should be clear, a view that is
largely agnostic with respect to the metaphysical character of the
‘things’ that generate (or give rise to) intelligent behavior. This is
important, because it allows for differences in the explanatory accounts
that are delivered by cognitive science (e.g., accounts that explain
behavior in terms of cognitive processes or cognitive mechanisms).
Some of these differences are no doubt merely idiomatic, and thus
of no substantive scientific relevance. Others, however, seem to be
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more important. As will become clear in a subsequent section (see
Section 2.3), cognitive science is a discipline that, at a practical level,
focuses its attention on the physical mechanisms that are responsible for
the expression of intelligent behavior. The focus of interest, in this case,
concerns the material constituents of mechanisms (e.g., neurons) and
their patterns of interaction (e.g., the propagation of bioelectric signals).
Such mechanisms are deemed to be cognitive mechanisms whenever they
support the expression of intelligent behavior. But not everyone speaks
in terms of physical mechanisms. Sometimes, behavior is explained
with respect to the presence of cognitive states and processes, and it
is far from clear that the explanatory referents of such accounts (i.e.,
states and processes) are the same as those targeted by mechanism-
based accounts. Such ostensible differences in explanatory focus are
easily accommodated by the intelligent behavior view of cognition.
What makes a process (or state) a cognitive process (or cognitive state)
is thus the role that such processes (or states) play with respect to
the generation of intelligent behavior. Similarly, when it comes to
mechanism-based explanations, what makes a mechanism a cognitive
mechanism is simply the role that such mechanisms play with respect
to the generation of intelligent behavior.
2.2 Cognitive Science, Philosophy and the Web
Relative to the intelligent behavior view of cognition (see Section 2.1),
we can see cognitive science as, in a general sense, the science that deals
with the forces and factors that give rise to intelligent behavior. This is
broadly consistent with the way cognitive science has been conceived
by philosophers and cognitive scientists. Bechtel et al. [35], for example,
offer the following definition of cognitive science:
Cognitive science is the multidisciplinary scientific study of
cognition and its role in intelligent agency. It examines what
cognition is, what it does, and how it works. [35, p. 3]
As with Web Science, cognitive science is a multidisciplinary en-
deavor, involving contact with disciplines such as philosophy, psychology,
2.2. Cognitive Science, Philosophy and the Web 13
Artificial Intelligence (AI), neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology.
Such disciplines serve as the basis for what might be thought of as the
cognitive science counterpart to the Web Sciences Butterfly Diagram:
the Cognitive Science Hexagram (see Figure 2.1).
Psychology
Computer
Science
Philosophy
Linguistics
Anthropology
Neuroscience
Figure 2.1: The Cognitive Science Hexagram [see 352].
Another point of commonality between cognitive science and Web
Science, aside from their multidisciplinary outlook, concerns their status
as analytic and synthetic disciplines. Both Web Science and cognitive
science are clearly disciplines that seek to analyze existing systems of one
sort or another, either Web-based or cognitive (and sometimes both!).
In addition to this, however, Web Science and cognitive science are
both disciplines that are, at least in part, concerned with the synthesis
(i.e., development) of de novo systems (again Web-based, cognitive
and sometimes both). This is particularly apparent in the case of Web
Science, which as a specialized area of computer science, is suitably
poised to extend the Web’s existing technological and computational
fabric. As is noted by Berners-Lee et al. [45]:
14 Cognition, Cognitive Science and Cognitive Ecologies
Physical science is an analytic discipline that aims to find
laws that generate or explain observed phenomena; computer
science is predominantly (though not exclusively) synthetic,
in that formalisms and algorithms are created in order to
support particular desired behaviour. Web science has to be a
merging of these two paradigms; the Web needs to be studied
and understood, and it needs to be engineered. [45, p. 3]
For the most part, cognitive science is an analytic discipline: it
studies a rich array of naturally-occurring (biologically-based) cognitive
systems. Beyond this, however, cognitive science is also concerned with
the engineering of cognitive systems, either for the purposes of improving
our understanding of existing systems,2 or for the purposes of building
de novo forms of cognitive organization that are able to emulate (and
sometimes surpass) the capabilities of biologically-based systems (such as
ourselves). It is in respect of this synthetic orientation that we encounter
one of the important overlaps between Web Science and cognitive
science. For the current preoccupation with machine intelligence and
intelligent systems engineering is one that is, to an ever-greater extent,
of mutual interest to both disciplines. Some of the more notable points of
convergence, in this case, come with respect to the use of Semantic Web
technologies to support advanced forms of machine reasoning [46], the
use of the Web or parts thereof (e.g., Wikipedia) as the informational
substrate for cognitive computing platforms [171], and the capacity
of the Web (especially the Social Web) to support the emergence of
novel forms of machine intelligence [451]. There is, an addition, a rather
obvious point of overlap when it comes to the development of Web-
based systems that are intended to yield collective intelligence [322, 350],
or which aim to augment the cognitive capabilities of individual Web
users [337]. All these areas touch on issues of philosophical relevance.
Should we, for example, see the representational commitments of the
Semantic Web as violating a “claim of intrinsic suitability” [see 102,
p. 107] regarding the sorts of material substrate that are sufficient for
intelligent behavior? Do the derivative semantics of online symbolic
2A classic example of this sort of approach is provided by Braitenberg in [64].
2.2. Cognitive Science, Philosophy and the Web 15
encodings rule out the possibility of genuine machine cognition [1]? Does
the virtual nature of the online environment exclude the possibility
of cognitively-relevant forms of material embodiment [544]? Does the
global and social nature of the Web support the social scaffolding of
machine intelligence [463]? And does our philosophical conception of
human knowledge influence our approach to the design of certain kinds
of Web-based system [382]?
When it comes to their status as synthetic disciplines, therefore,
there are a number of points of contact between Web Science, cognitive
science and the philosophy of mind. In addition, to this, however, a
degree of convergence can also be found in respect of a number of more
analytically-oriented issues and concerns. This is particularly apparent
when it comes to the cognitive implications of the Web. Does, for
example, the nature of our interaction with the Web yield a general
enhancement in cognitive functioning, or is it the case that exposure
to the Web leads to a form of cognitive diminishment? Is the Web a
cognitive boon (to be embraced), or is it a cognitive burden (to be
endured)? It turns out that these questions are much more problematic
than we might have thought. And the problem is not merely one of
running suitably controlled experiments. Instead, the problem lies in
the way we conceptualize cognition; in particular, the way we think
about the human mind and its relationship to the physical, social and
technological environments in which we humans are materially situated.
Here, then, is a further point of contact with the philosophy of mind: in
order to get an appropriate understanding of the cognitive significance of
the Web—the implications that the Web has for human cognizing—we
will need to understand the various ways in which the human mind is
situated in the “causal structure of the world” [see 422]. As will become
clear in the next section, the results of this philosophical analysis provide
us with rich array of conceptual positions. When it comes to questions
about cognition and the Web, the answer we get will probably depend
on the kind of conceptual lens we choose to don.
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2.3 Varieties of Cognition
Even so much as a cursory glance at the cognitive scientific literature
will reveal that cognition comes in a rich variety of flavors. In addition
to the forms of cognition associated with specific biological taxa (e.g.,
avian cognition, primate cognition, human cognition, and so on), the
cognitive science literature is littered with terms and concepts refer-
ring to ‘cognitive kinds’ of a somewhat more esoteric nature. These
include extended cognition [7, 102, 108], embedded cognition [417, 418],
scaffolded cognition [16, 483], embodied cognition [11, 432, 433, 434,
435], situated cognition[409], distributed cognition [240, 254, 255], group
cognition [381, 498, 499], social cognition [288], enactive cognition [141],
grounded cognition [28, 29, 386], augmented cognition [477], metacogni-
tion [396], and so on. Cognition, it seems, is a many varied (or at least a
multi-faceted) thing, and the medley of cognitive flavors on offer seems
to be of sufficient richness as to rival the offerings of even the most
cosmopolitan of Italian gelaterias.3 How should we make sense of this
bewildering array of cognition-related concepts? And what, moreover,
is the significance of this profusion of cognitive kinds for the discipline
of Web Science?
The present review is, in part, an attempt to answer these questions.
While we do not seek to cover every kind of cognition on offer, the
distinction between various forms of cognition is, we suggest, of both
conceptual and methodological significance. For the purposes of this
review, we limit our attention to the following forms of cognition:
embodied cognition (see Section 3), extended cognition (see Section 4),
embedded cognition (see Section 5), social cognition (see Section 6),
and collective cognition (see Section 7).
3Just to complicate the picture, cognitive scientists typically make a distinction
between different forms of cognitive processing, such as attention, memory, perception,
learning, problem-solving, decision-making, and so on [see 165]. Typically, each of
these cognitive process types is subject to further forms of conceptual decomposition.
In the case of memory, for example, cognitive psychological research is typically
organized with respect to different kinds of memory. These include, inter alia, episodic,
prospective, working, autobiographical, emotional, semantic, implicit, explicit, long-
term, short-term, and procedural memory [see 20].
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As a means of helping us understand these particular forms of cogni-
tion, it will help to view cognition from a number of different viewpoints,
perspectives or dimensions. Ultimately, such dimensions may serve as
the foundation for a conceptual framework that is able to accommodate
many of the cognitive kinds that appear in the contemporary cognitive
scientific literature. For the time being, however, we will limit our atten-
tion to just those dimensions that are relevant to the kinds of cognition
covered by the present review. These dimensions are as follows:
• Agent Nature: The nature of the agent that participates in
cognitive processing (e.g., human vs. machine cognition).
• Agent Cardinality: The number of agents involved in cognitive
processing (e.g., individual vs. collective cognition).
• Cognitive Domain: The domain over which cognitive processing
routines operate (e.g., social vs. mathematical cognition).
• Cognitive Mechanisms: The properties (including spatial lo-
cation and material composition) of the mechanisms that realize
cognitive processing (e.g., extended vs. embedded cognition).
As a means of introducing the specific forms of cognition that are
covered in the remainder of the review, it will be useful to examine
these dimensions in a little more detail.
2.3.1 Agent Nature
The nature of the agent that participates in cognitive processing is
perhaps the most straightforward way to understand cognitive kinds.
As mentioned above, biological criteria sometimes serve as the basis for
specialized forms of cognitive scientific effort, and this gives rise to forms
of cognition centered on particular species (or collections thereof). Much
of contemporary cognitive science is, of course, concerned with human
cognition (i.e., the kind of cognition exhibited by human agents). But
other kinds of cognition are also of significant interest. Prominent exam-
ples, in this respect, include avian cognition [86], primate cognition [506],
cephalopod cognition [137], and even plant cognition [73].
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In the present review, we will be concerned exclusively with human
cognition. We therefore seek to understand the points of contact between
Web Science and the realm of human cognitive processes. This does
not mean that other kinds of (agent-nature-oriented) cognition are
irrelevant to Web Science. To appreciate this, we need only reflect on
the growing importance of machine intelligence and machine learning
to the Web Science community [451, 452]. This particular kind of
cognition (i.e., machine cognition) is easily discerned once we direct
our attention to the nature of the agent that lies at the heart of some
episode of cognitive processing.
2.3.2 Agent Cardinality
In the attempt to understand the forces and factors responsible for
the genesis and organization of intelligent behavior, it is mostly the
behavior of individual agents (e.g., individual human subjects) that is
the primary focus of explanatory interest and attention. In addition
to these individual forms of cognition, however, cognitive science has
also been preoccupied with cognitive processes involving multiple in-
dividuals. Research in this area goes by a variety of names, such as
group cognition [497, 498, 499, 500], team cognition [128, 129], swarm
cognition [509], distributed cognition [240, 254, 510, 511], and collective
cognition [131, 460]. While the term “distributed cognition” is probably
the most familiar of these terms, we suggest that the term “collective
cognition” is the most appropriate way of referring to cognitive pro-
cesses involving multiple individuals. Collective cognition, on this view,
is an umbrella term that subsumes the notions of distributed, team,
group and swarm cognition (see Figure 2.2). It refers to situations in
which cognitive processing routines are distributed across multiple inde-
pendent (cognitive?) agents, irrespective of whether or not additional
(non-agential) resources (e.g., technological artefacts) are also involved
in the realization of the relevant cognitive processing routines.4 Relative
4In essence, collective cognition occurs when multiple individuals are involved
in cognitive processing routines. The result is that multiple individuals (and some-
times physical resources) are seen to be constitutive elements of a larger cognitive
organization or collective cognitive system.
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to this conceptualization, we can see group, team, swarm and distributed
cognition as specific forms of collective cognition (see Figure 2.2). For
the purposes of this review, these sub-types of collective cognition are
defined as follows:5
• Distributed Cognition: A form of collective cognition involving
(non-agential) artefactual resources in addition in agents. For the
most part, distributed cognitive systems can be thought of as socio-
technical systems that engage in collective cognitive processes,
e.g., collective problem-solving.
• Team Cognition: A form of collective cognition featuring rela-
tively high levels of entitativity.6
• Group Cognition: A form of collective cognition featuring rela-
tively low levels of entitativity.
• Swarm Cognition: A form of collective cognition in which the
relevant agents are typically eusocial insects, e.g., ants, bees,
termites, etc.
Discussions of collective cognition tend to go hand in hand with dis-
cussions of collective intelligence. In fact, each of the forms of collective
cognition discussed above can be coupled with a specific form of collec-
tive intelligence (Figure 2.2). In general, the term “collective intelligence”
is used to refer to the capacity of some collective (i.e., multi-agent)
organization to engage in intelligent processing or produce intelligent
outcomes [see 322]. In discussing the notion of distributed intelligence,
for example, Heylighen [238] suggests that distributed intelligence is the
5Three dimensions are relevant to the distinction between different kinds of
collective cognition. These include the entitativity of the agent collective (team vs.
group cognition), the extent to which inter-agent communication involves artefactual
mediation (distributed cognition), and the cognitive sophistication of the agents that
are involved in collective cognitive processing (swarm cognition).
6Entitativity refers to “the extent to which an assemblage of individuals is
perceived to be a group rather than an aggregation of independent, unrelated
individuals” [181, p. 15]. In the present context, the term is used to refer to the
cohesion of a group, i.e., the strength of the ties that link one member of an agent
collective to other members of the same collective.
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Figure 2.2: A number of forms of collective cognition have been discussed
within the philosophical and cognitive scientific literature. These include dis-
tributed [254], team [129], swarm [509] and group cognition [381, 474, 498]. A
number of forms of collective intelligence have also been discussed. These include
distributed [238], team [168], swarm [60, 272], and group intelligence [326]. Each of
these forms of collective intelligence is, we suggest, associated with a particular form
of collective cognition.
“ability to solve problems collaboratively, by integrating the contributions
from a broad assembly of human and technological agents” (p. 500).
In the context of the present review, we are concerned with both
individual and collective forms of cognition. Much of the review is
devoted to cognition of the individual variety; however, in Section 7
we turn our attention to collective cognition and examine why issues
of collective cognition and collective intelligence are of mutual inter-
est to members of the Web Science, cognitive science and philosophy
of mind communities.
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2.3.3 Cognitive Domain
In addition to looking at cognition from the standpoint of agent nature
and agent cardinality, we can also focus our attention on the domain of
cognitive processing—the kinds of things that cognition is about. From
this perspective, we are able to identify a number of forms of cognition,
including spatial cognition [147], metacognition [396], mathematical
cognition [74], temporal cognition [559], and social cognition [288]. What
is common to these forms of cognition is that they refer to cognitive
processing that is undertaken with respect to some domain of interest.
Spatial cognition, for example, refers to cognitive processes that deal
with the processing of spatial information and the generation of behavior
that is coordinated with respect to the spatial environment.
From the perspective of Web Science, social cognition is a form
of cognition that is of particular interest and relevance. As its name
suggests, social cognition refers to cognition that occurs in respect of
the spatial domain, e.g., the processing of information derived from
the social environment. In particular, social cognitive processes are
ones that operate over socially-relevant information, contributing to
our ability to make sense of social situations and the behavior of social
actors [218, 288]. In the context of the present review, the relevance of
such processes to Web Science is discussed in Section 6.7
2.3.4 Cognitive Mechanisms
The final dimension we wish to discuss relates to the nature of the
mechanisms that are responsible for cognitive processes (or, more gen-
erally, cognitive phenomena). There are two points of interest that
emerge in relation to such mechanisms. The first concerns the nature of
the material elements that make up (or comprise) a cognitive mecha-
nism. The second involves a philosophical distinction between what is
7Social cognition is, unfortunately, something that is apt to be confused with
the notion of collective cognition. Chi [91], for example, talks of the potential of the
Social Web to enhance the ability of groups to remember, think and reason, and
he glosses such enhancements as a form of “augmented social cognition.” In fact,
according to the approach adopted in the present review, what Chi is really talking
about here is a form of collective cognition, i.e., a form of cognition that involves the
participatory involvement of multiple human individuals.
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called constitutive mechanistic explanation and causal (or etiological)
mechanistic explanation. We will discuss each of these points in turn.
Turning first to the nature of the material elements that make up
a mechanism, it should be relatively clear that a significant chunk of
cognitive scientific work is concerned with the role of the biological
brain in realizing cognitive phenomena. Indeed, the attempt to un-
derstand the neural bases of cognitive processes can be seen as one
of the central features of disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience,
behavioral neuroscience, psychopharmacology and neuropsychology. For
these disciplines, the mechanisms of interest are, in most cases, neural
mechanisms—they are mechanisms that consist of the cellular elements
of the biological brain, i.e., neurons. It is these neural mechanisms that
serve as the basis for our (mechanistically-informed) understanding of
cognitive phenomena. For the sake of convenience, let us refer to this
particular form of cognition as neurocognition. Neurocognition is thus
the kind of cognition we encounter when the mechanisms that realize
a cognitive state or process are comprised of elements drawn solely
from the neurological realm.
Now, it might be thought that all forms of biological cognition are
also forms of neurocognition; for what else, other than neurons, could be
relevant to our understanding of the cognitive processes exhibited by (at
least) vertebrate species? In fact, one of the challenges to neurocognition
comes from research into what is called embodied cognition [433, 435].
Although there are a number of different views as to what is meant
by the term “embodied cognition,” a common feature of embodied
cognition research is the emphasis that is placed on extra-neural bodily
factors in shaping the course of cognitive processing [11, 433, 434].
Research into embodied cognition thus emphasizes the way in which
an organism’s bodily structure or physical actions help to constrain
(and sometimes constitute) cognition. A somewhat trivial example is
provided by the way in which the placement of an organism’s sensory
apparatus (the position of their eyes and ears) helps to structure the
incoming sensory array in ways that support perceptual processing [534].
Another example concerns the way in which dynamically evolving
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motor state variables can help to guide the expression of adaptive
behavioral responses [e.g., 336].
Of course, relative to our intuitions about the role of the biological
brain in realizing cognitive phenomena, the notion of embodied cognition
can appear unusual (and perhaps implausible). It should be noted,
however, that in its most general sense, the term “embodied cognition”
is simply a way of highlighting the relevance of extra-neural bodily
factors to cognitive phenomena. As is discussed below, there are at
least two ways of understanding this appeal to the relevance of bodily
factors: one contentious; the other, much less so. Let us refer to the more
contentious variety as strong embodied cognition and the less contentious
variety as weak embodied cognition.
Focusing first on the weaker form of embodied cognition, embodied
cognition theorists sometimes seek to highlight the causal significance
of bodily factors with respect to cognitive phenomena. In these cases,
the realization base for cognitive phenomena is still located in the
neurological realm. In other words, weak embodied cognition views
the body as a means to shape or influence the neural mechanisms
that realize cognitive phenomena. This is perhaps the best way of
approaching a particular strand of embodied cognition research that
emphasizes the role of the body in shaping the way we think about
the world. Lakoff and Johnson [292], for example, suggest that bodily
factors influence the structure of some of our most primitive concepts.
Linguistic expressions such as “I am on top of the situation,” “he is
under my control,” “she is the head of an organization,” and “I am facing
the future,” all seem to rely on spatially-oriented concepts that are tied
to the details of our physical embodiment. The body, in this case, is
clearly relevant to our understanding of the structure and organization
of the human conceptual economy; however, there is nothing particularly
radical about this claim. In fact, the claim that the body is exerting
a causal influence on neurally-realized cognitive processes need be no
more radical or contentious than the claim that a strong cup of coffee
influences cognition by affecting aspects of brain biochemistry.
The strong version of embodied cognition differs from its weaker
counterpart in insisting that extra-neural bodily elements are not just
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exerting a causal influence on cognitive mechanisms; instead, the claim
is that such elements are also constituent parts of such mechanisms.
The claim, in other words, is that the mechanisms that realize cognitive
phenomena include, as literal constituents, the material elements of the
extra-neural body. The cognitive mechanisms, in this case, are not solely
constituted by neural cells; instead, they extend beyond the neural realm
to encompass a range of other physiological resources. If all this sounds
highly implausible, it may help to consider the role of non-neural glial
cells in modifying aspects of brain function [15, 201, 362, 373, 387]. One
view of such cells is that they exert a causal influence on cognitively-
relevant neural mechanisms. But given the nature of the interaction
between glial and neural cells, is there any principled reason to think
that they could not (under any circumstances!) form part of the physical
fabric that realizes certain kinds of cognitive phenomena? This seems
unlikely, especially since the two cell types are relatively similar, at least
with respect to material criteria. But note that once we accept the basic
possibility of glial cells forming part of the mechanism that realizes
cognitively-relevant phenomena, then the neurocognitive spell is broken;
for we are now acknowledging that cognitive phenomena can be realized
by mechanisms that are not solely constituted by elements drawn from
the neural realm. And if we are prepared to accept the possibility of
hybrid cognitive mechanisms consisting of both neural cells and glial
cells, then why not go further and accept the possibility that other kinds
of non-neural corporeal resource might (under certain circumstances)
also form part of the mechanistic substrate that realizes cognitive
phenomena? This is the point at which issues of embodied cognition
start to align themselves with the theoretical and empirical interests of
Web Science. For the notion of a non-neural corporeal resource is not
something that applies solely to the realm of biological body parts (e.g.,
your left hand); it also applies to the realm of technological artefacts,
such as Web-enabled devices. Inasmuch as we allow for this possibility,
then it seems that Web-enabled devices (e.g., a smartphone) could form
part of the bodily platform that mediates our embodied, sensorimotor
engagements with the online world (see Section 3.3).
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Now let us turn to another point of interest when it comes to
cognitive mechanisms. This point relates to the notion of mechanistic
explanation and the distinction between constitutive and causal varieties
of mechanistic explanation. The first thing to note here is that when we
attempt to understand the mechanistic bases of cognitive phenomena,
we are adopting an explanatory approach that goes by the name of
mechanistic explanation. Essentially, what are trying to do is understand
how a cognitive process is realized by a set of material elements that work
together as part of an integrated mechanism. A useful characterization
of mechanistic explanation is provided by Bechtel and Richardson [36].
They suggest that:
By calling explanations mechanistic, we are highlighting
the fact that they treat the systems as producing a certain
behaviour in a manner analogous to that of machines. . . A
machine is a composite of interrelated parts. . . that are com-
bined in such a way that each contributes to producing a
behaviour of the system. A mechanistic explanation iden-
tifies these parts and their organization, showing how the
behaviour of the machine is a consequence of the parts
and their organization. [36, p. 17]
This notion of mechanistic explanation should be perfectly accept-
able to members of the scientific community; for mechanistic explana-
tions are a common feature of scientific practice [133, 134]. Whatever
the nature of the phenomenon that is the focus of scientific interest,
scientists are typically concerned with the discovery, delineation and
description of mechanisms. Indeed, in many cases, mechanistic expla-
nations lie at the heart of our scientific understanding of phenomena.
We do not, for example, proclaim to have a complete understanding of
biological memory until we have a grasp of the mechanisms that are
responsible for memory-related phenomena (e.g., the cellular processes
that mediate changes in synaptic strength).
Importantly, mechanistic explanations come in at least two vari-
eties: constitutive mechanistic explanations and causal (or etiological)
mechanistic explanations [266]. We have already touched on the distinc-
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tion between these two explanatory schemes in the earlier discussion
of embodied cognition. Recall that the distinction between the strong
and weak versions of embodied cognition turned on the kind of role
that non-neural bodily elements were seen to play with respect to the
neural mechanisms that realized cognitive phenomena. On the one hand,
bodily factors were seen to exert a causal influence on (neurally-realized)
mechanisms (i.e., weak embodied cognition); on the other hand, bodily
elements were seen to form part of the cognitive mechanisms them-
selves (i.e., strong embodied cognition). The critical difference between
these two forms of embodied cognition actually relates to the distinc-
tion between causal and constitutive relevance [132]. When an element
is seen to exert a causal influence on the operation of a mechanism,
it is deemed to be of causal relevance to the mechanism of interest,
and thus of causal relevance to the phenomenon that is the target of
mechanistically-oriented explanatory accounts. The result is that when
our explanatory focus is oriented towards factors of causal relevance,
the kind of mechanistic explanations that we develop are of the causal
or etiological variety (i.e., causal mechanistic explanations). Such expla-
nations seek to explicate the causal factors that influence the operation
of a mechanism, and they thus help to provide a better understanding of
the factors that causally influence phenomena. This kind of mechanistic
explanation is distinct from explanations that seek to describe the struc-
ture, organization and operation of mechanisms. In this case, we are
concerned with constitutive mechanistic explanations, i.e., explanations
that tell us how phenomena are linked to the elements that lie internal
to the mechanism. This is where issues of constitutive relevance come to
the fore: elements that are constitutively relevant to some phenomenon
of interest are ones that are components of the mechanism that realizes
the phenomenon of interest. These are the elements that are the focus
of interest for constitutive mechanistic explanations [see 132].
The distinction between constitutive and causal mechanistic ex-
planations (and constitutive and causal relevance) is useful when it
comes to understanding the nature of the philosophical fault lines that
separate the proponents of two prominent cognitive kinds: embedded
cognition [417, 418] and extended cognition [102, 108]. According to
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the proponents of extended cognition, cognition can sometimes extend
beyond the biological borders of the human individual to encompass (or
incorporate) resources drawn from the extra-organismic environment
(i.e., the environment that lies external to the traditional metabolic
boundaries of skin and skull). This is essentially a claim about the
constitutive relevance of resources that might not otherwise have been
deemed to form part of the realization base for cognitive phenomena.
At this point, it should be clear that the notion of extended cognition
bears a close resemblance to the strong version of embodied cognition
discussed above. Strong embodied cognition claims that elements of
the extra-neural corporeal environment are constitutively relevant to
cognition, and it thus invites us to consider the explanatory relevance of
the body from the standpoint of constitutive mechanistic explanations.
Something similar can be said about extended cognition. The only
notable difference is that extended cognition expands the scope of our
explanatory efforts to include elements that lie external to the biological
borders of the body. In both cases, we encounter a commitment to what
might be called extended cognitive mechanisms [see 163, 265, 268]. Such
mechanisms, if they exist, provide us with an extended view of cognition:
cognitive states and processes (or, more precisely, the mechanisms that
realize such states and processes) are seen to be materially-extended,
entangling all manner of extra-neural and extra-organismic resources
into complex time-variant nexuses of cognitively-relevant information
processing. The result, according to some theorists, is that the ma-
chinery of the mind is not confined (or at least not always confined)
to the intra-cranial realm:
. . . the actual local operations that realize certain forms of hu-
man cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-
forward, and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously
criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body, and world. The
local mechanisms of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the
head. Cognition leaks out into body and world. [102, p. xxviii]
A significant challenge to extended cognition comes in the form of
embedded cognition [417, 418]. The proponents of embedded cognition
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challenge the claim that the boundaries of cognition extend beyond
the traditional biological borders of the human agent. Extra-organismic
resources, they suggest, can influence cognitive processing in sometimes
deep and unexpected ways; however, they reject the claim that such
resources should be seen as intrinsic to the mechanisms that realize
cognitive states and processes. Although cognitive mechanisms can be
seen to depend on aspects of the external environment, extra-organismic
resources should, according to embedded cognition theorists, be seen
to be causally rather than constitutively linked to cognitive processes.
From the standpoint of embedded cognition, therefore, the machinery
of the human mind remains confined to the intra-cranial realm.
By now it should be clear that the difference between embedded
and extended cognition is linked to issues of causal and constitutive
relevance. In the case of embedded cognition, extra-organismic elements
are seen to exert a causal influence on cognitive processing, and they
are thus of causal relevance to cognitive phenomena. This, however,
does not make such elements part of the physical fabric (i.e., part of
the cognitive mechanism) that realizes cognitive phenomena. Extended
cognition, in contrast, views extra-organismic elements in a different way.
In this case, the extra-organismic elements are seen to be constitutively
relevant to cognitive phenomena. The result is that extended cognition
views extra-organismic resources as, on occasion, proper parts of the
mechanisms that realize cognitive phenomena.
This way of thinking about embedded and extended cognition is also
relevant to issues of embodied cognition. In particular, the distinction
between causal and constitutive relevance helps us view embodied
cognition from either an embedded or an extended perspective. From
an embedded perspective, for example, we can see a bodily element as
exerting a causal influence on neural processing. The bodily element, in
this case, is deemed to be causally relevant to cognitive processing, and
the result is an embedded form of embodied cognition, corresponding to
the weak version of embodied cognition discussed above (see Figure 2.3).
Alternatively, if we view things from an extended perspective, we can
see the bodily elements as forming an integral part of the mechanisms
that realize cognitive phenomena. The bodily element, in this case,
2.3. Varieties of Cognition 29
Corporeal  
Element 
Extra-Organismic 
Element 
Causal Relevance 
Embedded 
Embodied Cognition 
Embedded 
Cognition 
Constitutive 
Relevance 
Extended Embodied 
Cognition 
Extended Cognition 
Figure 2.3: A taxonomy of embedded, extended and embodied cognition, organized
with respect to two factors: the object that is the focus of explanatory attention
(corporeal vs. extra-organismic elements) and the explanatory relevance of the focal
object to cognitive phenomena (causal vs. constitutive relevance). The first factor
concerns the focus of explanatory attention—whether our attention is focused on
corporeal (i.e., bodily) elements or elements that lie external to the biological borders
of the human individual (i.e., extra-organismic elements). The second factor concerns
the extent to which the focus of our explanatory interest is causally or constitutively
relevant to the phenomena that we seek to explain. If our attention is focused
on (extra-neural) corporeal elements, and we think of the causal or constitutive
relevance of these elements to cognitive processing, then we get the embedded and
extended versions of embodied cognition. If, however, our attention is focused on
extra-organismic elements (i.e., elements that lie external to the biological borders
of the human individual), and we think of the causal or constitutive relevance of
these elements to cognitive processing, then we get the conventional (non-embodied)
forms of embedded cognition and extended cognition.
is constitutively relevant to cognitive processing, and the result is an
extended form of embodied cognition, corresponding to the strong
version of embodied cognition discussed above (see Figure 2.3).
In the context of the present review, the Web is discussed from the
perspective of embodied, extended and embedded cognition. Issues of
embodied cognition are discussed in Section 3. For the most part, the
focus of Section 3 is on the extended (or strong) version of embodied
cognition. Section 4 discusses the Web from the standpoint of extended
cognition. Here, we explore the extent to which the informational and
technological elements of the Web can be seen as part of the material
fabric that realizes cognitive phenomena. In other words, Section 4
explores the idea that the Web may, on occasion, be incorporated into
extended cognitive mechanisms. Finally, the implications of embedded
cognition for our understanding of human–Web interactions are explored
in Section 5. This section explores the ways in which the Web can be
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seen to exert a causal influence on cognitive phenomena. In this case,
there is no commitment to the idea that the Web is an intrinsic part of
the mechanisms that realize cognitive phenomena.
2.4 The Web as a Cognitive Ecology
Over the past several decades, the Web has emerged as an important
part of the material environment in which human cognition occurs. To
an ever-greater extent our cognitive and epistemic endeavors are shaped
by the nature of our interactions with the online (i.e., Web-based) world.
This view ties in nicely with what is known as an ecological approach
to cognition [see 27, 30, 256, 321, 361, 511]. One of the features of
this approach is the emphasis that is placed on cognitive ecosystems
(i.e., complex networks of material forces and factors that span brain,
body and world) as part of the attempt to explain and understand
human cognitive capabilities. Hutchins [256], for example, suggests
that our attempt to understand “cognitive phenomena must include a
consideration of the environments in which cognitive processes develop
and operate” (p. 706). From an ecological perspective, therefore, the
Web can be seen as part of the ecosystem for human cognition: it serves
as an increasingly important part of the material environment in which
an ever-expanding array of human cognitive and epistemic activities
are situated [see 460].
This sort of ecologically-oriented view of the Web is one that will
be adopted throughout the remainder of the review. Not only is such a
view the perfect conceptual partner to the various forms of cognition
we discuss in subsequent sections (i.e., embodied, extended, embedded,
social and collective cognition), it is also a view that helps to focus
attention on the nature of our interactions and engagements with the
online environment. In particular, an ecological approach enables us to
link Web-based forms of social participation with the notion of niche
construction [102, 293, 482]—an idea that potentially transforms our
understanding of the socio-technical origins and perhaps the ultimate
destiny of the human mind (see Section 8.5).
3
Embodied Cognition
At first sight, it might be thought that embodied cognition is of little
relevance to Web Science. Work in embodied cognition tends to focus
on situations in which we are actively engaged with the real world,
exploiting all manner of sensorimotor cues in order to realize intelligent
thought and action. The nature of our interaction with the Web seems
far removed from this sort of situation. Although we might be justified in
seeing the Web as an important part of the context in which cognition
occurs—part of the material backdrop against which our thoughts
and actions take shape—it is by no means clear that the details of
our physical embodiment really matter that much when it comes to
understanding the cognitive significance of the Web. As Canny and
Paulos [75] note, “cyberspace has been built on Cartesian ideals of
a metaphysical separation between mind and body: When we enter
cyberspace, even a 3D world, it is the ‘mind’ that enters. . . The body
stays outside” (p. 276).
This notion of the environmentally-decoupled and physically-disem-
bodied nature of our online interaction contrasts with the main thrust
of theoretical and empirical work in embodied cognitive science. In this
case, active, real-time engagement with the external world is a central
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element of the embodied cognitive science agenda. The result is that the
Web looks to be an unlikely focus of philosophical or scientific interest
for those adopting an embodied approach to cognition.
As we shall see, there are a number of reasons to doubt the integrity
of this rather pessimistic conclusion. The present section thus attempts
to highlight a number of points of contact between Web Science and
the science of embodied cognitive systems.
3.1 Embodied Interaction
One reason to think that the Web is relevant to embodied cognition
comes from the changing nature of our everyday interactions with the
Web. As is noted by Smart [449], the advent of mobile and portable
computing technology is progressively altering our sense of what it
means to engage with the online world. In place of conventional forms of
interaction, in which we interact with the Web via a browser interface
while seated at a desktop computer, it is increasingly common for us
to engage with the Web as part of our embodied interactions with
the wider physical environment. Mobile devices, such as smartphones,
thus enable us to interleave our interactions with the Web and the
‘real world’ in a manner that seems to blur the traditional distinction
between ‘oﬄine’ and ‘online’ modes of interaction [see 175, 177]. In
addition, as new kinds of Web-enabled device become available, so the
palette of physical actions and gestures that we use to interact with the
Web is expanding. Touchscreens have clearly played an important role,
here, with swiping and zooming emerging as more-or-less standard parts
of our gestural lexicon. Other kinds of interactivity aim to capitalize on
the way in which we typically interact with a common array of physical
artefacts and objects, helping to support various forms of embodied
interaction [see 150] with the online realm. These sorts of innovations
help to situate the Web at the heart of our everyday interactions with
the world, and they help to make the Web a potent source of interest
for those who approach cognition from an embodied perspective.
As a means of reinforcing this particular point, consider the at-
tempt of Matsumoto et al. [332] to develop a Web-enabled umbrella.
The umbrella features a variety of sensors—e.g., Global Positioning
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System (GPS), compass, accelerometer, etc.—and it is able to project
Web-based content directly into the user’s field of view by virtue of
a projection device focused on the underside of the umbrella canopy.
By providing the user with a range of interactive opportunities (e.g.,
the normal turning, dipping, and twisting actions that people perform
with umbrellas), and by also integrating information from a variety of
sensors and Web services, the umbrella is able to present a variety of
forms of context-relevant information that take into account both the
user’s physical location as well as their current interests and activities.
Interestingly, Matsumoto et al. [332] describe their work as part of an
effort to realize what they call the Embodied Web: a form of enhanced
interactivity in which natural embodied interactions are used to interact
with the Web and “make our experience in the real world more engaging
and active” [332, p. 49].
The introduction of mobile and portable computing devices thus
marks an important shift in the way we access the Web. The traditional
vision of online interaction is one in which we are sat in front of a desktop
computer, accessing the Web through a conventional browser-based
interface (such as Internet Explorer or Google Chrome). In these cases,
we are encouraged to see the flow of our thoughts as somewhat decoupled
from the ‘real world’, as occurring in response to remotely located
information resources, and as being largely unaffected by events in the
sensory periphery of the computer screen. This vision is not necessarily
incorrect; however, it is rapidly being superseded by a different vision—
one that situates the Web at the heart of an ever-expanding array
of everyday activities.
3.2 Shaping the Body
The technologies we use to access the Web influence the structure of
our physical actions. In order to access particular bodies of information
from the Web, we thus need to resort to a sequence of actions whose
topographic structure is, at least in part, determined by the properties
of the device that mediates our contact with the online world. There is
nothing particularly profound about this observation; for it should be
clear that the nature of our physical interactions with a desktop com-
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puter are not the same as those associated with the use of a smartphone.
When we think of the various ways in which we access the Web, we can
see the properties of our devices as enforcing (or at least promoting)
the adoption of different kinds of bodily structure. The resulting vision
is perhaps best captured by the metaphor of a lock and key. This sees
the process of accessing online information as a form of ‘unlocking’
activity—one in which we adjust our bodies (the key) so as to fit the
conformational constraints imposed by a physical device (the lock) in
order to gain access to the online world:
Lock-and-Key Metaphor
In retrieving information from the Web, the properties of
a device influence the shape of our physical actions. The
device can be thought of as a lock and the user’s body as a
key. Dynamic adjustments in the shape of the user’s body
are required to ‘fit’ the device in order to gain access to
online information.
The value of this metaphor is that it highlights the role of device-
related properties in altering our physical (bodily) actions as part of
our interactive engagements with the Web. Of course, such changes
in body-related parameters are precisely the sorts of things that em-
bodied cognitive scientists tend to be interested in. We see this in a
range of studies that focus on the relationship between bodily variables
and cognitive outcomes. When it comes to body posture, for example,
research has revealed that postural factors can influence the recall of
autobiographical memories [146] and alter subjective responses to task
performance [479]. It is also known that body posture can influence
psychosocial processes. In one study, for example, Huang et al. [247]
demonstrated that posture could influence the cognitive and behavioral
manifestations of power, with an expansive body posture increasing
one’s sense of power and activating associated action tendencies.
Facial expressions have also been the focus of considerable research
attention by the embodied cognitive science community. Particular
interest has been expressed in the facial feedback hypothesis [69]—the
idea that facial expressions play a role in regulating overt behavior, as
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well as aspects of subjective experience. Requiring subjects to furrow
their brow while performing a cognitive task, for example, increases
the perceived difficulty of the task [283, 479], and such manipulations
can alter the metacognitive processes associated with specific learning
experiences [283]. In accord with the facial feedback hypothesis, facial
expressions have also been implicated in various emotional responses.
In particular, interventions that alter the activation of specific facial
muscles have been shown to accentuate certain kinds of emotional
response [484]. The facial feedback hypothesis has also been invoked to
account for the anti-depressant efficacy of Botulinum toxin (BOTOX R©)
treatment [172, 320, 552]. Given that BOTOX R© administration reduces
the activation of certain facial muscles, the claim is that depressive
symptoms are alleviated as the result of a sustained inability to ‘express’
negative emotions (e.g., sadness).
Some of the most important findings regarding the relationship
between cognitive and corporeal variables have emerged in relation
to gesture. In particular, studies suggest that gesture may play an
important role in alleviating cognitive load and supporting learning [125,
126, 192, 193]. Children who gesture while learning a mathematical
concept are more likely to maintain what they have learned, as compared
to children who do not gesture [125]. The same appears to be true of
adults attempting to learn a foreign language [9]. Cook et al. [126]
also report that gesture plays a role in mnemonic processing, with
gesture at the encoding stage of a memory task boosting subsequent
retrieval performance. Crucially, these results are not limited to the
case of spontaneous gesture; they also occur with interventions that
are deliberately intended to influence gestural movements. Instructed
gesture thus yields the same sorts of cognitive benefits as those found
in the case of spontaneous gesture, and these benefits apply to a range
of cognitive processes, such as working memory [127, 388], mnemonic
recall [126] and learning [125].
At this point, it should be clear that the role of technology in
shaping the structure of our bodily responses is a topic of crucial
importance to embodied cognitive science. As we move from one device
(e.g., a desktop computer) to another (e.g., a smartphone), so our
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bodies must ‘contort’ to fit the modes of interaction afforded (and
sometimes mandated) by the device in question. In the light of the
empirical findings concerning posture, facial expression, and (perhaps
most importantly) gesture, we can now see that such conformational
adjustments in corporeal structure are likely to come with cognitive
consequences. This raises a host of issues for the Web Science community,
especially for those whose empirical interests are directed to the realm
of Human–Computer Interaction (HCI). One focus of research attention
relates to the cognitive consequences of using specific kinds of device
to access the Web. Does the transition from keyboard/mouse to multi-
touch screen, for example, affect cognitive performance as a result of
subtle shifts in (e.g.) mnemonic processing and/or the alleviation of
cognitive load? And what is the effect of enhanced ‘mobility’ on our
creative and communicative capabilities [see 529]?
Another line of enquiry relates to the design of future human–Web
interfaces. Can we structure our modes of interaction with the Web so as
to exploit body-mediated changes in cognitive performance? Something
along these lines is, in fact, proposed by Klemmer et al. [279] who see
issues of embodiment as helping to provide new directions for interaction
design. Some initial work by Segal [426] is also of interest here. Segal
reports on research that aims to explore the extent to which specific
‘gestural interfaces’ can be used to support cognitive processing. He
suggests that interfaces supporting the expression of certain gestures
can foster the use of representational and computational strategies that
are conducive to problem-solving success.1
3.3 Corporeal Extension
Another way of highlighting the theoretical and empirical significance
of embodied cognition to Web Science comes in the form of what
might be called corporeal extension. This is the idea that Web-enabled
1The role of technology in supporting productive shifts in psycho-affective well-
being is another line of research that is germane to the design of gestural interfaces.
Such work is inspired by research into the facial feedback hypothesis. The idea of
being forced to smile before one can use a technological device is one expression of
this sort of idea [see 357].
3.3. Corporeal Extension 37
devices may, on occasion, function as literal prosthetic extensions of
an individual’s biological body. Such a claim is, of course, likely to be
immediately rejected by those who insist that the notion of a ‘body’
is grounded in appeals to issues of material composition. It might be
claimed, for example, that the body is a biological entity and only
biological systems can be said to qualify as embodied systems.2 The
legitimacy of this view is called in question, however, as soon as we
consider the way in which a number of non-biological elements can serve
as replacements for conventional body parts. Consider, for example,
the way in which our intuitions about the centrality of bio-material
considerations are liable to shift once we reflect on the ‘corporeal’ status
of a variety of non-biological objects, such as tooth implants, prosthetic
limbs and cochlear implants. What seems to be important, in these
cases, is the way in which some object or set of objects mediates our
sensorimotor engagements with the world. Our ears therefore count as
part of our body because they assist with the transduction of certain
kinds of energetic fluctuation in the ambient environment; our legs count
as part of our body because of the way they service our locomotory
objectives; and our teeth count as part of our body because of the way
they enable us to physically prepare certain kinds of matter for the
processes of digestion and absorption.
Another reason to reject the idea that embodied cognitive science
should restrict its interests to the realm of biological bodies comes from
work in AI [see 93]. It thus seems that some of the core lessons and
ideas from embodied cognitive science are just as applicable to the
design of synthetic intelligent systems as they are to our understand-
ing of naturally-occurring (biological) systems. Consider, for example,
Clark’s [97] description of the can-collecting robot, Herbert. Clark de-
scribes how certain aspects of the robot’s bodily motion (in this case,
the rotation of the robot’s ‘torso’) works to achieve an appropriate
physical alignment between the robot and a target object—one that
helps to secure the success of subsequent reaching movements.
2See Ziemke [562] for an useful overview of the notion of embodiment, as well as
a discussion of the kinds of bodies are able to support embodied cognition.
38 Embodied Cognition
What, then, is the right way to think about the body? One answer
to this question comes from approaches that emphasize the functional
contribution of body parts in mediating our sensorimotor engagements
with the wider extra-corporeal environment [99, 101, 102]. Clark [101]
thus suggests that we should identify the body with whatever it is that
just so happens to serve as “the locus of willed action, the point of
sensorimotor confluence, the gateway to intelligent oﬄoading, and the
stable (though not permanently fixed) platform whose features and
relations can be relied upon in the computation of certain information-
processing solutions” (pp. 55–56). The claim, in essence, is that we
should identify the body with whatever it is that fulfils the functional
role typically played by the biological body in giving rise to intelligent
behavior. This leads to a functionally-oriented conception of the body—
one that is fully abstracted from issues of material implementation.3
Inasmuch as we accept a functionally-oriented approach to the body,
then it seems that our current arsenal of portable and mobile Web-
enabled devices are viable candidates for corporeal extension. In other
words, there seems to be no reason (at least in principle) why Web-
enabled devices should not count as candidate objects that play the role
of literal body parts. The crucial question, of course, is to what extent
such devices actually are apt for bodily incorporation. It has to be said
that very few empirical studies are available that deal directly with
this issue; what work is available tends to rely mostly on circumstantial
or anecdotal evidence. The mobile phone has probably been the focus
of most attention when it comes to issues of corporeal extension [407,
421]. Drain and Strong [151], for example, suggest that the smartphone
“. . . becomes incorporated within the assemblage of bodily appendages,
environmental features, and artifacts that we encounter in everyday
life, to the point where the phone can be considered as a prosthetic
3A functional approach to understanding the body is defended by Wheeler [544].
The advantage of such an approach, Wheeler suggests, is that it allows us to apply
the notion of embodied cognition to virtual agents, e.g., synthetic agents that exist
solely in the online environment. A similar idea surfaces in respect of recent work into
computational embodied cognition [468]. In this case, issues of embodied cognition are
explored using virtual 3D environments built on top of state-of-the-art computer game
engines. Such work builds on earlier work involving the use of virtual environments
for the purposes of artificial life research [440, 495].
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extension of ourselves” (p. 190). A number of studies have also revealed
that users often regard their mobile phones as extensions of their ‘self’ or
body [183, 371, 372]. Perhaps such results should not come as a surprise
given the way many individuals now relate to their mobile phones. To
an ever-greater extent the smartphone is an indispensable instrument
that enables the individual to negotiate the various social, cognitive and
epistemic challenges that they confront as part of their daily life [151,
353]. This is often reflected in the deep emotional attachments that
people have with their mobile devices [353]. As Vincent et al. [524] note
“for some people [their mobile device] has become almost an extension
of their body as they hold and fondle the device even when the device
is not in use” (p. 72).
There are a number of ways in which issues of corporeal extension
(especially as they relate to Web-enabled technologies) could be explored
in future scientific and philosophical work. These include, but are not
necessarily limited to, the following:
• Functional Properties: One option is to focus on the nature of
our interaction with Web-enabled devices and assess the extent
to which such forms of interaction satisfy the sort of functional
criteria alluded to by (e.g.) Clark [102]. These criteria emphasize
the functional role of a bio-external resource in mediating our
sensorimotor interactions with the world.
• Neurophysiological Changes: A second option is to explore
changes in brain activity using (e.g.) neuroimaging or electroen-
cephalographic (EEG) recording techniques [421]. Traditionally,
this has been the preferred approach for investigating tool-related
extensions to what is commonly referred to as the body schema [259].
The body schema, in this case, is “a suite of neural settings that
implicitly (and non-consciously) define a body in terms of its
capabilities for action, for example, by defining the extent of ‘near
space’ for action programs” [99, p. 272].
• Action Kinematics: Changes in the kinematics of action execu-
tion are another means of studying the mutability of the body
schema [77, 78]. Cardinali et al. [77], for example, show that the
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use of a tool induces changes in the kinematics of grasping and
pointing movements, in a manner that suggests changes in the
somatosensory representation of bodily properties. Interestingly,
the results of Cardinali et al. [77] point towards an enduring
change in the body schema: one that affects the dynamics of
sensorimotor processing even in the absence of the tool. Such
results point to something of an ‘after-effect’ or ‘capability echo’
concerning the impact that previously integrated tools have on
our action-related capabilities.
• Perceptual Changes: Finally, a number of studies have relied on
experimental techniques involving subjective changes in so-called
after-image phenomena [67, 79, 399]. This research is based on the
idea that the assimilation of a tool into the body schema can be
indexed by action-consistent changes in tool-related after-images.
A key assumption is that the after-image of a grasped tool should
fade from view if the tool is released from the hand and falls
to the floor.
The importance of future work in this area should not be underesti-
mated. If we accept that Web-enabled devices can function as literal
body parts—as prosthetic technological extensions that enable us to
sense, manipulate, exploit, and alter the online world—then they can
be seen as putting us in direct contact with the online environment
(just as our biological body mediates our access to the real, physical
environment). Technologies thus provide us with a means to extend the
boundaries of the embodied agent to the very ‘edge’ of the online world.
By virtue of the corporeal assimilation of Web-enabled technologies
and devices, we extend the reach of our perceptuo-motor capabilities,
and in doing so, we potentially transform the shape of the human
cognitive system [see 276].
3.4 The Wearable Web
Irrespective of whether or not we buy into the notion of corporeal
extension, there should be little doubt that the trend of technology de-
velopment is to yield devices that are able to establish ever-more intimate
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forms of contact with our sensorimotor surfaces. As is usefully pointed
out by Lynch [318], “we should not just concern ourselves with whether
our knowledge is extending ‘out’ to our devices; our devices are extending
in, and with them, possibly the information they bring” (p. 299, origi-
nal emphasis). Wearable technologies are, of course, the most obvious
example of these ‘inner-reaching’, intimate devices, with smartwatches
and activity trackers now widely available. Other forms of wearable
technology promise (or perhaps threaten) to encroach even further on
the biological body. Notable areas of research in this space includes work
on so-called artificial skin (or e-skin) devices [470, 556], wireless contact
lenses [307], smart fabrics [180], and neural implants [41, 42, 119].
The use of wearable technologies to track our bodily states and ac-
tions is one area where wearable technologies may be of crucial cognitive
significance. As wearable technologies become more sophisticated, so
they become more capable of sensing our physiological and behavioral
states, and this enables them to contextualize their modes of operation
to support cognitive processing. Many contemporary devices already
feature this kind of context sensitivity. For example, if we are located in
New York, and we wish to visit a particular museum, we can rely on the
GPS capabilities of our Web-enabled devices—an iPhone let’s say—to
contextualize information retrieval operations, and thus deliver infor-
mation that is likely to be of particular relevance to our task-specific
needs and concerns. One example of this sort of context sensitivity is de-
scribed by Hattori et al. [224]. They propose an activity-based approach
to information retrieval, in which information about a user’s location
and likely activities are used to refine search queries and contextualize
information retrieval operations.
In all likelihood, future wearable technologies will enable us to exploit
a far richer range of body-related cues and affordances than is possible
with today’s technology. This is important, because by monitoring body-
related information it becomes possible to deliver new forms of context
sensitivity. Consider, for example, work by Koriat and Nussinson [283] to
investigate the physiological correlates of the “feeling of knowing” [see
282]. They report that the tension of the corrugator muscle can be
used to detect the subjective experience we have when we feel we know
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something. Inasmuch as future devices are able to track physiological
signals that index a variety of epistemic feelings (such as the feeling of
knowing or the feeling of difficulty) [see 347], it is possible that future
technologies may be able to adaptively modify their modes of operation
to support human end-users with regard to a variety of cognitive- and
epistemically-relevant performances. In fact, something along these lines
is proposed by Kunze et al. [289]. They suggest that the use of mobile
sensing technologies portends an era in which technology will be able to
recognize and monitor various forms of cognitive activity, revolutionizing
our understanding of the factors that contribute to optimal cognitive
performance, as well as providing new ways for technology to shape and
support our cognitive routines.
3.5 Measurable Me
The use of technology to record or track information about individual
human subjects is a central element of work that goes under the heading
of the quantified-self [315, 492].4 This is a term that is used to refer to
any form of self-tracking activity, where the information that is tracked
is typically of a biological or behavioral nature. Current forms of self-
tracking thus include the recording of body weight, energy levels, time
usage, heart rate, body temperature, exercise patterns, sleep quality,
sexual activity, diet, dreams and blood chemistry (see Figure 3.1).
One of the implications of the quantified-self movement is that it
provides a greater degree of awareness regarding one’s bodily states
and processes. Self-tracking technologies are thus sometimes seen as a
means of creating a digital dashboard for the biological body, enabling
individuals to tap into a wealth of previously inaccessible data. Some
writers thus talk about self-tracking devices as supporting the emer-
gence of technological ‘exosenses’ that extend the reach of the body’s
sensory capabilities:
. . . the quantified self may become additionally transformed
into the extended exoself [i.e., a suite of exosenses] as data
4A variety of other terms are sometimes used to refer to the same phenomenon.
These include “lifelogging,” “measured me,” “self-tracking” and “self-surveillance.”
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Figure 3.1: A visualization of exercise and sleep data from the Fitbit App (source:
https://www.fitbit.com/uk/app).
quantification and self-tracking enable the development of
new sense capabilities that are not possible with ordinary
senses. The individual body becomes a more knowable, cal-
culable, and administrable object through QS [quantified-
self] activity, and individuals have an increasingly intimate
relationship with data as it mediates the experience of
reality. [492, p. 85]
The general idea, therefore, is that self-tracking affords a new way by
which body-related information can come to influence the course of cog-
nitive processing. In particular, by virtue of their ability to make body-
related information explicitly accessible and perceptible through other
senses, the vision of the quantified-self opens the door to forms of em-
bodied cognition in which issues of technological mediation are of central
significance. It has long been known, for example, that individual cogni-
tive and emotional responses can be shaped by feedback loops involving
physiological signals [e.g., 518]. In view of this, it seems entirely possible
that future technologies could play an important role in determining
the way in which our thoughts and actions (as well as the thoughts and
actions of others) are influenced by body-related information [see 262].
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Conceived of as a purely epistemological exercise—i.e., as a means of
getting to know the ‘self’—self-tracking appears to be a commendable
strategy. Indeed, the use of reliable technologies, coupled with the use of
cloud-based data analytic techniques and informative visualizations, is
an approach that is largely consistent with a number of views in main-
stream epistemology, most notably virtue reliabilism [203] and process
reliabilism [196]. There is, however, a concern with the way in which
self-surveillance provides the basis for a technological transformation
of the self. We thus encounter the idea that self-tracking gives rise to
another kind of self—a digital self: a self that is digitally created from
the various streams of data that emanate from the biological body. A
variety of other terms have been used to refer to this notion of a digital
self, including data doubles [316, 415], algorithmic identities [89] and
digital doppelgängers [58]. The idea, however, is roughly the same in all
cases: the use of tracking technologies creates a digital representation
that mirrors or reflects the properties of the original self (i.e., the self
of the self-tracker).
It might be thought that the digital self is merely a digital rendition
of information that is available via the standard, biologically-based
routes to self-related knowledge. It seems, however, that things are
not quite that simple. The digital self, it is sometimes claimed, reveals
‘hidden’ dimensions of the original self that might not otherwise be
available. Crucially, such dimensions are presented in a form that is
concrete, tangible and untainted by the vagaries of wishful thinking,
fallible memory. and cognitive bias. The result is a somewhat different
‘picture’ of the self. By virtue of numerical quantification and graphical
visualization, tracking technologies perhaps reveal something about the
‘real you’—they provide a window into the true self. In this sense, the
digital self perhaps becomes more ‘real’ than the original self: our sense
of who and what we are is transformed as a result of our attempts to
establish a computationally-mediated quantitative grip on the otherwise
unruly realms of cognitive, behavioral and physiological flux [see 58].
The result of all this is a complex vision of the relationship between
technology and the self. In particular, the self is seen to be something
that emerges from the complex forms of reciprocal influence that exist
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between the biological body and the surrounding technological envi-
ronment. As noted by Lupton [316], with the advent of a ‘self-tracking
culture’, “bodies, selves and data are entangled in the digitised self-
tracking experience” (p. 5). Interestingly, such claims resonate with the
views of philosophers and scientists who embrace an ‘extended’ (as in
the sense of extended cognition) approach to issues of agency and the
self [100, 103, 116, 232, 445].
A final point to note about the quantified-self movement is the
emphasis that is placed on issues of self-enhancement and performance
optimization. Issues of self-improvement are typically highlighted as
one of the main reasons why individuals participate in self-tracking
activities, and the quantified-self movement is often seen to provide
new opportunities for self-related optimization. Swan [492], for example,
suggests that:
Wearable electronics could facilitate automated self-tracking
as vast amounts of data are uploaded to the cloud for pro-
cessing by millions of agents (i.e., normal individuals) going
about their daily lives. The QS [quantified-self] data ecosys-
tem could include wearable electronics paired with mobile
phones and cloud-based big data services so that the individ-
ual’s continuous personal information climate could provide
real-time performance optimization suggestions. [492, p. 95]
Issues of self-improvement (in the context of the quantified-self
movement) are typically approached from the perspective of the so-
cial sciences. Lupton [315], for example, notes that the emphasis on
self-improvement tallies with neoliberalist narratives regarding the in-
dividual as a responsible citizen, willing and able to take care of their
own self-interest and welfare. In addition to the social science issues,
however, there are also a number of points of interest for both cognitive
science and the philosophy of mind. In particular, the role of social
and technological elements in supporting attempts at self-improvement
raises important questions about the material character of agency, self-
control and the will [100, 225, 378, 523]. In this respect, the sorts of
feedback provided by (e.g.) digital dashboards might be seen to play
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a crucial role in scaffolding our attempts at self-control, yielding im-
plicit and explicit forms of behavioral guidance that we cannot help
but heed. There is also a sense that in uploading information to the
Web, and making it available for public viewing, we are effectively
using the (online) social environment as a means to supplement, over-
ride, or perhaps even extend(!) the will [225, 378, 523]. As is noted
by Lanzing [298], “being aware of the fact that others monitor one’s
behavior adds another layer of externalized control and disciplining
power” (pp. 10–11, original emphasis).
3.6 The Quantified Cognizer
In addition to issues of self-knowledge, the quantified-self movement
also has implications for our understanding of human cognition. The
notion of the quantified-self thus lays the foundation for what might
be called the quantified cognizer : the idea that self-tracking activities
provide us with an important opportunity to monitor aspects of human
cognitive performance [289]. The value of such measures is typically
discussed in relation to the ability to combine or merge data from
multiple individuals. Consider, for example, the ability to monitor
attentional focus using contemporary eye tracking devices [260, 291]. As
noted by Kunze et al. [289], the use of such devices to derive aggregate
measures of attentional focus (i.e., measures of collective attention)
could be of practical significance in helping us understand the cognitive
impact of socially-shared resources:
Content creators could. . . leverage quantified ‘mind logs’ to
improve their works: Which part of a movie most excites
viewers? What feelings does a particular paragraph in a
book convey? At what point in a grant proposal does the
reader lose interest? [289, p. 108]
This introduces us to an issue that will be discussed in more detail in
Section 6.4. It concerns the use of the Web to glean information about the
cognitive responses of multiple individuals. The general idea is that the
nature of our engagements with the online environment provide insight
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into our cognitive states and processes, and these can be combined to
yield aggregate measures of collective or socio-cognitive processing. This
idea is clearly related to the (rather more direct) use of the Web to
further our scientific understanding of the human cognitive economy.
The Web thus provides a valuable opportunity to gather data about
the relationship between (e.g.) lifestyle factors (such as sleep patterns
and dietary habits) and aspects of cognitive performance. Cognitive
tracking apps, such as those marketed by Quantified Mind,5 provide
us with one example of how the Web can be used to gather cognitive
data. Another example is provided by computer gaming technology.
Sea Hero Quest, for instance, is a mobile computer game that aims to
gather information about the spatial cognitive abilities of both normal
and clinical human subject populations [359]. The recent use of this
game to assess the spatial abilities of over one million people [see 473]
highlights the potential value of the Web as a platform for studying the
human cognitive system.6
5http://www.quantified-mind.com/
6This use of the Web is not limited to the realm of individual-level cognition; it
can also be used to shed light on the forces and factors that govern the performance
of teams, groups and other multi-agent collectives [see 327].
4
Extended Cognition
Extended cognition refers to a particular form of cognition in which
the mechanisms responsible for cognitive phenomena are deemed to
extend beyond the neural realm. Work in this area tends to go by
a variety of names, such as locational externalism [547, 548], active
externalism [108], vehicle externalism [252, 413], environmentalism [412],
cognitive extension [102] and the extended mind [108]. What all of these
locutions have in common, however, is a commitment to the idea that
aspects of the external, extra-neural environment can, at certain times,
play a constitutive role in the material realization of the mind (or
aspects thereof) (see Section 2.3.4).
Issues of extended cognition and cognitive extension have been
a prominent focus of attention for philosophy of mind and cognitive
science [5, 102, 106, 340]. However, extended cognition is also a topic
that is of considerable interest to Web Science. This is reflected in
a wealth of work that has emerged in respect of Web-based forms of
cognitive extension [113, 214, 215, 229, 314, 447, 453, 454, 460, 475, 545].
One of the reasons extended cognition is important to Web Science is
because cognitive extension is seen to lie at the root of an important
form of cognitive enhancement for our species [102]. This makes the
48
4.1. Web-Extended Minds 49
Web a critical focus of attention for those who are concerned with issues
of cognitive performance and cognitive well-being [e.g., 81, 312, 448,
538]. Inasmuch as we accept the idea that the Web forms part of the
supervenience base for human mental states and process, then it is
clearly important that we understand the implications of the online
environment for our species-specific cognitive capabilities (both now
and in the future).
The current section focuses on a number of strands of work that have
emerged in relation to extended cognition and the Web. This is by no
means a complete survey; for the terrain in this part of the intellectual
landscape covers a bewildering array of topics and disciplines [see
454]. The areas of research reviewed in this section are those that
have proved to be some of the more popular targets of philosophical
and scientific attention.
4.1 Web-Extended Minds
The most explicit application of active externalist (or extended cog-
nitive) theorizing to the Web comes in the form of the Web-extended
mind hypothesis [447]. This is the idea that “the technological and
informational elements of the Web can (at least sometimes) serve as
part of the mechanistic substrate that realizes human mental states
and processes” [447, p. 447]. Inasmuch as we accept the core claim of
extended cognition—that the physical machinery of the mind can extend
beyond the bounds of the biological body—the Web-extended mind
hypothesis looks to be largely innocuous. Indeed, all the Web-extended
mind hypothesis aims to do is take the conventional notion of extended
cognition and apply it to the technological context of the Web. The
question, however, is whether the Web is able to support real-world
cases of extended cognizing. Are Web-extended forms of cognition a
practical possibility, or are they merely a topic of theoretical interest
and philosophical speculation?
One way of making progress on this issue is to refer to criteria
that have been developed to evaluate putative cases of extended cog-
nition. Perhaps the most well-known of these criteria (although by no
means the only ones) are those proposed by Clark and Chalmers [108]
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as part of their seminal work on the extended mind. The criteria in
question are informed by a classic thought experiment involving a
mnemonically-impaired individual, called Otto, and a conventional,
paper-based notebook. In presenting the thought experiment, Clark
and Chalmers [108] ask us to imagine two individuals: Inga and Otto,
both of whom are situated in New York City. Inga is a normal human
agent with all the usual cognitive competencies, but Otto suffers from
a mild form of dementia and is thus impaired when it comes to cer-
tain acts of information storage and recall. To attenuate the impact
of his impairment on his daily behavior, Otto relies on a conventional
notebook which he uses to store important pieces of information. Otto
is so reliant on the notebook and so accustomed to using it that he
carries the notebook with him wherever he goes and accesses the note-
book fluently and automatically whenever he needs to do so. Having
thus set the stage, Clark and Chalmers [108] ask us to imagine a case
where both Otto and Inga wish to visit the Museum of Modern Art to
see a particular exhibition. Inga thinks for a moment, recalls that the
museum is on 53rd street and then walks to the museum. It is clear
that in making this episode of behavior intelligible (or psychologically
transparent) to us Inga must have desired to enter the museum, and it
is clear that she walked to 53rd street because she believed that that
was where the museum was located. Obviously, Inga did not believe that
the museum was on 53rd street in an occurrent sense (i.e., she has not
spent her entire life consciously thinking about the museum’s location);
rather, she entertained the belief in a dispositional sense. Inga’s belief,
like perhaps many of her beliefs, was sitting in memory, waiting to be
accessed as and when needed.
Now consider the case of Otto. Otto hears about the exhibition,
decides to visit the museum, and then consults his notebook to retrieve
the museum’s location. The notebook says the museum is on 53rd street,
and so that is where Otto goes. Now, in accounting for Otto’s actions
we conclude, pretty much as we did for Inga, that Otto desired to go to
the museum and that he walked to 53rd street because that is where
he believed the museum was located. Obviously, Otto did not believe
that the museum was on 53rd street in an occurrent sense (Otto has
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not spent much of his life constantly looking at the particular page in
his notebook containing museum-related facts); rather, he entertained
the belief in a dispositional sense. Otto’s belief, like perhaps many
of his beliefs, was sitting in the notebook, waiting to be accessed as
and when needed.
Clark and Chalmers [108] argue that the case of Otto establishes
the case for a form of externalism about Otto’s states of dispositional
believing. The notebook, they argue, plays a role that is functionally
akin to the role played by Inga’s onboard bio-memory. If this is indeed
the case, then it seems to make sense to see the notebook as part
of the material supervenience base for some of Otto’s mental states,
specifically his states of dispositional belief (such as those involving
museum locations). The main point of the argument is to establish
a (potential) role for external artefacts in constituting the physical
machinery of at least some of our mental states and processes. If, as
Clark and Chalmers [108] argue, the functional contribution of an
external device is the same as that provided by some inner resource,
then it seems unreasonable to restrict the material mechanisms of the
mind to the inner, neural realm. It seems possible, at least in principle,
for the human mind to occasionally extend beyond the head and into
the external world.
As is noted by Clark [106], the aim of this particular thought
experiment was to:
. . . convince the reader that, under certain conditions, the
coarse functional role of a bio-external encoding could be
sufficiently similar to that of a persisting internal encoding as
to mandate similar treatment, revealing the non-biological
resource as part of the physical machinery underpinning
some of an agent’s genuine mental states. (p. 448)
As Clark and Chalmers are quick to note, however, not every form of
bio-technological or bio-artefactual coupling seems to invite treatment
in cognitive terms. “There would,” as Clark [96] suggests, “be little
value in an analysis that credited me with knowing all the facts in the
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Encyclopaedia Britannica just because I paid the monthly installments
and found space for it in my garage” (p. 217).
What, then, are the conditions under which we should count a
set of bio-external resources (such as Web resources) as proper parts
of the machinery of the mind? In answering this question, Clark and
Chalmers [108] proposed a set of criteria that have come to be known
as the trust-and-glue criteria [see 105]. The criteria, as presented by
Clark [105, p. 46], are as follows:
• “That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked.”
[Availability Criterion]
• “That any information thus retrieved [from the resource] be more
or less automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to
critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for example).
It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved
clearly from biological memory.” [Trust Criterion]
• “That information contained in the resource should be easily
accessible as and when required.” [Accessibility Criterion]
One way of evaluating the extent to which the Web is able to support
extended cognition is thus by reflecting on the kinds of interaction that
we currently have with the Web. We can then assess the extent to which
these kinds of interactive engagement comply with the requirements of
the trust-and-glue criteria. In the remainder of this section, we provide
an overview of the philosophical literature as it relates to the availability
and accessibility criteria; trust-related issues are covered in a separate
section (see Section 4.2).
The first of the trust-and-glue criteria relates to the availability of
a resource. According to this criterion, one of the things that makes a
bio-external resource apt for cognitive incorporation is the fact that it
is “reliably available” and “typically invoked.” This seems to suggest
that issues of portability and mobility are relevant to issues of cognitive
extension: the more portable something is, the better its candidacy for
cognitive incorporation. In this respect, the general thrust of technology
development seems to speak in favor of Web-based forms of cognitive
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extension [see 453]. This is because recent developments in mobile
computing provide ever-more convenient ways of accessing the online
environment. The portability of a smartphone, for example, is probably
not all that dissimilar to the notebook resource that features in the
classic Otto thought experiment [see 108]. Wearable devices may boast of
even greater levels of portability. Consider, for example, the portability
of a contemporary smartwatch, or the portability of future devices, such
as electronic skin devices [556] and smart fabrics [275]. Given that the
portability of such devices may begin to approximate the ‘portability’
of biological body parts, it seems increasingly likely that human Web
users will be able to enjoy reliable access to the online realm.
A potential problem with this upbeat assessment of the availability
criterion is that it ignores the power demands of mobile computing
devices. As Heersmink [228] usefully notes, “digital diaries embedded
in one’s smart phone, tablet, or other electronic device, in one sense,
provide less reliable access, because they are inaccessible without elec-
tricity. So one not only needs to remember to bring the device when
needed, but also to charge it when the battery is empty” (p. 586). In
response to this particular worry, it may be worth considering research
efforts that deal with issues of power consumption. This includes re-
search into energy harvesting techniques [383], inexact/approximate
computing techniques [219], novel forms of integrated circuit design [342]
and wireless power transfer capabilities [290]. Another line of enquiry
relates to the use of so-called backscattering techniques to yield battery-
free devices that are able to use existing radio waves as the basis for
wireless communication [198, 311].
Power and portability thus do not seem to represent much of a
problem when it comes to a consideration of the availability criterion.
There are, however, a number of other issues that are raised by the
availability criterion. Crucially, these issues only tend to come to light
when we seek to evaluate the availability criterion in the context of
debates about the Web-extended mind [454]. To help us gain some
insight into the nature of these issues, consider the claim that when
it comes to issues of availability, it is not so much the portability of
a resource that counts, as the fact that a resource is simply available
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whenever we need it to be so. This idea is captured by the notion of
dynamic reliability, which is discussed by Wheeler [543]:
What really matters is a property in relation to which porta-
bility makes a positive enabling contribution, but which
may be secured without portability. That property is some-
what difficult to specify precisely, but, roughly speaking, it
amounts to a kind of dynamic reliability in which access
to the externally located resource under consideration is,
for the most part, smooth and stable just when, and for
as long as, that resource is relevant to some aspect of our
ongoing activity. The qualifier ‘dynamic’ here reflects the
fact that. . . organism-centred hybrid systems. . . often persist
only when, and as long as, they are contextually relevant,
meaning that the external resources concerned need not be
smoothly and stably accessible at other times.
What Wheeler is suggesting here is that the continuous availability
of a resource need not be all that important. Instead, what matters is
the availability of a resource in a particular task context. To help us
understand this idea, imagine that your only means of accessing the
Web is via a desktop computer. Such a device is clearly not particularly
portable, or at least, it is not as portable as, say, a smartphone. But
what if you only need to perform a particular kind of task when you
are actually seated in front of the computer? Does it really matter that
the computer is not particularly portable, given the fact that it does
permit access to the online realm whenever you need it to do so?
Another issue concerns the meaning of the term “resource” in the
availability criterion. Note that when we focus our attention on the Web
(or Internet), we are forced to recognize a distinction between a physical
resource (e.g., a notebook or a smartphone) and the information that
is made available as a result of interacting with that resource. In the
original Otto (notebook) case, this distinction is of nugatory significance,
because the relevant information is stored within the notebook. As a
result, wherever the notebook goes the information is sure to follow.
This, however, is not the case with a smartphone or wearable computing
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device. In this case, the technological device could be readily available
(and thus meet the availability criterion), but it could still fail to provide
access to the relevant body of online information in certain situations
(as when the networking capabilities of the device are disabled).
What this shows is that issues of availability in a Web-extended
mind context are perhaps a little more complicated than we might have
thought. In particular, when it comes to issues of cognitive extension,
what seems to count is not the availability of a physical resource, such
as a notebook or a smartphone; instead what counts is the availability
of the information that is made available by the resource. This, however,
yields a couple of problems. The first is that the availability criterion is
in danger of being redundant. This is because the accessibility criterion
already presupposes the availability of the target body of information—
as long as some body of online information is sufficiently accessible,
why concern ourselves with availability-related issues? The second (not
altogether unrelated) problem is that exactly the same body of online
information could be accessed via different devices in different contexts.
In view of this, why should the properties of a particular device really
matter that much, given that it is the availability of the information
that really counts? We might, for example, access a particular body of
online information via a desktop computer in the home environment,
and then access the same body of information using a smartphone while
on the move. The fact that one device is portable and the other is
not does not seem to be of particular interest or relevance here. Much
the same could be said for the appeal to typical invocation that also
features as part of the availability criterion (see above). Given that the
availability of online information may be unaffected by the fact that
different devices are used on an occasional basis (at different times and
in different places), why should we commit ourselves to the idea that
typical invocation is of particular interest or relevance when it comes
to Web-based forms of cognitive extension?
Enough has probably been said about the availability criterion at
this point. Time, then, to turn our attention to the accessibility criterion.
In an extended mind context, issues of accessibility have proved to
be something of a divisive issue. Ludwig [314], for example, suggests
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that we can think of Wikipedia as extending our body of beliefs and
knowledge as a result of the access it provides to specific kinds of
information. Smart [447, 453] disputes this. He suggests that typical
forms of browser-based access to Wikipedia undermine the extent to
which we can talk of Wikipedia as an extended mind resource. There
is a sense, of course, in which Wikipedia (qua encyclopedic resource)
does enhance the accessibility of information. Compared to a paper-
based version of the Encyclopedia Britannica, for instance, there can
be little doubt that Wikipedia does provide improved access to certain
kinds of information. In spite of this, however, the average HTML-
rendered Wikipedia article is a veritable cornucopia of information,
and the task of extracting relevant information from the article is
one that requires considerable time and effort. Such temporal and
energetic costs seem to count against the idea that Wikipedia content
is accessible, at least insofar as our concerns relate to the demands of
the accessibility criterion.
It is at this point that we encounter an appeal to the representational
formats countenanced by the Semantic Web [46, 430] and linked data [53,
54, 226] communities. Alongside the familiar approach to representing
online content in the form of HTML documents, there has been a
recent attempt to move towards a more data-centric vision of the
Web—one which emphasizes the role of the Web in providing access to
globally-distributed bodies of machine-readable information [53, 226,
553]. Crucially, the representational formats that feature as part of this
ongoing effort are ones that promise to transform the nature of our
informational (and perhaps cognitive) contact with the Web. Linked
data resources are thus able to serve as a back-end repository for all-
manner of data-driven apps and services, many of which can be tailored
to provide easy access to specific bodies of information content. To help
us see this, contrast the way in which information is represented in
Wikipedia—a system primarily designed for human consumption—with
the approach taken by DBpedia [17, 55]. What DBpedia aims to do is
represent a subset of the information content of Wikipedia in a form
that is much more amenable to machine-based processing. DBpedia
thus relies on the use of representational frameworks, such as Resource
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Figure 4.1: A screenshot of the mSpace Browser applied to the domain of classical
music (source: http://research.mspace.fm/projects/musicspace).
Description Framework (RDF), to create an interlinked network of
information and data items, where the links represent semantically
significant relationships between the data items. The advantage of this
alternative representational scheme is that it effectively transforms
Wikipedia into something of a structured ‘database’, improving the
accessibility of specific items and supporting the flexible recombination
of data items in particular task contexts. By itself, of course, this is
unlikely to be of much use to a human agent: navigating a vast nexus
of cryptically-encoded data items is hardly likely to be any easier than
scrolling through endless reams of textual content on Wikipedia. But
the benefits of DBpedia come into sharper focus once we consider the
(many) ways in which the data can be used to support new forms of
user interaction and information visualization [see 51].
One example of the benefits of data-centric representational formats
is provided by schraefel et al. [424]. schraefel et al. describe a specific
tool, called the mSpace Browser, which pulls together a variety of
interaction and visualization techniques to provide rapid access to a wide
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variety of heterogeneous sources in one persistent view (see Figure 4.1).
Besides providing in-context information about any selected element
in the domain, the mSpace Browser allows a user to manipulate the
relationships that apply to elements within that domain, enabling them
to easily reorganize and retrieve information as a means of addressing
specific information requirements.
Data-centric representations not only provide us with novel ways of
accessing online information, they also open up a wealth of opportunities
to develop various forms of assistive intelligence. In order to help us
see this, think about the way in which a body of semantically-enriched
online data [see 430] might be exploited by a speech-enabled intelligent
assistant, such as Apple’s Siri or Microsoft’s Cortana. Suppose that the
body of data being exploited relates to the birth dates of significant
historical figures. Given that the data is both machine-readable and
annotated in ways that support various forms of (semantically-enabled)
search and reasoning, it now becomes possible to initiate new kinds of
epistemically-potent interaction with a conversationally-enabled digital
companion. You can thus ask Siri questions such as: “When was Charles
Darwin born?” Almost immediately, you will hear the response: “Charles
Darwin was born the 12th February 1809.” This mode of information
access, it should be clear, is both easier and much more efficient than
relying on browser-based access to Wikipedia.
The general idea, then, is that the move to data-centric representa-
tions opens up a range of opportunities for Web-based resources to be
incorporated into cognitive processing routines [447, 453]. The present
discussion also helps to highlight an important principle: when it comes
to issues of cognitive extension, we should not restrict our attention to
one particular kind of informational resource (e.g., conventional HTML
Web pages). Different resources will, in general, yield profoundly differ-
ent kinds of interactive relationship between the human cognizer and
the online world, and this calls for a much more nuanced and refined
view concerning the kinds of cognitive contact we have with the Web.
In general, blanket statements that talk of the Web (in a general sense)
as either supporting or not supporting extended cognition lack the sort
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of precision that is required for them to be of genuine philosophical or
cognitive scientific value.1
4.2 Trusting The Web
Of all the trust-and-glue criteria, the trust criterion has proved to be
the most problematic for the Web-extended mind hypothesis [403, 453,
454]. According to the original trust criterion, in order for something
to count as a constituent element of an individual’s cognitive economy,
it should be “more or less automatically endorsed” and “deemed [to
be] about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological
memory” [105, p. 46]. This is often seen to present a problem for
Web-based forms of cognitive extension, since the information that is
retrieved from the Web is seldom information that we ourselves have
curated. The result, it seems, is that we are seldom, if ever, presented
with a situation in which online information can be trusted to the same
extent as information retrieved from biological memory. It is for this
reason that Clark [105] expresses doubt about the suitability of (at least
some) Web-based resources for cognitive incorporation. Mobile access
to Google, he suggests, does not count as a form of cognitive extension
precisely because it violates the trust criterion.
The first thing to say about all of this is that it hazardous (to say
the least) to make assumptions about the way Web users approach
online information in the absence of any sort of empirical evidence. The
fact that online information exists in a public and contested space [see
481] is not sufficient, by itself, to warrant conclusions regarding the
extent to which we trust (or do not trust) online information. This
is, in fact, something that is explicitly acknowledged by Clark [105].
The important question is thus not whether online information ought
to be trusted (i.e., whether it is trustworthy); instead, the question
is whether online information is trusted. This, it should be clear, is a
question that can only be resolved on the basis of empirical research.
In fact, a variety of strands of evidence suggest that Web users seldom
1This also applies to work of a more general nature, such as work that seeks to
understand the effect of the Web on cognitive performance [81, 333].
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subject online information to critical scrutiny. Rather than engage in
the meticulous evaluation of online information, Web users tend to
rely on factors such as Web site design and navigability in forming
credibility judgements [178, 179, 344]. Other kinds of cues, such as
the number of followers a user has on Twitter, also tend to influence
credibility judgements [541].
A second point to note about the trust criterion is that even if
it could be shown that Web users do distrust the majority of online
information, it is far from clear that the Web is congenitally unable
to meet the demands of the trust criterion. Trust-related worries tend
to be grounded in the fact that we do not have sufficient control over
Web-accessible information. In other words, the concern is that online
information is typically contributed by other users and is (perhaps)
subject to communal editing efforts. But not all online information needs
to be of this sort. Personal data stores [520] and private cloud computing
repositories [202] illustrate some of the ways in which the Web may be
used to establish something of a personal information ecosystem—one
that provides access to carefully curated bodies of previously endorsed
information. It is far from clear that such information is at risk of
violating the trust criterion, at least to the same extent as information
available on the ‘open’ Web.
Following on from the previous point, it is surely possible to imagine
situations in which Web-based content was presented to a user in such a
way as to avoid concerns about active scrutiny and automatic endorse-
ment (the core concerns targeted by the trust criterion). Information
could, for example, be presented to a user in a subliminal manner,
thereby avoiding the route through conscious awareness [140]. Of partic-
ular interest, in this respect, is work relating to subliminal perception
in human–machine interaction contexts [360]. As is noted by Negri et
al. [360], subliminal stimuli can be used in concrete scenarios to bolster
performance on mnemonic, problem solving, and navigational tasks.
The third, and final, point about the trust criterion relates to its
validity. Should we accept the degree to which the trust criterion holds
sway over our attempts to adjudicate the authenticity of putative cases of
cognitive extension? One reason for scepticism, in this respect, concerns
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the extent to which issues of automatic endorsement apply to the realm
of inner (i.e., brain-based) information flows. When it comes to memory,
for example, Michaelian [346] questions the extent to which mnemonic
information is immune to evaluative assessment:
. . . due to the constructive character of encoding, consoli-
dation, and retrieval, [mnemonic] records are not endorsed
automatically upon retrieval—metamemory processes rather
intervene to determine [the] endorsement/rejection of re-
trieved records. . . [346, p. 1156].
Michaelian uses this to cast doubt on the extent to which bio-external
information can be regarded as a form of extended memory. However,
the absence of automatic endorsement in the case of biologically-based
memory could also be seen as undermining the legitimacy of the trust
criterion. For why should we insist on automatic endorsement in the case
of world-involving information flows, when such forms of endorsement
do not appear to jeopardize the cognitive status of information flows
in the inner, neural realm? Just to reinforce this particular point, it
may help to reflect on situations where recall occurs in high-stakes
situations. Imagine, for example, that you need to retrieve informa-
tion from memory in order to make a critical decision—one where
human lives are at stake. Even if you recalled the information with ease
and believed the information to be true, would you not be inclined to
check the veracity of the information by engaging in a form of ‘active
scrutiny’, checking the information with respect to other (internal and
external) sources of information? Does the fact that you are under-
standably circumspect about the retrieved information, in this situation,
undermine the cognitive status of the processes that ‘served up’ the
information? The answer to this is surely a resounding no. Given that
we do not doubt the cognitive status of our biological memory simply
because its informational deliverances are, in certain situations, subject
to critical scrutiny, perhaps we should resist the urge to accord a signif-
icance role to active scrutiny and conscious evaluation in determining
whether some bio-external resource counts as a bona fide element of an
individual’s cognitive machinery.
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Setting aside the specific details of the trust criterion, it is worth
noting that issues of trust have a more general relevance to debates
about the cognitive and epistemic impacts of the Web. One example
of this comes from the epistemological literature. In particular, the
extent to which information on the Web is of sufficient quality as
to promote an overall elevation in our epistemic standing is an issue
that has attracted the attention of the epistemological community [56,
314, 403]. Much of the debate centers on the extent to which the
consumers of online content can trust the information they retrieve
from the online realm. Record and Miller [403], for instance, note
that it is incumbent on the users of smartphone devices to scrutinize
the information they receive from those devices. They proclaim that
smartphone users “implicitly trust their devices,” but they question the
extent to which this trust is warranted. There is surely something right
about this. In a “post-truth” era dominated by “false facts” and “fake
news,” it seems that blind faith in the veracity of online information
is unlikely to be a recipe for epistemic success. The result, according
to Record and Miller, is that we are duty-bound to be suspicious of
online content. Inasmuch as we accept that automatic endorsement
is a precondition for cognitive extension, then it seems that the Web-
extended agent is obliged to abstain from actions that are necessary to
ensure the veritistic integrity of their doxastic system. The upshot is
that in order to satisfy the trust criterion, Web users are required to
forsake their duties as responsible epistemic agents.
It is not our aim, in the context of the present review, to contest
the views of Record and Miller [403]; it is, however, worth noting that
the trustworthiness of online information is a common focus of interest
for the philosophy of mind, epistemology and Web Science communities.
Indeed trust is one of the core topics that lies at the heart of the
Web Science research agenda [188], and considerable effort is being
invested in the development of techniques that can be used to assess the
veracity of online information and improve its overall trustworthiness.
It is here, perhaps, that we might be inclined to question the claims of
Record, Miller and others. In particular, it is not always clear that the
reliability of information is always undermined as a result of its being
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located in a public and contested space. Indeed, there are occasions
when the activities of others can help to indicate the reliability of
online information [see 494]. Smart and Shadbolt [465] thus talk of
the socio-technical construction of reliability indicators that can be
used to guide epistemic evaluations [see also 39]. Something similar
emerges in relation to work by Westerman et al. [541]. They show how
system-generated cues (e.g., information about the number of Twitter
followers associated with a user account) can be used to guide credibility
judgements. Whether such credibility judgements are valid or not is, of
course, another matter; but what matters for present purposes is simply
the idea that communal access to information may provide opportunities
for the socially-mediated epistemic evaluation of information content.
Rather than seeing the social nature of the Web as a threat to positive
epistemic standing, it may be that such properties help to assist the
responsible, truth-seeking agent with regard to the epistemic vetting of
Web-based information content.
As a means of further pressing this point about the epistemic utility
of public access to socially-shared information, it may help to draw a
parallel between online information and the information provided by
road traffic signs. We uncritically endorse the information provided
by road signs because the information is, in general, true. But part
of the reason why these road signs are reliable is surely down to the
fact that lots of people depend on them. It is, in other words, issues
of social dependence that determine the continued reliability of the
road signs. This does not, of course, mean that road signs are immune
to vandalism. But given the role that road signs play in coordinating
social behavior, we can at least be sure that considerable attention
will be devoted to monitoring their integrity. At the very least, the
chaos ensuing from any errors should suffice to arouse suspicion that
something has gone awry, and thus lead to some form of remedial action.
When it comes to the realm of road signs, therefore, we can see the
necessary epistemic safeguards as, in some sense, built-in features of
the larger socio-technical system. As more and more people come to
rely on a particular information resource, so there is a greater need to
ensure that any errors in the resource are quickly resolved. In these
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cases, the resources are reliable precisely because they exist in a socially-
shared space, not in spite of it. The general idea, then, is that far from
undermining the trustworthiness of online information, public spaces
can sometimes play an important role in ensuring the reliability of
the information that is contained within them. The persuasive force
of this argument is, of course, tied to issues of social penetration and
social dependence. In particular, it is important that some information
resource plays a critical role in ensuring the proper functioning of a social
system. It might be thought that this serves to limit the applicability
of the foregoing argument to the Web. However, the Web is a system
that plays an increasingly important role in society, serving as a form
of critical infrastructure for a broad array of social processes. As our
dependence on this system increases, is there any reason to think that
the reliability of (at least some parts) of the online realm will not match
those of other resources that play a crucial role in ensuring the continued
functioning of various forms of social machinery?
4.3 Dimensions of Cognitive Integration
In addition to the trust-and-glue criteria, there is another way of evalu-
ating the Web-extended mind hypothesis. This approach comes in the
form of the multidimensional framework proposed by Heersmink [228].
Heersmink suggests that cognitive incorporation—the integration of
bio-external resources into an agent’s cognitive processing routines—can
be evaluated with respect to a number of dimensions (see Table 4.1).
In a Web-based context, these dimensions relate to the nature of the
information flow between a human agent and some online resource, the
accessibility of online information, the durability of human–Web cou-
plings, the amount of trust a user puts into online information, the ease
with which online information can be interpreted, and so on. According
to Heersmink, “[t]he higher a situated system scores on the proposed di-
mensions, the more functional integration occurs, and the more tightly
coupled the system is” [228, p. 577]. In essence, when it comes to
Web-based forms of cognitive extension, we can use Heersmink’s mul-
tidimensional framework to evaluate the extent to which some form
of agent–Web coupling should be seen as a genuine case of extended
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Table 4.1: Dimensions of integration in Heersmink’s [228] multidimensional approach
to the evaluation of extended cognitive systems.
Dimension Description
Information
Flow
The dynamics of the information flow between an
agent and a resource: one-way, two-way or
reciprocal.
Reliability The extent to which a resource is likely to be
available.
Durability The duration of the relationship between agent
and resource.
Trust The extent to which a resource is trusted by the
agent.
Procedural
Transparency
The ease with which a resource is exploited,
often indicated by the degree of automaticity
associated with the use of a resource.
Informational
Transparency
The ease with which an agent can interpret and
understand the information delivered by a
resource.
Individualization The extent to which the properties of a resource
are tailored to suit the cognitive requirements of
a given individual.
Transformation The extent to which the representation and
computational capabilities of the human
cognitive system are transformed as a result of
informational contact with the resource.
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cognizing. In this case, the higher the rating that is achieved on each of
the dimensions, the denser the integration between agent and online
information, and thus the more likely that the online information is of
constitutive relevance to an agent’s cognitive states and processes.
Although the multidimensional framework has been applied to a
number of computing technologies, including smartphone devices [248],
it has not been used to examine the nature of our interactive engage-
ments with the contemporary Web. As a means of addressing this
shortcoming, we can apply the framework to the resources that were
discussed in relation to the accessibility criterion (see above). These
include a paper-based encyclopedia, Wikipedia, DBpedia, and Siri.
Figure 4.2 shows the results of an informal analysis that applies the
multidimensional framework to these resources (or at least the kinds of
interactive engagement that are typically supported by these resources).
As is clear from Figure 4.2, each resource is associated with a
distinct distribution of scores across each of the dimensions of the
multidimensional framework. As a means of quantifying these differences,
we can calculate what is called the Cognitive Incorporation Quotient
(CIQ) for each resource. The CIQ, in this case, is a measure of the
relative degree of cognitive integration/incorporation for each resource,
which is calculated as the average of the normalized scores for each of
the dimensions in the multidimensional framework. Based on the results
of the present analysis (see Figure 4.2), it appears that DBpedia and
Siri have the highest CIQs. This suggests that these resources provide
relatively greater opportunities for cognitive incorporation, as compared
to the case of browser-based access to Wikipedia and conventional access
to a paper-based encyclopedia.
This is, of course, an informal analysis whose primary purpose
is to illustrate the use of the multidimensional framework. It is thus
not intended to support definitive conclusions regarding the ‘extended’
status of specific resources. In spite of this, the analysis helps to reinforce
an earlier point about the dangers of blanket statements regarding the
suitability of the Web as a target for cognitive incorporation. Consider,
for example, that in using Wikipedia, Siri, and a DBpedia-coupled
mSpace browser, we may be accessing the same (or at least very similar)
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Highcharts.com(a) Paper-based encyclopedia.
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Highcharts.com(b) Wikipedia (via Web browser).
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Highcharts.com(d) Conversational agent (e.g., Siri).
Figure 4.2: A comparison of different information resources using the multidimen-
sional framework proposed by Heersmink [228]. [CIQ scores: Encyclopedia: 0.36;
Wikipedia: 0.48; DBpedia: 0.64; Conversational Agent: 0.64]
bodies of information. The facts that serve as the target of interest
for the extended mind theorist (e.g., Charles Darwin’s date of birth)
may thus be contained in (or at least originate from) a common data
source (e.g., the database associated with the Wikipedia system). What
seems crucial, therefore, is the mode of access we have with some Web-
accessible body of information, not the actual source of the information.
This is clearly something that will depend on the nature of the devices
and applications that are used to interact with the Web, and it is thus
difficult (if not impossible) to state that some specific body of online
information is apt for cognitive incorporation. It is for this reason that
we caution against the use of blanket statements to the effect that the
Web is (or is not) suitably poised to support cognitive extension. This
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issue is not one that can be answered with any degree of philosophical
precision in the absence of a detailed understanding of the specific
ways in which human users interact with the online realm. Additional
caution is required when it comes to the analysis of specific systems. In
the case of Wikipedia, for example, it might be tempting to conclude
that Wikipedia is unable to support cognitive extension on account
of (e.g.) the accessibility of specific items of information (see above).
The problem with this conclusion is that it is likely to be based on a
particular way of accessing Wikipedia (no doubt one involving the use
of Web browser technology). Given that whatever it is that is picked
out by the term “Wikipedia” is distinct from our ways of accessing
Wikipedia content, we are unlikely to be in a position to make general
claims about the status of Wikipedia as an online resource that is (or
is not) apt to support cognitive extension.
4.4 Extended Memory
The field of memory has become the crucible where many issues discussed
in this section have been thrashed out or have reached their highest
point of theoretical development. Many authors have discussed memory
as a sort of proxy for the broader arguments about the validity and
application of the extended mind [105, 418, 491], and in the form of E-
Memory (electronic or digital memory technologies), it has been widely
discussed as one of the main ways that the Web may extend the mind.
One reason for this focus is that new memory technology appears
to be ubiquitous, and it is rapidly colonizing the cognitive niche largely
vacated by paper-based media. From explicit external memory appli-
cations such as Evernote, to the general trend toward high capacity
cameras and voice recording applications embedded in smartphones and
tablets, to the still nascent trend toward wearable devices such as Google
Glass, the world is becoming permeated with a host of technologies,
all of which can encode, store and increasingly allow us to dynamically
retrieve and organize memory traces.
Another reason is that mnemonic technology has a long history [148]
and already is deeply incorporated in human cognitive ecologies. Knots
in string, clay tablets, scrolls, codices, libraries and digital databases:
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all can act as what Donald called exograms, i.e., artefactually based
memory stores external to the body and brain (internally stored memory
traces are what he calls engrams). The development of the human
mind can be seen to march in step with the development of such
technologies and may be directly implied in the development of new
cognitive capacities [208, 321, 525]. Capstone technologies such as
writing hold in place much of our civilization and give shape to the
sorts of minds we possess and the sorts of beings we are [374], although
these can and do undergo radical reshaping [112].
Donald [148] notes that one deep historical tendency in mnemonic
technology is to externalize at least part of the memory processes from
those flexible, labile but relatively interpenetrative ones natural to our
brains, toward those that make use of the more durable and manipulable
affordances of external objects, from clay tablets, to the printing press,
to digital records. Donald argued it is through these extended memory
technologies that our specifically human forms of memory can arise. But
crucially, due to its historical nature, human memory is not fixed but
can be reshaped and transformed as we create, appropriate and incor-
porate new regimes of mnemonic technology. Sutton’s complementarity
principle affirms that in extended cognitive systems, “external states
and processes need not mimic or replicate the formats, dynamics or
functions of inner states or processes” [491, p. 194]. Instead, we tend to
deeply incorporate cognitive technology precisely when it makes avail-
able cognitive properties not found in our existing array of biological
and technical memory systems.
There appear to be some deep continuities to the properties of exter-
nal memory technology we develop but also, it is increasingly becoming
clear, some important discontinuities. With the Web, we are passing
through a major transition at least with respect to the technological
basis of human memory. Whether this signifies a major transition for
our cognitive processes and subjectivity more widely depends both upon
the potential cognitive properties of this new technology, but also on
how deeply we integrate this technology into our cognitive routines, and
ultimately our minds.
70 Extended Cognition
Clowes [110] argues that four factors—totality, incorporability, social
entanglement and autonomy—conjointly characterize much of what is
new about E-Memory technologies. The factor which arguably is most
novel with respect to the Web is totality [37, 110]. In part, totality is a
question of capacity. To take one example, very recently a family might
have one polaroid camera with which to record a lifetime’s worth of
memories within a single photograph album. Now, the same number of
photographs may be taken in a day by a teenager with a smartphone.
In principle, all of these photos—perhaps a lifetime’s worth—could be
uploaded to the Web and then retrieved and incorporated as needed in
that individual’s ongoing cognitive life.
In part, totality continues the historical tendency of memory tech-
nologies, which has been to make increasingly detailed, indelible and
easily accessible memory traces that complement our more labile and
reconstructive bio-memory systems. However, there are also important
discontinuities. With traditional memory technologies, it has always
required effort or work to lay down new records and, indeed, one gener-
ally had to make decisions about what to record. Thanks, however, to
the convenience, voluminous capacity and sometimes automaticity of
existing memory technologies, it is rapidly becoming possible to record
any event we choose or just effortlessly and indiscriminately record in
digital high-fidelity any memory trace that is available [37, 325, 334].
The tendency was first expressed in the trend toward lifelogging [222,
370], whereby users of digital memory technologies sought to record
digital memory traces with the aspiration of capturing the totality
of an individual’s experience. This aspiration, conjoined with today’s
hyper-mobile and hyper-connected E-Memory gadgetry, means that a
form of lifelogging is becoming an everyday reality for a substantial
proportion of the population.
With the advent of cheap and efficient mobile network technologies,
we can all record any thought, sound or image more or less as we
choose. Moreover, the ability to organize and access digital memory
traces using technologies such as Google Search or Amazon Alexa is
rapidly changing the ecological space of memory. It is often simply
easier to Google a disputed fact or personal memory trace than it is to
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wrack our own brains [113]. As the user interfaces of mobile devices and
their apps come to incorporate AI, personalization, and can be heavily
customized to individual users’ needs, our devices seem to be tending to
meet the conditions on cognitive integration (as just discussed around
Heersmink’s [228] matrix) to an ever-increasing degree. As we habituate
to, customize and individualize these devices and their set of apps, the
patterns of information flow between us and them become ever denser,
we often rely upon and trust their deliverances to a greater degree,
and we can become more skillful interpreters of our preferred devices.
Indeed, their usage becomes a form of second nature. In the process,
the way that we accomplish a variety of tasks, such as navigating
around a city, remembering a birthday or appointment, or keeping track
of an exercise regime, is deeply transformed. This readiness by our
mobile and wearable devices to be incorporated in a variety of cognitive
operations is what Clowes calls incorporability. The new mobile devices
are ripe for incorporation. The ecological space of memory and a raft of
other cognitive operations is thereby being radically transformed, and
with it, the potential to augment, or at least seriously alter the nature
of human memory.
Some have worried that these deep tendencies have worrying impli-
cations for the human mind [81, 206, 515]. It may be that the ongoing
tendency to deeply integrate E-Memory technologies may be undermin-
ing core human cognitive faculties. The thought is that as we come to
rely on these technologies, our biological capacities will be weakened
in the process. One of the more developed versions of this argument
proceeds from the idea of transactional memory. Transactional memory
is a form of memory organization found to occur in social groups where
one participant will come to be seen as the expert in a particular field
and then become treated as the memory specialist for other members
of the group [536]. The process seems to be highly advanced in families
and especially married couples where one partner might become the spe-
cialist on the names of films and who acted in them, and another might
specialize in remembering to pay the bills [537]. In transactive memory
systems a specialist takes over the role of remembering a specific type
of information and is consulted by other members of the group when
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information in that domain needs to be recalled. These spontaneous
specializations seem to be a feature of the human social division of labor
in respect of mnemonic tasks.
Wegner and Ward see the Internet as a supernormal stimulus that
builds upon these tendencies in potentially dangerous ways [530, 531,
538]. Wegner and Ward argue that our brains tend to treat the Internet
as just another sort of transactive memory partner, effectively an expert
in everything, and in so doing, the danger is that our brains cease to
store information internally and simply treat the Internet as a sort of
universal expert. Indeed, there is some evidence that, at least when
sitting at a non-Internet connected computer screen, we do tend to
forget the details of some accessed information, but remember instead
how to access it [472]. In this way, the thought goes, our memories and
a wide range of our cognitive abilities may be undermined as we learn
to rely on the sort of memory store provided by the Web, instead of the
detailed information we might otherwise remember with our biological
memory systems. The worry is this might be progressively undermining
our organic memory systems. Ward adduces empirical evidence that,
in the process, we are becoming self-deceivers with an over-enhanced
sense of cognitive self-esteem, attributing knowledge to ourselves which
we do not really know, but is merely accessible via the Web.
Clowes points out that today’s hyper-mobile Internet users’ self-
attributions “might just be recognizing the new epistemic conditions
as realities” [114]. That is to say, if per the extended mind argument,
the deeply incorporated resources of the Web are ever-present, or at
least dynamically reliable, then perhaps avid Web users are simply
attributing to themselves knowledge that they can, under normal sit-
uations reliably access. Perhaps they implicitly take themselves to be
Web-extended people. If so, we may have reasons not to worry so deeply
about the new tendency to store more information in exograms and the
expense of engrams. It might be better to epistemically evaluate the
whole cognitive agent and not merely the agent’s biological components.
This could accord with the long history of the human mind which,
as we have seen, tends to appropriate and incorporate a wide variety
of artefactual systems.
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Yet, it is perhaps hard to see why the vast knowledge stores of the
Web should be considered as part of individual Web user’s minds, even if
all of the extended mind conditions are met. In part, this is because it is
not clear that Web resources are best understood as personal resources
at all. It might, some have argued, be better to consider some or all such
resources as part of a cognitive commons that we can all draw upon,
rather than as part of any individual’s mind [113, 152, 483]. The Web
may, at least in many scenarios, be more like a tube map to the London
Underground, utilized in cognitive operations of many, but not part of
any individual’s mind, than they are like Otto’s notebook: uniquely and
personally part of Otto’s cognitive operations.
Many of these arguments apply specifically to semantic memory.
They become more challenging when we consider the way that E-
Memory technology can support episodic and autobiographical memory
functions in ways we have already touched on in the consideration
of lifelogging [109, 232]. Such self-supporting—or self-instantiating—
technology has already been shown to help some individuals keep a grip
on themselves, and organize their lives in the context of traumatic brain
trauma or conditions such as mild Alzheimer’s [49, 153]. Experimental
research with the SenseCam device, has shown that keeping track
of one’s everyday life by wearing a technology that automatically and
unobtrusively takes a picture every few seconds, can help consolidate the
memory of some patients [49] as well as enhance that individual’s quality
of life [437]. These potential benefits of E-Memory technologies, could
be ported to more widely available portable and wearable devices given
current and near-future Web-based technologies with the possibility of
helping many people with a range of memory disorders.
But should such memory stores actually count as an instantiating
part of anyone’s self, or as part of them as a person? On a narrative
theory of the self, the sorts of deeply detailed and deeply integrated
personal memory stores that lifelogging makes possible may mean that
the properties of some information stores and some Web-applications
are better regarded as parts of an individual person or self than part of
a mere technological adjunct [232, 445]. This may have serious ethical
consequences, in for example, situations where an individual’s data store
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is compromised, when service is interrupted, or when memory stores
are tampered with [230].
Some properties of the Web when considered as a memory store—in
its current form—may countervail against it really being best consid-
ered as an adequate instantiation of a part of any individual’s self.
Apart from the lack of dynamic reliability of much current Web-based
mnemonic technology, E-Memory on the Web is often socially-entangled
and autonomous in ways that may not be compatible with it being
considered part of anyone’s self. When Facebook encourages someone to
recollect a day or friendship and post it to their timeline, the prompt,
is constructed by a series of hidden algorithms that largely depend on
how others interact with that individual’s “personal” memory traces.
The chance of recollecting any particular memory trace mediated by
Facebook is based on massively socially-entangled memory systems [110].
Apart from this social entanglement and thanks to increasing perme-
ation of AI technologies in the substrata of the Web, the Web is an ever
more active and autonomous memory store.
Consider a personal photo, or video clip composed automatically
from a series of photos, which unrequested pops up as you open your
tablet device. The processes by which this particular photo is cued to
appear to you, is dependent upon, rapidly changing, algorithmically
complex and—at least to the majority of users—cognitively impenetrable
processes which may, moreover, be commercially sensitive and thus
hidden from view. From our foregoing discussion, it is contestable
whether this should matter from the standpoint of the extended mind.
They do not appear to figure either in the trust-and-glue conditions or in
Heersmink’s multidimensional approach. The brain itself is cognitively
penetrable only to a limited extent and what it recollects can also turn
on processes that are socially driven. The algorithms cuing the memory
trace are also likely to be highly personalized to data arising from
that individual user and her immediate social circle. Yet, Web-mediated
mnemonic technology appears to be ever-more autonomous and based on
AI technologies driven by market forces, corporate policy and collective
dynamics beyond the individual’s purview. Are such factors really
irrelevant to whether a given device, application or process can be
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counted as part of an individual? Arguably these considerations make
it much more difficult to see contemporary E-Memory technologies as
parts of individual memory stores at all, and more like a highly partial
and civilization-specific forms of collective memory. A memory store
may play a cognitively potent role for the individual, with important
ethical and political consequences, without it needing to be considered
part of anyone’s mind.
4.5 Extended Knowers
The application of active externalist theorizing to the Web has po-
tentially profound implications for our status as epistemic agents. In
particular, arguments for the extended mind seem to suggest the possi-
bility of extended knowers, i.e., agent’s whose epistemic capabilities are
not constrained by the limits associated with biological memory. In the
case of an extended mind, an agent’s beliefs are seen to be constituted
(at least in part) by information that lies outwith the borders of skin
and skull. All that matters, in this case, is the kind of access the agent
has to external information. Given the right sort of access, external
information should be counted as part of our body of beliefs about
the world, and assuming these beliefs are true, it seems as though the
Web-extended cognizer is poised to undergo a profound transformation
of what they know about the world [see 314].
In order to help clarify all of this, it will be useful to consider a
particular thought experiment. Imagine that you are equipped with a
Web-enabled head-mounted display device (similar to the technological
target envisioned by the Google Project Glass initiative). Such a device,
let us suppose, comes equipped with a built-in camera and it is able
to post images to a Web service and display results from the service
directly within your field of view. Now imagine that the Web service is
able to analyze photos of historical paintings and return information
about the painting (e.g., the title of the painting and the name of
the relevant artist).2 By virtue of this technological set-up, you are
2See work by Johnson et al. [263] and Saleh and Elgammal [420] for details about
the sort of technical approaches that might be relevant to this capability.
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able to wander around an art gallery and view information about
the paintings on display.
What should we make of your knowledge of art in such a situation?
Would it be appropriate to conclude that you pretty much ‘know’
everything there is to know about the pieces of art contained in the
art gallery, at least in terms of the information that is made available
by the Web? Do you qualify as a bona fide art expert, despite the fact
that quite a lot of the relevant processing seems to be occurring beyond
the borders of the biological domain? Perhaps, as is often suggested in
cases of extended cognition, the processing loop that travels through
your technological devices and into the online environment should be
considered as functionally akin to the brain-based neural circuits that
would otherwise enable you to retrieve information from bio-memory.
Inasmuch as this is the case, why should we seek to cast aspersions on
your artistic expertise? If online information is poised to influence your
thoughts and actions in roughly the same sort of way as information
retrieved from bio-memory, then what is the basis for claiming that
cases of brain-based information retrieval are indicative of a particular
kind of cognitive competence, whereas the retrieval capabilities of some
bio-technologically integrated ensemble fail to hit the (cognitive) mark?
For those who are still in some doubt as to the persuasive appeal
of this argument, it may help to consider what it is that determines
what you think you already know. What seems to determine whether we
know or do not know something is not the fact that we are continuously,
consciously aware of a set of relevant facts and figures. Instead, what
seems to count is the kind of access we have to relevant information—the
fact that when we need to recall information, it is there, easily made
available to us by our bio-memory systems. But need our bodies of
personal knowledge be so reliant on biologically-based modes of infor-
mation storage? What if our access to externally-located information
was the same as that afforded by bio-memory? In this case, it seems,
there is no principled reason to suggest that the external information
would not count as part of our own body of knowledge and beliefs about
the world. As Clark [98] argues:
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. . . it sometimes makes both social and scientific sense to
think of your individual knowledge as quite simply what-
ever body of information and understanding is at your
fingertips; whatever body of information and understand-
ing is right there, cheaply and easily available, as and
when needed. (p. 42)
In addition to whether it makes social and scientific sense to credit
you with particular bodies of knowledge, we can also ask to what
extent the mode of access outlined above would prompt a shift in your
subjective feelings of what you did and did not know. If you were
accustomed to having reliable, continuous access to particular bodies of
information, would you eventually start to feel as though the externally-
located information was actually part of the body of knowledge that
you called your own? If someone standing next to you in the art gallery
asked you whether you knew the identity of the artist for a particular
painting, would you feel inclined to answer in the affirmative, based on
your past experience of accessing art-relevant information?
One reason to expect a positive answer, in this case, stems from
work relating to tool-related shifts in sensorimotor processing. In par-
ticular, one of the recent findings to come out of research on tool use
is that changes to an individual’s body schema can lead to changes in
sensorimotor processing that persist beyond the period of time in which
the tool is actually used [77, 78] (see Section 3.3). Cardinali et al. [77],
for example, provide evidence to suggest that the use of a 40cm long
mechanical grabber introduces a change in the kinematics of subsequent
grasping movements. They report that the use of the grabber alters the
kinematics of subsequent free-hand grasping movements and pointing
movements in a way that suggests the represented length of the arm
has been modified. Such results point to something of an ‘after-effect’
or ‘capability echo’ concerning the impact that a previously integrated
tool has on our action-related capabilities.3
Intuitively, we might expect the cognitive equivalent of a capability
echo to assume the form of a subjective shift concerning the nature of
3Further evidence in support of this ‘after-effect’ or ‘capability echo’ is found in
work using virtual reality applications [52, 209, 476].
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our cognitive and epistemic capabilities. In other words, we might expect
cognitive incorporation to alter our sense as to what we feel we can do,
even when we are decoupled from the bio-external resource that grounds
our extended cognitive abilities. This is a view expressed by those who
claim that research on bodily incorporation serves as the corporeal
equivalent to the notion of cognitive incorporation [99]. Clark [100], for
example, claims that reliable access to external bodies of information is
all it takes to effect a shift in capability-related subjective experiences:
Easy access to specific bodies of information, as and when
such access is normally required, is all it takes for us to factor
such knowledge in as part of the bundle of skills and abilities
that we take for granted in our day to day life. And it is this
bundle of ‘taken-for-granted’ skills, knowledge, and abilities
that. . . quite properly structures and informs our sense of
who we are, what we know, and what we can do. [100, p. 106]
Such claims are of particular interest in light of recent findings
concerning the effect that Web access has on our subjective sense of
our cognitive and epistemic capabilities. In situations where people
use the Web to search for online information it appears that their
subjective sense of what they know is transformed, extending to include
not just the information that is available from bio-memory but also
the information that is available from the online realm [173, 530, 531].
Searching for information online, Fisher et al. [173] suggests, thus “leads
people to conflate information that can be found online with knowledge
in the head” (p. 675). Similarly, Ward [530] notes that as people turn to
the “cloud mind of the Internet, they seem to lose sight of where their
own minds end and the mind of the Internet begins. They become one
with the cloud, believing that they themselves are spectacularly adept
at thinking about, remembering, and locating information” (p. 88).
Interestingly, and in accord with the notion of a capability echo, such
effects persist beyond the period of time in which users have access to
the Internet. Thus, even when a mobile phone is not at hand, the mere
fact of being accustomed to its use renders an agent overconfident in
estimating the limits of her epistemological capabilities [530, 531].
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Such results tend to speak in favor of the conclusion that access to
the Web alters the nature of the metacognitive judgments underpinning
our subjective sense of what we do and do not know. Not all studies,
however, support this conclusion. Ferguson et al. [169], for example,
report the results of a study in which access to the Internet appears to
undermine rather than enhance feelings of knowing.
The available research thus presents a somewhat confusing picture
regarding the effect of Web access on meta-memorial processes. Never-
theless, it seems clear that access to the Web can effect a fundamental
shift in subjective experiences regarding epistemic capabilities. In future
research, it will be important to relate the findings of psychological
experiments with theoretical models that detail how metacognitive
processes alter as the result of past experience [161, 408]. It will also
be important to pay close attention to the kinds of access that users
have with the online environment. To echo the point made above (see
Section 4.1), we should not assume that the results obtained with one
kind of Web access (e.g., that provided by Google Search) will generalize
to other kinds of Web access. The cognitive impacts of the Web are
likely to depend on the modes of access we have to the Web, and much
the same may be true of the metacognitive processes that give rise to a
rich array of epistemic feelings and emotions [14, 347].
4.6 Supersized Knowers?
The idea that the Web might, on occasion, give rise to extended know-
ers has led epistemologists to make a number of claims regarding the
impact of the Web on our epistemic profile. One implication of the
Web-extended mind concept, Ludwig [314] argues, is that we are able to
envisage a profound transformation of our doxastic potential. In partic-
ular, he anticipates “an explosion of dispositional beliefs and knowledge
that is caused by digital information resources such as Wikipedia or
Google” (p. 355). Similar views are expressed by Bjerring and Peder-
sen [56]. They argue that the Web enables us to enjoy various forms of
“restricted epistemic omniscience,” corresponding to more-or-less “com-
plete knowledge about a particular, fairly specific subject matter” (p. 25).
We thus arrive at a claim that seems to follow quite naturally from the
80 Extended Cognition
possibility of Web-extended minds: cognitively-potent forms of Web-
based bio-technological bonding will lead to states of Web-extended
knowledge, in which many of our epistemically-relevant doxastic states
supervene on material elements that are typically treated as part of the
technological and informational fabric of the Web.
Unfortunately, there are a number of problems confronting this
sort of claim. One of the most pressing problems relates to the way in
which attempts to satisfy the criteria for cognitive extension (e.g., those
proposed by Clark and Chalmers) seem to cause problems for the epis-
temic integrity of the technologically-extended agent [453]. Consider, for
example, the accessibility criterion, which was discussed in Section 4.1.
The general idea behind the accessibility criterion is that external infor-
mation should be quickly and easily accessible—it should be possible
for agents to access information and incorporate it into their problem-
solving routines with little effort or difficulty. Accessibility thus appears
to demand a degree of fluency with respect to the kinds of interaction an
agent has with bio-external resources, where the notion of fluency can
be understood (at least in part) as the “subjective experience of ease or
difficulty with which we are able to process information” [375, p. 237].
Now, the problem with claims regarding easy access and fluent
interaction is that these properties seem to be in some tension with
the possibility of Web-extended forms of knowledge. Thus, one of the
findings to emerge from research into fluency is that fluent processing
leads to a truth bias, in which the ‘truth’ of some body of external
information is judged relative to the subjective ease with which it is
processed [10]. Fluency thus seems to speak in favor of the possibility
of Web-extended minds, but it seems to work against the interests
of Web-extended knowers (i.e., agents whose epistemic credentials are
enhanced as a result of Web-based forms of cognitive extension). We
thus encounter what has been dubbed the extended cognizer vs. extended
knower problem [453]:
Extended Cognizer vs. Extended Knower Problem
The properties that work to ensure that an external resource
can be treated as a candidate for cognitive incorporation
are also, at least in some cases, the very same properties
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that work to undermine or endanger the positive epistemic
standing of a technologically-extended agent.
This is an important problem; for it suggests that Web-extended
minds may not be the natural harbingers of Web-extended knowledge.
Although we might be inclined to assume that, as Clark [107] puts
it, “extended minds breed extended knowers” (p. 3760), things seem
to be somewhat more complicated in view of the extended cognizer
vs. extended knower problem. Indeed, if the proposed tension turns
out to be real, then this will undoubtedly undermine claims about the
potential role of the Web in effecting a significant transformation of our
epistemic capabilities [56, 314].
The extended cognizer vs. extended knower problem makes its
presence felt in a number of ways. In fact, the problem has already
been encountered in relation to the earlier discussion on trust (see
Section 4.2). Recall that as part of that discussion, we encountered
the idea that the trust criterion imposes a constraint on extended
cognition, such that the extended cognizer should eschew the deliberate
and meticulous evaluation of online information [403]. The upshot,
claim Record and Miller [403], is that the extended cognizer is (by
definition) unable to engage in the sort of epistemic vetting and active
scrutiny that, they insist, is mandated by the questionable reliability of
online information. In the absence of such scrutiny (which, recall, is a
condition for cognitive extension), the beliefs of the Web-extended agent
seem to lack the necessary justificatory status that would otherwise
warrant claims of positive epistemic standing. In other words, by virtue
of the specific properties of online information, the extended beliefs
hosted by the Web-extended mind are unlikely to count as a form
of extended knowledge.
A similar sort of worry occurs in relation to claims regarding the
use of linked data formats to enhance the accessibility of online in-
formation. Recall that in Section 4.1 we encountered the idea that
linked data formats provide a means to address the demands of the
accessibility criterion [447, 453]. The problem with this idea is that
it potentially undermines the role of ‘peripheral’ information in guid-
ing credibility evaluations. By peripheral information, we mean the
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kinds of cues and affordances that are associated with the context in
which information appears. Such information includes, for example,
the visual design elements of a website, the structural organization of
information, and the presence of socially-constructed reliability indica-
tors and system-generated cues (see Section 4.2). Crucially, all these
kinds of informational cues, prompts are affordances are used by hu-
man users in forming epistemically-relevant judgments about online
content [179, 344, 465, 541]. The concern, therefore, is that if we re-
move this epistemically-crucial contextual information as a result of
the adoption of data-oriented representations, we will remove an im-
portant source of information that undermines the extent to which an
individual’s beliefs can be said to be justified, and thus indicative of
positive epistemic standing. In an attempt to enhance the conditions
under which Web-extended minds emerge (i.e., using data-centric repre-
sentations to enhance the accessibility of online information), we may
inadvertently undermine the extent to which the Web-extended cognizer
can be regarded as a Web-extended knower.
Here is a somewhat more subtle manifestation of the extended
cognizer vs. extended knower problem. Suppose we take the findings
of Ward [530, 531] and Fisher et al. [173] at face value and accept
that the Web inflates our sense of what we know. If this is indeed the
case, then it seems that the Web-extended agent is likely to regard
themselves as more knowledgeable and expert when they have access
to the Web. Now, it might seem that such subjective shifts are episte-
mologically innocent and do not affect our overall epistemic standing.
However, according to a recent view in social psychology, situations
that alter expertise-related self-perceptions may contribute to shifts
in cognitive style. In particular, according to the earned dogmatism
hypothesis, individuals who believe themselves to be more expert in a
given domain are also more likely to adopt a dogmatic, closed-minded
orientation [377]. This is important, because dogmatism is often seen
to undermine the epistemic standing of an individual. This is espe-
cially so in the case of virtue-theoretic conceptions of knowledge within
contemporary epistemology [31, 204]. According to a position known
as virtue responsibilism, for example, knowledge ascriptions are tied
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to the possession of a number of positive character traits or intellec-
tual virtues [21, 558]. Some notable examples of such virtues include
intellectual patience, open-mindedness, intellectual humility, curiosity,
intellectual courage, epistemic diligence, intellectual tenacity, carefulness
and intellectual conscientiousness. Perhaps unsurprisingly, dogmatism
and closed-mindedness are not to be found among this list of intellec-
tual virtues. Instead, dogmatism and closed-mindedness are deemed to
constitute intellectual vices, and these are almost universally denigrated
on account of their knowledge-undermining potential.4 In particular,
dogmatism seems incompatible with positive epistemic standing, since
it seems that the beliefs of the dogmatic individual are unlikely to track
the truth. Even in situations where the dogmatic individual does succeed
in believing the truth, the truth of such beliefs seems to be due more to
luck than it does anything else. The true beliefs of the dogmatic individ-
ual will thus violate an epistemic anti-luck condition [392, 394], and this
is almost universally regarded as inimical to knowledge attribution.
It seems, therefore, that subjective shifts in our sense of what we
do and do not know are of considerable epistemological importance.
Far from being epistemologically innocent, the subjective changes that
accompany our exposure to the Web may modify elements of our
cognitive character, leading us to fall prey to intellectual vices that work
to degrade and diminish our status as epistemic agents.
4.7 Privacy Implications of the Web-Extended Mind
Given that all forms of cognitive extension involve resources that lie
beyond the traditional biological borders of the skin and skull, it should
be clear that extended cognitive processes are of greater visibility to
external agencies than are their brain-based counterparts. Although
4As always, there are dissenting voices. Smart [456], for example, suggests that
while we are correct to see dogmatism as a genuine form of intellectual vice, its vice-like
properties are only apparent at the individual level of analysis—the level of individual
agents. In contrast, when we turn our attention to the collective level, the dogmatic
properties of individual agents have a more virtuous feel to them. This is due to
what Smart refers to as mandevillian intelligence—the idea that individual cognitive
shortcomings, limitations or biases can, on occasion, play a positive functional role
in yielding collective forms of cognitive success (see Section 7.7).
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future forms of technological innovation may support a form of ‘brain
reading’, whereby we are able to monitor and interpret patterns of brain
activity [267, 507], it seems as though extended cognition permits a
particularly easy form of observational access to an individual’s cognitive
machinery. In particular, cognitive extension seems to afford a more-
or-less ‘direct’ observational route to an individual’s cognitive ‘innards’.
By extending the machinery of the mind to the extra-organismic realm,
it becomes possible to access and monitor a subset of the physical
elements that realize an individual’s mental states and processes—to
quite literally ‘see the mind in action’ [see 286].
The accessibility of bio-external cognitive circuits leads to a natural
concern with covert forms of ‘cognitive veillance’.5 The idea, here, is
that cognitive extension opens the door to forms of monitoring and
surveillance that are not encountered in the case of brain-based forms of
cognition (i.e., neurocognition). Even if we allow for the possibility of fu-
ture brain-reading technologies, it seems unlikely that such technologies
will introduce the same sort of privacy concerns as those associated with
extended cognition. This is because, in the brain reading case, it seems
much harder (although not impossible) to imagine situations in which a
particular individual was being monitored without their knowledge. In
the extended mind case, however, covert monitoring could be as easy as
looking over someone’s shoulder as they perform a long multiplication
task using pen and paper resources.6 The visibility and accessibility of
extended cognitive routines thus ‘opens up’ the mind to a particularly
worrisome form of what we might call ‘cognitive privacy violation’.
Unfortunately, such worries are only amplified in the case of Web-
extended cognition; for issues of privacy and surveillance are of particular
importance when it comes to the nature of our relationship with the
Web [369]. Crucially, the Web provides a wealth of opportunities to
record and monitor the actions of individuals as they engage with the
online realm. This is important, because the Web is, to a large extent,
a public space where bodies of data and information are easily accessed
5This extends the types of ‘digital veillance’ identified by social scientists [see
317, chap. 2].
6See Wilson and Clark [550] for an active externalist approach to long
multiplication.
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and shared, sometimes without our knowledge. Every time we interact
with the Web—to post a message or perform a Web search—we face
the risk of making some body of personal information available to
a variety of interested parties, e.g., government agencies, commercial
organizations, and (in the worst case) criminal fraternities. It should
now be clear why Web-based forms of cognitive extension are likely to
accentuate concerns about cognitive privacy: once we accept the idea
that cognitive extension provides a means to observe the mind in action,
then the Web emerges as the perfect arena in which covert forms of
cognitive veillance could be undertaken, perhaps on an industrial scale.
There is, of course, no reason to assume that such forms of surveillance
will be benign in nature. Indeed, they could be undertaken for a variety
of highly nefarious purposes. We thus come face-to-face with a vision
of a surveillance society that is, in some respects, just as unsettling as
the one portrayed by Orwell’s [376] classic novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four.
The citizens of Orwell’s society were at least able to enjoy some degree
of privacy concerning their innermost thoughts and feelings. Such is not
the case when the machinery of the mind extends to include the global
digital networks of the online world.
The notion of the Web-extended mind thus raises important issues
concerning cognitively-relevant forms of surveillance, monitoring and
control. Importantly, such issues only arise when we seek to situate
the notion of cognitive extension within the specific socio-technical
context of the Web. In fact, in the absence of the Web, the notion of
extended cognition might seem to be relatively benign from a privacy
perspective. Similarly, in the absence of an extended mind perspective,
the existing debate over privacy and surveillance lacks an important, and
politically-significant, cognitive dimension. Given the recent interest in
various forms of surveillance that have been undertaken by government
agencies [see 251, 469], now is arguably a good time to consider the
privacy implications of the Web-extended mind.
5
Embedded Cognition
Unlike the notion of extended cognition, which sees the elements of the
extra-organismic environment as sometimes playing a constitutive role in
the realization of cognitive states and processes, the notion of embedded
cognition rejects the idea that the boundaries of cognition extend beyond
the traditional biological borders of the human agent. This is not to say
that proponents of embedded cognition fail to recognize the cognitive
significance and relevance of the extra-organismic environment. As is
noted by a leading advocate of the embedded approach:
. . . cognitive processes depend very heavily, in hitherto unex-
pected ways, on organismically external props and devices
and on the structure of the external environment in which
cognition takes place. [417, p. 393]
The distinction between embedded and extended cognition thus
relates to the constitutive relevance of resources that lie beyond the
biological borders of the individual. The extended theorist accepts the
idea that bio-external resources can sometimes qualify as part of the
machinery of the human mind, while the embedded theorist insists that
cognitive mechanisms are resolutely confined to the intra-cranial realm,
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even though they accept that such mechanisms may be subject to causal
influence by aspects of the extra-organismic environment.
Given that embedded cognition recognizes that human cognitive
processes are subject to causal influence by extra-organismic factors, it
should come as no surprise to learn that there are many of points of
interest for the embedded cognition theorist when it comes to the Web.
In fact, practically all the features of the Web that surface in relation
to embodied and extended cognition also come into focus when we view
the Web through the lens of embedded cognition. There are, however, a
number of specific points of interest for the embedded cognition theorist.
Some of these are reviewed in the current section. Section 5.1 presents
the notion of the cognitive commons, which is a term that has been
used to describe the Web from an embedded perspective. Subsequent
sections cover the Web of Things (WoT) (see Section 5.2), the notion of
programmable worlds (see Section 5.3), and the cognitive implications
of the Web from an embedded perspective (see Section 5.4). Finally, in
Section 5.5, we discuss why the conceptual distinction between extended
and embedded cognition is important from a scientific, philosophical
and engineering perspective.
5.1 The Cognitive Commons
In Section 4, it was suggested that the informational and technological
elements of the Web could serve as part of the physical substrate that
realizes cognitive states and processes. Needless to say, not everyone is
convinced by this proposal. Harnad and Dror [152, 221], for example,
explicitly reject the notion of cognitive extension. They see cognition as
something that is confined solely to the inner, neural realm, and they
dispute the idea that cognition extends beyond the metabolic surfaces
of the biological agent. “[C]ognition,” insist Harnad and Dror [221],
“begins and ends at the cognizer’s sensor and effector surfaces.”
Although Harnad and Dror reject the notion of extended cognition,
they do appreciate the potential significance of the Web when it comes
to issues of human cognizing. The Web, they suggest, corresponds to a
publicly accessible informational environment whose contents are both
socially-created and socially-maintained. In essence, Harnad and Dror
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see the Web as a “cognitive commons”—a resource that is collaboratively
created and poised to alter the cognitive power and potential of humanity
at both an individual and collective level:
. . . the worldwide web, a distributed network of cognizers,
digital databases and software agents, has effectively become
our “Cognitive Commons,” in which distributed cognizers
and cognitive technology can interoperate globally with a
speed, scope and degree of interactivity that generate cogni-
tive performance powers that would be inconceivable within
the scope of individual local cognition alone. [152, p. 21]
The idea of the Web as a cognitive commons is an appealing one,
not least because it emphasizes the social nature of the Web—the fact
that the online environment emerges as the result of collective efforts.
This is important in helping us understand some of the ways in which
the Web can support human cognition. In exploiting the resources of the
online environment, we are thus sometimes able to perform cognitive
tasks that would have been difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish
should we have attempted to perform those tasks in the absence of
‘social’ support. An example comes in the form of scientific open access
initiatives, which allow scientific papers to be publicly accessible. Such
initiatives, in conjunction with the use of global information networks,
may help to stimulate various forms of creative insight and intellectual
progress. As Harnad [220] rightly notes, the Web allows us to accomplish
something akin to “scholarly skywriting”—scientific theories, thoughts,
ideas, and sometimes research data, are made available in ways that
are increasingly accessible to fellow academics and scientific colleagues.
It is almost as if the outputs of scientific enquiry were written in the
sky for all to see.
One virtue of this particular mode of information distribution and
dissemination is that it enables thoughts and ideas to influence the minds
of individuals with very different outlooks, knowledge and experience.
As is noted by Clark [96], such forms of information flow potentially
enable a community of individuals to establish shortcuts or conduits
between thoughts and ideas that would otherwise be too distant or
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disconnected to be linked by a single individual. In discussing the role of
language as a means to support the migration of ideas between different
individuals, Clark thus suggests that:
. . . such migrations may allow the communal construction
of extremely delicate and difficult intellectual trajectories
and progressions. An idea that only Joe’s prior experience
could make available, but that can flourish only in the
intellectual niche currently provided by the brain of Mary,
can now realize its full potential by journeying between Joe
and Mary as and when required. The path to a good idea
can now criss-cross individual learning histories so that one
agent’s local minimum becomes another’s potent building
block. [96, pp. 205–206]
When we merge this idea with the claims of Harnad and Dror,
we are presented with a powerful and compelling vision concerning
the cognitive potential of the Web. In particular, we can see the Web
as boosting the scope and scale of the processes alluded to by Clark,
supporting discontinuous jumps within a space of thoughts, theories,
ideas, and insights.
5.2 The Real World Web
As first sight, the claim that we can understand the cognitive significance
of the Web from the standpoint of embedded cognition looks to be
largely uncontroversial. The appeal to the notion of ‘embeddedness’
is, after all, intended to draw our attention to the role of the extra-
organismic environment in shaping the cognitive processing routines of
a given individual. Inasmuch as the Web counts as an extra-organismic
environment (which it surely does), then it seems reasonable to assume
that the Web is relevant to issues of embedded cognition. Moreover,
such an approach allows us to connect our understanding of Web-
embedded cognition to a long history of theory and research that details
the cognitive significance of tools, technology and other aspects of
material culture [96, 321].
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There is, however, a potential problem with all this. The problem
relates to the distinctive nature of the online and oﬄine environments—
between the virtual environment of the Web and the physical envi-
ronment of the real-world. The typical focus of embedded cognition
concerns the nature of our interactive engagements with the physical
environment, and there seems little doubt that we are embedded in such
environments. But is the same true of the virtual environment? Are we
embedded in the online world to the same extent as we are embedded
in the oﬄine one? This is, in fact, a difficult question, not least because
it highlights a potential deficiency in our understanding of the notion
of embeddedness. Inasmuch as we see the online environment as an
environment that is distinct from the physical world—some abstract
informational realm that lies beyond the browser interface—then there
is always a risk that the Web will be seen to be of little relevance
to embedded cognition.
We have, of course, already encountered one response to worries of
this sort in the section on embodied cognition (see Section 3.1). In that
case, the response centered on the validity of the distinction between
the online and oﬄine environments. Such a distinction, it was suggested,
might be called into question as a result of the way in which Web-based
information is used to guide everyday thoughts and actions.
Another kind of response is inspired by research into the WoT
[210, 211, 212, 561]. For present purposes, we can see the WoT as
the Web-based counterpart to the conventional Internet of Things
(IoT) [207, 354]; the only notable difference being that the WoT relies
on the use of Web-based communication protocols to effect the exchange
of information. Aside from this (perhaps minor) technical detail, we
can think of the WoT as providing similar functionality to the IoT.
As with the IoT, for example, the WoT aims to extend the reach
of the Web into the wider physical environment, equipping a variety
of everyday material objects with data acquisition, data processing
and data exchange capabilities. This is important, because it helps
us see the Web as more than just some remote informational realm
that is separate from our everyday engagements with the real-world.
In place of this vision, we are encouraged to view aspects of the real,
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physical environment—the world in which we are materially embedded—
as themselves falling within the empirical and theoretical remit of
contemporary Web Science. The result is that the putative relevance
of the online/oﬄine distinction, especially when it comes to issues of
embedded cognition, starts to look increasingly spurious. For why should
we downplay the relevance of the Web from an embedded perspective
when it seems that an ever-expanding array of real-world physical
objects will be Web-enabled? Such forms of enablement not only raise
questions about the material nature of the Web environment (e.g.,
do Web-enabled objects exist as literal parts of the Web?), they also
provide us with another way to think about the cognitive significance
of the Web. This becomes apparent when we consider the way in which
the WoT promises to transform the properties of everyday physical
objects. As physical objects become invested with computational and
communicative potential, so their implications for human thought and
action are likely to shift. In essence, we can think of the WoT as
altering the affordances of objects and thus changing the resultant
topography of the “enactive landscapes” [see 276] in which our cognitive
routines are situated.1
As a concrete example of the way in which the WoT may help
to shape human cognition, consider the case of prospective memory.
Prospective memory is a form of memory that involves “remembering
to carry out intended actions without being instructed to do so” [20,
p. 343]. The case of an individual who needs to remember to defrost
the meat by removing it from the freezer when they return home
from work serves as a typical example of prospective memory. Such
forms of memory are, of course, relatively commonplace, and they are
pretty much indispensable in terms of our ability to coordinate our lives
effectively—a fact that is all too sadly evidenced by those suffering from
impairments in prospective memory [554]. As has been pointed out by
a number of commentators [e.g., 475, pp. 36–37], the advent of smart
1The notion of an enactive landscape refers to the way an agent perceives the
world in specific task contexts [276]. The basic idea is that enactive landscapes consist
of affordances that support the expression of particular actions. Such affordances
change according to the goals of the agent; however, they also change in response to
the use of tools or exposure to specific technologies.
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environments provides a range of opportunities to radically reshape the
nature of prospective memory. Staley [475], for example, talks of smart
devices being used to implement prospective memory systems that allow
individuals to “embed their intent” within specific environments, such
as within their home or office. An individual could thus be reminded
of the need to engage in particular actions (e.g., to remove the meat
from the freezer) whenever they are suitably placed to perform those
actions (e.g., when they first enter the kitchen upon returning home
from work). Such interventions may be of particular importance when it
comes to the ‘treatment’ of individuals with cognitive impairments, such
as individuals suffering from dementia or some form of acquired brain
injury. Smart objects thus provide us with an important opportunity
to build on the existing use of the Web for the purposes of providing
clinically-relevant cognitive support. When it comes to prospective
memory, for example, McDonald et al. [337] found that the use of
a specific Web technology (namely, Google Calendar) could serve as
an effective memory aid for individuals suffering from impairments
in prospective memory. The WoT enables us to extend the scope of
such interventions to the local ambient environment that surrounds
specific individuals. Indeed, the use of smart objects in a clinical setting
may encourage us to engage in a productive re-evaluation of what it
means to ‘treat’ some form of cognitive impairment. Instead of the usual
emphasis on individual-centered interventions (e.g., the administration
of drugs), we can also begin to note the value of changes to the local
environment in which an individual is embedded. This is an idea that is
perfectly compatible with a situated or ecological approach to cognition.
As one proponent of the ecological movement once suggested, if you
want to understand human intelligence you should ask “not what’s
inside your head, but what your head’s inside of” [319, p. 43]. Such
sentiments highlight the value of interventions that aim to enrich the
environment, as opposed to interventions that aim to repair the brain:
by making the world smart, we are able to trade ecological enrichment
for neuro-computational sophistication, adapting the environment to
suit the residual capabilities of the cognitively-impaired individual.
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5.3 Programmable Worlds
From the perspective of embedded cognition, the WoT promises to
transform the environment into something of a cooperative partner
when it comes to the performance of particular tasks.2 In this sense, the
WoT speaks to the sort of vision that is often alluded to in discussions of
ubiquitous computing [539] and ambient intelligence [535]. The general
idea is that by extending the reach of the Web to the elements of our
physical environment, we are able to transform the environment into
something that is more responsive to our needs and more supportive
of our thoughts and actions. This is, of course, the guiding principle
behind work that seeks to develop a seemingly endless array of ‘smart
things’, e.g., smart TVs, smart cars, smart buildings, smart cities, and
smart environments [see 354].
How do we create devices that are able to adapt their modes of
operation to suit the (cognitive) needs and requirements of particular
individuals? One answer to this question is to support individuals in
customizing the behavior of smart objects. Such approaches aim to
give individuals greater control over their environments, enabling them
to tailor the structure of Web-based information flows to suit their
idiosyncratic needs and concerns. There is an obvious parallel, here,
with issues of personalization and customization in the cognitive science
literature. Sterelny [483], for example, talks about the role of person-
alization in smoothing the flow of cognitively-relevant informational
exchanges between agent and artefact. Similarly, Clowes [113] discusses
the importance of personalization to issues of cognitive incorporation. In
this case, Clowes suggests that we should see personalization as enabling
2Castelfranchi et al. [84], for example, talk of the attempt to “create environments
that are sensitive and responsive to inhabitants’ needs and capable of anticipating
their needs and behavior as well” (p. 17). Something similar is proposed by Ricci
et al. [406]. They suggest that the development of networking technologies, cloud
technologies and the IoT supports the emergence of “a new kind of smart space
in which digital, physical, and social layers are strongly intertwined. These spaces
extend the classic assistive functionality of AmI [Ambient Intelligence] toward more
proactive possibilities, where the smart environment not only monitors people as
they perform tasks, or supports them by executing their requests, but also influences
and changes their plans and intentions” (p. 60).
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a technological resource to be ‘assimilated’ into a agent’s cognitive rou-
tines. Issues of personalization and customization also surface in relation
to the notion of cognitive niche construction [102, 482, 483], which is
defined as “the process by which animals build physical structures
that transform problem spaces in ways that aid (or sometimes impede)
thinking and reasoning about some target domain or domains” [102,
p. 62]. Here, the ability to modify the environment is seen to play an
important role in yielding certain kinds of cognitive success. By virtue of
the ability to restructure the environment in particular ways, an agent
is sometimes able to transform a difficult (or impossible) problem into
something that is more suitability aligned with the native information
processing repertoire of the bare biological brain.
One way in which individuals can customize the behavior of Web-
enabled devices and influence the shape of Web-based information
flows is exemplified by technologies that use rules to implement specific
actions in response to specific informational contingencies. An illustra-
tive example of this sort of technology is provided by IF This Then
That (IFTTT).3 IFTTT is a Web service that can be used to connect a
broad array of online systems (e.g., Gmail and Dropbox), social media
sites (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and LinkedIn), and
Internet-enabled devices (e.g., Fitbit and Phillips Hue4). These are
collectively referred to as “services” by the IFTTT community. The
connection between services is realized by trigger-action rules, which as
their name suggests consist of both a trigger component and an action
component. The trigger part of the rule is a conditional expression that
defines a set of events and contingencies associated with a source service.
When these conditions are met, the action part of the rule is ‘triggered’.
The action part of a trigger-action rule engages with a target service to
implement certain operations. For example, the action might use the
Application Programming Interface (API) provided by a social media
site to upload or modify content. IFTTT thus provides a means by
which specific actions can be performed in response to changes in the
global online data environment. Crucially, this environment includes the
3https://ifttt.com/
4http://www2.meethue.com/en-gb/
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Table 5.1: Examples of IFTTT trigger-action rules. Note that these examples are
operational applets that can be accessed via the IFTTT website (https://ifttt.com/).
# Trigger (IF) Action (THEN)
1 The International Space Sta-
tion passes overhead
Change the color of my
Phillips Hue light bulb
2 Rain is forecast for tomorrow Send me an email
3 I take a photo with my smart-
phone
Upload the photo to my Flickr
account
4 A photo is uploaded to my
Flickr account
Post the same photo to my
Facebook page
5 My Fitbit device registers low
sleep levels
Remind me to go bed early
6 I receive a Google Scholar
email alert
Append the contents of the
email to a running note in Ev-
ernote
data streams that emanate from a broad array of physical devices, and
this provides an opportunity for IFTTT users to detect and monitor
changes that occur in both the physical and virtual environments. Other
kinds of data streams can be exploited to indirectly detect events in
the physical environment. For example, a user could create a rule that
notifies them whenever a new article is added to the “Earthquake in
California” category on Wikipedia.
Some concrete examples of IFTTT rules are listed in Table 5.1.
These rules highlight a number of important features of IFTTT. The
first thing to note is that IFTTT rules can exploit the data streams that
are provided, managed and maintained by a large number of different
agencies. The first rule (Rule #1) in Table 5.1, for example, exploits a
data stream that is managed by the U.S. space agency. As is illustrated
by this rule, the sorts of contingencies targeted by IFTTT need not
always be restricted to the online realm: they can also refer to states-
of-affairs that exist in the physical environment. Here we can see the
value of the Web in providing a digital representation of the physical
environment. By creating data streams that are sensitive to the changing
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nature of specific parts of the physical environment, individuals are
afforded the opportunity to maintain an awareness of events that, in
many cases, would be beyond the reach of their perceptual systems. As
is demonstrated by Rule #2, such an awareness can effect changes in
behavior, enabling individuals to coordinate their thoughts and actions
with current or future states of the world. There is, in addition, no
reason why the focus of awareness should be limited to states-of-affairs
that exist beyond the boundaries of the biological body. As is evidenced
by Rule #5, IFTTT rules can be authored to take into account the
information provided by Internet- or Web-enabled wearable devices. Not
only do such devices transform the nature of our informational contact
with our own bodies and behavior, they also afford an opportunity to
connect our biological body with an ever-expanding suite of sensors,
actuators and online computational services.
A second feature of IFTTT is revealed by Rules #3 and #4 in
Table 5.1. This concerns the ability to support complex chains of rule
execution. The action (or THEN) part of Rule #3 involves the uploading
of a photo to Flickr. This, in turn, triggers the execution of Rule #4,
which posts the uploaded photo to a Facebook page. This scenario
involves the successive execution of just two rules; however, there is no
limit to the number of rules that can be linked or ‘chained’ in this sort
of way. Similar kinds of rule chaining can also be applied to the realm
of smart objects and devices, thereby enabling an individual to alter
the properties of the local (or remote) environment in response to some
contingency that occurs in the physical or virtual world.
At this point, it should be clear that IFTTT rules enable the casual
user to engage in a form of ‘programming’. This is perhaps most obvious
in the case of rules that automate certain kinds of tasks and routines
(e.g., Rules #3 and #4). Beyond this, however, we can see how the
advent of smart objects enables the physical environment itself to be
approached as a programmable resource. We thus encounter the notion
of what might be called the programmable world—the idea that the
Web and Internet enable the physical environment to be the target of
forms of control and manipulation that are typically the preserve of
more conventional programming efforts [see 493]. Superficially, there is
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nothing particularly radical about this idea; for the kinds of control and
manipulation that are being achieved in these cases are still very much
grounded in standard forms of computational processing. A program
that executes against the physical environment (via the use of smart
objects) is thus similar to the kinds of programs that execute against
a set of online digital resources—in both cases the relevant program
exploits digital representations that are made available by the Web.
Despite this, the programmable world concept remains important, if
only because it highlights the opportunities that individuals have to
configure the local environment in ways that are germane to their
idiosyncratic needs, interests and concerns.
A similar point applies to the management of information flows that
exist solely in the online realm. Rule #6, for example, demonstrates how
information from one service (email) can be automatically routed to
another service (Evernote), resulting in the aggregation of information
in a single location. This is a simple example, but it is an example
that highlights an important point: the use of IFTTT rules can be
used to control the flow of information in the online realm, enabling
an individual to assemble novel information resources and customize
their cognitive contact with such resources. This extends a point that
was encountered earlier in the review (see Section 4.1) regarding the
extent to which conventional HTML pages are able to support the
emergence of Web-extended minds. In the context of that discussion,
we highlighted the danger of limiting our attention to one particular
form of informational contact with the Web. The Web, we suggested,
provides a range of opportunities for individuals to access particular
bodies of information, and this potentially undermines the validity of
blanket statements regarding (e.g.) the suitability of the Web as a
target for cognitive incorporation. The present discussion of IFTTT
reinforces this particular point. In particular, we are now in a position
to see how the informational ecology of the online environment can be
customized in ways that befit the cognitive requirements of a specific
individual. An individual could, for example, create a rule that presents
them with particular bodies of information using a simple text message.
In this case, there is clearly no need for the individual to actively search
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and retrieve information from the Web. Instead, the information is
presented to the individual whenever they deem it appropriate for that
information to be presented. There is, in addition, no need for us to limit
our attention to the case of simple textual prompts. As is illustrated by
Rule #1 in Table 5.1, bodies of online information can be used to effect
changes in the local ambient environment, yielding perhaps subtle (or
even subliminal) forms of cognitive and behavioral influence.
5.4 Embed with the Web?
The cognitive implications of being embedded in a world of Web- or
Internet-enabled smart objects is rarely subject to detailed examination.
Yet, it is clear that many human cognitive processes are liable to change
in response to the constant availability of the Web and the plethora of
objects that rely on the Web to support their functionality.
Technologies, tools and material culture, more generally, can sculpt,
shape and support a range of cognitive abilities [321]. For some, this
relationship is particularly intimate and aspects of material culture
are seen to shape and constrain the development of the human brain.
The result is that at least some of our cognitive abilities, along with
their neural instantiations, might be bound to particular artefactual
substrates, with tools and technology constricting our cognitive abilities
and directing their development down predetermined paths.
One of the controversies to emerge from debates in this area is
whether the material support provided by the paper book allows for the
development of literary capabilities and whether these capabilities are
hindered by the emergence of alternative media ecologies, such as the
Web. It has been suggested that the new digital culture might undermine
the brain circuits that support such abilities [551]. Indeed, an unintended
consequence of the Web may be a progressive diminishment of the very
cognitive abilities that allowed us to create the Web in the first place.
One motivation for this idea stems from Dehaene’s hypothesis that
new cognitive abilities can only be developed if the brain circuits that
instantiate them are sufficiently similar to allow them to be “recycled”
with respect to a new task context [138]. The idea is that as our brains
adapt to a particular ecological niche (or, by extension, human-made
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tools), certain circuits of the brain will need to be appropriated for new
tasks, and in the process, reshaped. Dehaene’s hypothesis is that the
information processing properties of brain circuits will be altered by
the appropriation and recycling to new cognitive tasks associated with
skills built around novel tool use. However, the acquisition of artefact-
dependent skills may come with a cost. In particular, as new skills are
acquired, others may be lost, as the co-opted brain region no longer
supports the previous task so well. Dehaene has put this forward as a
zero-sum hypothesis: gaining one set of skills through neural recycling
is in danger of undermining the skills that were previously supported
by the relevant neural substrate. This leads to a worry about the
cognitive impact of Web technologies. In particular, as our brains are
‘reprogrammed’ by our exposure to Web technologies, the fear is that
we might become less able to acquire skills that were more easily forged
in an earlier (pre-Web) era.
It is important to say here that despite finding that our brains
can indeed be rapidly reshaped by the Internet [312], there is little
or no evidence that this involves a correlative reduction in cognitive
abilities. The zero-sum hypothesis mentioned by Dehaene is thus without
empirical basis, at least when it comes to the use of Web technologies.
Moreover, it is clear that the cognitive ecology of the Web is currently
undergoing rapid transformation, at least in part to make it possible
to fluidly develop skills such as reading [115]. The invention of E-
Readers and tablet computers seems to provide a suitable medium
for much traditional style reading. Indeed, recent empirical studies
suggest that the cognitive effects of new screen devices are likely to be
negligible, especially when it comes to reading-related abilities. Many of
the effects originally reported for poor comprehension or slower retention
in respect of Web-based reading are now much harder to find, with
some studies reporting little or no difference between electronic devices
and paper books [517].
It seems that some of the rhetoric surrounding the ‘impact’ of digital
technologies on our cognitive abilities has all the hallmarks of a moral
panic, which fails to consider the extent to which technologies change
to support existing as well as newly minted skills. It remains an open
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question as to just how much human cognitive abilities are tied to
the details of our contemporary technosphere; however, there are good
historical examples of complex skill sets making transitions between
material substrates. The ability to read was arguably not seriously
compromised as we moved from hand-copied codices to printed books.
It is also seldom considered which new cognitive capacities might
become available as human beings develop skills to manipulate our Web-
based material culture. As mobile and wearable technologies become
ever-present props, the resources of the Web start to provide a sort of
ever-present virtual environment for cognition. From the presence of
virtual agents such as Amazon’s Alexa—ready to answer questions and
perform tasks for us—to the highly personalized apps resident on our
mobile devices, a broad array of Web-based tools now provide a new
sort of constant virtual cognitive environment. It is one that we can
often interact with through natural language, which responds in highly
tailored ways to our individual cognitive profiles—in part thanks to
the huge data sets companies such as Google now build about all of
us—and that can be used for an ever-expanding set of cognitive tasks.
5.5 Extended vs. Embedded: Does It Matter?
It might be thought that the preceding discussion of smart objects,
smart environments, the cognitive commons, and so on, is relevant
only to embedded cognition. This is, in fact, a mistake. The WoT, for
example, could be deemed to be of as much relevance to extended
cognition as it is to embedded cognition, especially when one considers
the opportunities that Web-enabled objects provide for cognitively-
potent forms of bio-technological bonding. Similarly, much of the content
in Section 4 could be approached from an embedded rather than an
extended perspective. It might thus be thought that the distinction
between embedded and extended approaches to cognition is of little
practical (or indeed theoretical) significance. Although the distinction
between extended and embedded approaches has been the source of a
lively philosophical debate [2, 104, 105, 417], why should members of
the Web Science community (and, more generally, the computer science
community) care about such a distinction?
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In the current section, we aim to address this particular issue by
introducing the reader to the five E’s: explanation, ethics, enhancement,
education, and engineering. By considering the implications of extended
and embedded cognition for each of these topics, we hope to show
that the distinction between extended and embedded cognition is more
than just a philosophical sideshow or an inconsequential terminological
dispute. Table 5.2 provides a summary of the key points raised in
respect of this issue.
5.5.1 Explanation
Inasmuch as we see human cognitive capabilities as rooted in the oper-
ation of extended cognitive mechanisms, then it should be clear that
an extended approach to cognition will be required to help us under-
stand the material underpinnings of the human cognitive system. In
the absence of such an approach, there is a risk that human cognitive
phenomena may appear somewhat mysterious, appearing to arise from
(neural) mechanisms that lack the wherewithal to realize them.
Donald [148] refers to this sort of ‘explanatory gap’ in his discussion
of human memory. The human cognitive system, Donald argues, has
evolved to support the externalization of memory by means of written
language, number systems, diagrams, and other representational systems.
These external memory systems, he suggests, play functionally identical
roles to those encountered in the case of biological memory. The result is
that we cannot understand human mnemonic capabilities in the absence
of an account that refers to the properties of external representational
systems, as well as the nature of the interactions we have with these
systems. An account that limits its attention to (e.g.) the processing
dynamics of the biological brain, is, it seems, unlikely to yield a complete
understanding of our cognitive capabilities, and it is for this reason
that Donald and others encourage an approach that expands the unit
of cognitive scientific analysis beyond the limits of the biological brain
[254, 255, 256, 257].
A similar sort of worry sometimes surfaces in debates about the
extended mind. Quite often, when explaining someone’s actions, we refer
to the beliefs and desires possessed by the agent. Such mental states
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Table 5.2: The distinction between extended and embedded cognition is impor-
tant when it comes to the five E’s: explanation, ethics, enhancement, education,
and engineering.
Explanation If human cognition is grounded in the operation
of extended mechanisms, then an extended
approach to cognition is required to understand
human cognitive capabilities. An embedded
perspective, in this case, risks leaving certain
aspects of human cognition unexplained or, in
the worst case, inexplicable.
Ethics If human cognition is extended, then bio-external
resources from part of the machinery of the
human mind, just as do parts of the biological
brain. From an extended perspective, therefore,
the deliberate destruction of an external resource
perhaps counts as a form of personal assault.
Enhancement Cognitive extension may lead to qualitative shifts
in cognitive processing that are not easily
predicted or explained from the perspective of
embedded cognition.
Education An extended perspective has implications for
educational policy, especially as it relates to the
use of the Web in academic examinations.
Engineering The distinction between extended and embedded
cognition matters when it comes to the
engineering of intelligent systems. If human
cognition is extended, then a system that
emulates the processing capabilities of the
biological brain is unlikely to exhibit human-level
intelligence.
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typically form part of the (folk psychological) explanatory story that we
use to make sense of an agent’s behavior. If, however, some of our beliefs
are stored in external media, then perhaps they too should count as part
of the explanatory story. Extended mental states, suggests Chalmers,
“can function in explanation in very much the same way that beliefs
function, and they should be regarded as sharing a deep and important
explanatory kind with beliefs. This explanatory unification is the real
underlying point of the extended mind thesis” (p. xiv) (see foreword
to Clark [102]). Chalmers thus argues that external beliefs are essential
to explaining human thought and action. Inasmuch as we see the Web
as forming part of the realization base for extended mental states, then
it seems we may be obliged to refer to the Web as part of our attempts
to develop folk psychological explanations of human behavior.
5.5.2 Ethics
Clark [98, chap. 7] points out several moral and societal issues related
to cognitive technology. These include unequal access to technology;
unauthorized access to personal information by individuals, corporations,
and governments; and the potential for alienation. These issues also
apply to Web-based forms of cognitive extension. We do not all have
equal access to the Web, resulting in information ‘haves’ and ‘have-
nots’ [242, 487]. Our Web-based extended memory systems might be
accessed by others, resulting in an infringement of our privacy. If our
external memories are publicly accessible, then we should perhaps be
more careful in generating certain online content. Others, however,
have pointed out that this may lead to self-censorship, which limits
human freedom and autonomy [335]. Spending too much time online,
the argument goes, may alienate us from friends, family, nature, and
political engagement. Conversely, the Web may also foster friendship [65]
and political engagement [63].
Heersmink [231] draws attention to three additional ethical issues
related to extended cognition, namely, the consequences of cognitive
technology for brains, cognition, and culture; the moral status of cogni-
tive technology; and the implications of cognitive technology for issues
of personal identity. Some theorists have argued that an overreliance on
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online information diminishes some of our onboard cognitive capabilities
and alters our cognitive profile in perhaps undesirable ways. Technology
critic Nicholas Carr [81, 82], for example, argues that relying on the
Internet as an external memory system reduces the amount of facts we
store in long-term memory, thereby making us less knowledgeable. Susan
Greenfield argues along similar lines. She writes: “Those with more
facts at their immediate disposal can build richer constructs of reality
and thus have a world view informed by a context that enables deeper
understanding, more wisdom” [206, p. 221, original emphasis]. On her
view, Internet use generates a culture in which people have a shallower
understanding of topics and are less wise. Carr and Greenfield’s criti-
cisms are based on research in cognitive psychology, which shows that
when information is available externally, people tend to spend less effort
committing such information to biological memory [472]. This is referred
to as the “Google effect.” Heersmink [229], however, has questioned
the generalizability of Sparrow et al.’s research to the Internet, as their
research does not actually involve using the Internet, it only involves
storing statements on a desktop computer. It is very likely that the
Web transforms human biological memory systems in all kinds of ways,
but the currently available empirical research in cognitive psychology
does not seem to support strong negative conclusions of the kind voiced
by Carr and Greenfield.
If the Web extends the human cognitive system, then parts of the
Web are likely to have a particular moral status. On an extended cog-
nition view, altering one’s extended memory is on a par with altering
one’s hippocampus (the part of the brain involved in memory). Johnny
Søraker claims that “the case with Otto’s notebook suggests that infor-
mation and information technology can have moral status, but only if
they are constitutive and irreplaceable in a strong sense” [471, p. 14]
(see also [304]). The same reasoning applies to Web-based extended
cognitive systems, implying that online information may have moral
status. Therefore, we ought not interfere with people’s online minds.
Carter and Palermos [83] argue that, for these reasons, stealing or
otherwise intervening in one’s extended mind should be seen as a form
of personal assault. An extended approach to cognition thus has ethical
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and legal implications, and these often go beyond those associated with
an embedded approach to cognition.
Web-based extended memory systems have an obvious relation to
human selfhood. Some philosophers argue that our self is a narrative
construct, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (un-
folding) life story [423]. The building blocks of the narrative self are
specific autobiographical memories. Web technology can play an essen-
tial role in storing such memories. Lifelogging, for example, aims to
capture and store personal experiences in an indexed database called a
lifelog. Gordon Bell’s MyLifeBits project, developed at Microsoft, is an
interesting example. Bell’s digital lifelog contains photos, videos, Web
pages, GPS locations, letters, memos, receipts, legal documents, busi-
ness cards, meeting agendas, symposia programs, diplomas, employee
evaluations, newspaper clippings, childhood drawings, birth certificates,
and much more. He can search his lifelog relatively effectively and uses
it as an external autobiographical memory. Bell and Gemmell predict
that lifelogs “will become vital to our episodic memory. As you live
your life, your personal devices will capture whatever you decide to
record. Bio-memories fade, vanish, merge, and mutate with time, but
your digital memories are unchanging” [37, p. 57]. Because of the supple-
mentary role of Web-based lifelogs for autobiographical memory, they
also play a key role in our narrative self. Other Web-based technolo-
gies that play an important role in our narrative self are social media
systems such as Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, etc. The photos and status
updates provided by these systems arguably play an important role in
autobiographical memory [143], and thus contribute to the construction
of the narrative self.
5.5.3 Enhancement
A consideration of cognitive extension is required to understand how
to enhance human cognitive performance. In a careful reflection on the
properties of extended cognitive systems, Wilson [549] writes:
One way for cognitive extension to lead to a reduction in
functional capacity is through cognitive clutter: by adding
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more bells and whistles to an existing cognitive system, we
might well cause it to operate less effectively, or even lose
certain kinds of functionality; so-called “smart technolo-
gies,” for all the benefits they bring, are often used in ways
that have this effect for particular tasks (e.g., in driving).
[549, p. 23]
We should thus be aware that not all forms of cognitive extension
are cognitively beneficial. In some cases, they may be detrimental.
There is so much information available on the Web that it does not
always lead to the desired epistemic effect. Part of the reason is that
we do not always have the cognitive resources available to filter and
evaluate search results, Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds, emails, and so
no. Information overload can thus lead to the use of false or incorrect
information. We should be aware of such effects of technology on our
cognitive capacities. Generally, however, using technology is cognitively
beneficial [365]. As Clive Thompson puts it: “From Socrates onward,
we lose old cognitive skills as we gain new ones, but we’ve benefited
from the trade-off” [501, p. 135].
Having access to online information has transformed many aspects
of human cognitive life, usually for the better, including education,
navigation, journalism, and academic scholarship. We can perform
significantly more cognitive tasks when we have access to the Web. We
look up information with search engines, store documents in the cloud,
navigate with online maps, read online newspapers and books, engage
with online courses, use online recipes, check online timetables, watch
online videos, and so on. The Web allows us to streamline many of
our daily cognitive tasks. The human brain is a powerful information
processor, but there are limits to its capacity to remember, calculate,
navigate, plan, and learn. To overcome these limits, we create and use
artefacts, including the Web, and these enable us to perform cognitive
feats that we might otherwise struggle to achieve.
As we have seen in our discussion of the complementarity princi-
ple (see Section 4.4), human beings tend to rely on tools that provide
capacities that contrast with their existing cognitive abilities. Insofar
as the Web provides such tools, we can expect them to be increasingly
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factored into everyday cognitive skills. From the extended cognition
viewpoint such skills can, in principle, be viewed as capacities of the
agent; whereas on the embedded viewpoint, these appear more like the
agent outsourcing his or her capacities. The deep incorporation of tools
can look like the agent effectively swapping out “real” internal cogni-
tive capabilities for non-cognitive external ones. In this way, adopting
extended or embedded viewpoints can have real implications for issues
of cognitive enhancement and diminishment [113]. Choosing to adopt a
theoretical viewpoint can also have ethical consequences, in that the
adoption of the very same technological device may look like a form of
diminishment from an embedded viewpoint and a form of enhancement
from an extended viewpoint.
5.5.4 Education
Clark writes that “[t]echnological education will be crucial if human-
machine cooperation is to enrich and humanize rather than restrict
and alienate” [98, p. 183]. To optimize our embodied interactions with
cognitive technology, we should thus educate pupils and students so as
to enable them to use technology in the best possible way. Theorizing on
the role of technology in education from an extended mind perspective,
Mike Wheeler [543] writes:
Perhaps what we ought to focus on, then, is the education
of those hybrid assemblages, a focus which is entirely con-
sistent with the goal of endowing the brain with the skills
it needs to be an effective contributor to such assemblages.
From this perspective, of course, there are extremely good
reasons to support the increased presence of technology
in the examination hall.
Wheeler thus argues that we should focus on educating extended
cognitive systems and allow students to use technology when they are
taking exams. If we couple with online information to form extended
cognitive systems, how should such systems be educated? We should
first of all be aware that, in some cases, extending one’s cognitive
system may have undesirable effects. Consider, again, Wilson’s [549]
108 Embedded Cognition
observation that, in some cases, extending one’s cognitive system results
in performing tasks less effectively, or may even result in losing certain
kinds of functionality. Web-users should be educated so as to prevent or
minimize such negative consequences. Moreover, as pointed out above,
one’s extended memory such as, for example, a Web-based application
such as Google Calendar, can be accessed by others, potentially resulting
in an infringement of one’s privacy. It is important to educate people
as to how to use Web-based technologies in the best possible way
and to make people aware that their Web-extended minds might be
accessed by others [404].
Epistemologist Duncan Pritchard writes: “Focussing on the real-
world cognitive situations that citizens encounter—situations which
are these days laden with technology—is entirely the right approach
for our educational policies to take” [395, p. 50]. Given that the Web
is ubiquitously used in many contexts, we should focus on educating
Web-extended cognitive systems. This means we should teach pupils
and students information literacy skills such as the ability to efficiently
navigate, evaluate, compare, and synthesize online information [145, 229,
405]. Given that search engines are the main portal to the Web, it is im-
portant to educate people how to use search engines in an epistemically
responsible way by being able to define search queries, choose the best
search results, and evaluate sources for reliability and validity [see 145].
5.5.5 Engineering
The distinction between extended and embedded cognition alters the
way we think about the development of Web-based systems. The ma-
jority of development efforts are, of course, geared towards supporting
human agents with respect to the performance of cognitive tasks [145,
364, 365], and this highlights the relevance of cognitive ergonomics [241]
and cognitive engineering [57] to the development of Web-based sys-
tems. This is the case irrespective of whether we view cognition from an
extended or embedded perspective. On an extended view, however, the
engineering of online systems provides the material fabric for extended
cognitive mechanisms, and it is in this sense that technological and
software engineering can be seen as, quite literally, a form of ‘cognitive
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engineering’ or ‘mind engineering’—a way of providing the material
elements from which extended cognitive organizations are built. Such a
perspective obviously affects our approach to the engineering of techno-
logical systems. As is noted by Blomberg [57], an extended approach to
cognition can “help researchers and system designers to achieve a shift
of perspective that could have practical consequences downstream from
research and design” (p. 98).
Another engineering-related issue that emerges in respect of the
distinction between extended and embedded cognition centers on the
attempt to develop systems with advanced (human-level) intelligence.
Suppose that we approach human cognition from an embedded per-
spective. In this case, the biological brain serves as the point-source
for human cognitive capabilities, and it is thus the biological brain
that serves as the primary focus of attention when it comes to our
attempts to understand the machinery of the mind. The result, from
an engineering perspective, is likely to be an approach that focuses on
the processing dynamics of the biological brain. Indeed, by building a
precise computational replica of the biological brain, we might expect
to yield a system with all the cognitive flair, power and sophistica-
tion of the human cognitive system. And why not expect this? We
have, after all, re-created all the mechanisms deemed to be sufficient
for human cognizing.
Now let us look at things from the standpoint of extended cognition.
In this case, the mechanisms that are deemed relevant to human cogni-
tion are not necessarily confined to the intra-cranial realm. The result
is that in attempting to emulate human-level cognitive capabilities, we
are obliged to broaden the scope of our computational modeling efforts,
taking into account the potentially crucial role played by information
processing circuits that extend beyond the neural realm. From an ex-
tended perspective, the exclusive focus on neural mechanisms now looks
to be a little inadequate. It is almost as if we were attempting to emulate
the aeronautical capabilities of a modern fighter aircraft by focusing all
our attention on the jet engines. Sure, jet engines are important. And if
you build a precise replica of a jet engine, then you will no doubt end
up with a system that does at least something interesting. . . perhaps
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even valuable. Virtuoso displays of aeronautical expertise are, however,
unlikely to be among the list of competences yielded by this partic-
ular form of reverse engineering. The same may very well be true of
computational modeling efforts that focus all their attention on the
biological brain. Crucially, if human intelligence is not realized solely by
the biological brain, then a question is raised about the extent to which
we can expect large-scale neural simulations [120] and neuromorphic
chips [246] to yield information processing capabilities that resemble
those of human cognizers.
6
Social Cognition
Thus far, the discussion has centered on how the cognitive profile of
individual human agents might be affected by current or future forms
of the Web. There is, however, another aspect to this discussion that
we haven’t touched on as yet. This is the role played by the Web in
supporting social interaction and interpersonal communication. The
recent growth and expansion of the Web has, to a large extent, been
driven by the emergence of systems that alter the shape of our social
interactions. Indeed, the advent of social media sites (e.g., YouTube),
social networking systems (e.g., Facebook) and microblogging services
(e.g., Twitter) has prompted a significant shift in how we think about
the Web. Instead of the Web serving as a mere source of information, it
is now common to see the Web as something of a ‘social space’—a space
in which people are able to interact, socialize and share information.
We are increasingly witnessing the emergence of what has been dubbed
the Social Web [see 189]: a suite of applications, services, technologies,
formats, protocols and other resources, all united in their attempt to
both foster and support social interaction.
The social character of the contemporary Web suggests that it
may be relevant to processes that are typically subsumed under the
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heading of social cognition [218, 288]. Unlike the kinds of cognition
discussed in previous sections (i.e., embodied, extended and embedded),
social cognition is concerned with a particular set of processes, namely,
those that enable us to make sense of the social world and interact
with other agents. In this respect, the Web is an important focus of
empirical and theoretical attention. Given the role of the Web in the
formation, maintenance and dissolution of inter-personal relationships,
it is important that socially-minded philosophers and scientists consider
the potential impact of the Web on social cognitive processes.
One widely held view, both inside and outside academia, is that the
Web poses a threat to our social cognitive capabilities. One of the main
protagonists in this debate is Sherry Turkle. Turkle suggests that we are
in danger of substituting the deep and meaningful relationships we have
with other human beings for the somewhat more psychologically-insipid
forms of engagement we have with digital technologies [515]. A similarly
pessimistic view is expressed by Susan Greenfield [206]. She suggests
that the overuse of online social networks is contributing to a general
decline in our social cognitive skills, perhaps contributing to a rise in the
incidence of autistic spectrum disorders. Such claims, it should be clear,
are highly controversial, with many arguing that the available evidence
is not sufficient to warrant the alarmist character of recent rhetoric [38,
355]. In fact, recent debates about the effects of the Web on human
social cognitive capabilities have all the hallmarks of a moral panic.
Clowes [111], for example, suggests that the rapid growth and popularity
of the Social Web circa 2007 outpaced the ability of the scientific
community to evaluate its cognitive effects, leading to widespread public
anxiety about the Web’s impact on socially-relevant cognitive abilities.
In this section, we provide an overview of research relating to social
cognition. Although there are many points of interest here, we limit our
attention to three topics that have been the focus of recent research.
These topics relate to the effect of the Web on person perception and
impression formation processes (see Section 6.1), the emergence of so-
called social bots within the social media ecosystem (see Section 6.2),
and the role of the Web in mediating various forms of social influence
(see Section 6.3). Section 6.4 explores an additional topic that is relevant
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to social cognition research. This concerns the extent to which the Social
Web enables us to exceed the limits on social cognitive processing as
imposed by the human brain.
6.1 Person Perception
Person perception (also known as social perception) represents one of
the core focus areas for social cognition research. Researchers in this
area are concerned with the processes that enable us to form impressions
of other people. The cognitive processes of interest are thus ones that
relate to the collection and interpretation of information about other
individuals [384]. In the standard (face-to-face) case, of course, person
perception is informed by a rich variety of linguistic, para-linguistic
and non-verbal cues, not all of which are available in the online realm.
In spite of this, research suggests that the Web is able to support
person perception processes.
One of the main focal points for research in this area relates to the
informational cues that are available from social media sites. A notable
example is information relating to an individual’s social network. As
Donath and boyd [149] point out, social networking sites are often set
up in such a way that information about a user’s social network is
automatically broadcast to other users. The number of followers one
has on Twitter or the number of connections one has on LinkedIn are
two examples of what Donath and boyd refer to as “public displays of
connection.” Crucially, many of these online social cues are not ones
that are (directly) created and maintained by the human users of an
online system; instead, the cues are generated by the online system,
based on the behavior of the system’s user community [508].1 A Twitter
user, for example, has no real control over the information that depicts
the number of followers associated with their user account. Instead, this
information is computed by the servers that host the Twitter system,
and it is the server machines that render this information in graphical
or textual form. The process by which online social cues are generated
is thus one that relies on patterns of human behavior and the ongoing
1As a result, such cues are sometimes referred to as “system generated cues” [541].
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execution of one or more (machine-based) computational processes.
Inasmuch as we see such cues as influencing the processes of person
perception, then it should be clear that the outcomes of such processes
often have as much to do with the technological properties of the Web
as they do with the interpretive capabilities of the Web’s human users.
Recent research suggests that online social cues can indeed be
used to drive person perception processes, informing social judgements
relating to (e.g.) credibility, extraversion, popularity and social attrac-
tiveness [508, 528, 541]. Consider, for example, one of the leading social
networking sites: Facebook. One of the pieces of information that Face-
book provides is the number of ‘friends’ associated with a user account.
This information is generally unavailable (or at least difficult to obtain)
in face-to-face contexts, but it is relatively easy to access in the context
of the social media ecosystem. Findings by Tong et al. [508] indicate
that the availability of this piece of socially-relevant information has
a profound effect on perceptions of a profile owner’s popularity, ex-
traversion and social attractiveness. By experimentally manipulating
the number of apparent friends listed on a Facebook profile page, Tong
et al. were able to demonstrate a curvilinear relationship between the
number of Facebook friends and perceptions of social attractiveness. In
particular, those with moderate numbers of friends were seen as more
likeable, relative to those who had a smaller or larger number of friends.
Another study concerning the impact of online social cues on person
perception was performed by Westerman et al. [541], this time using the
Twitter microblogging system. What Westerman et al. discovered was
that the number of ‘followers’ associated with a Twitter account served to
influence judgements relating to the account owner’s credibility. As with
the study by Tong et al. [508], Westerman et al. report the presence of a
curvilinear relationship, with moderate numbers of followers eliciting the
highest credibility ratings. Such observations are important because they
highlight the ways in which credibility evaluations can be manipulated
by relatively simple system-generated cues. Given that the information
posted on social media sites may not always be the most reliable, it is
important to understand the factors that determine when an individual
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is likely to be influenced by such information, based on the perceived
credibility of the information source.
These studies are among several examples that illustrate the extent
to which online social cues can be used to support person perception
processes [519, 527]. Interestingly, the research in this area seems to
suggest that person perception occurs quite quickly in the context of
social media sites, i.e., people form an impression of another Web user
within a relatively short timeframe. This result is somewhat surprising in
view of the predictions made by Social Information Processing Theory
(SIPT) [526]. One of the central tenets of SIPT is that impression
formation and person perception processes occur relatively slowly in an
online context, often requiring multiple interactions over an extended
time period. Such claims are difficult to reconcile with the results of
(e.g.) Westerman et al. [541] who report that users were able to evaluate
the credibility of a Twitter user following a single exposure to the user’s
profile page. “[E]ven in a relatively restricted time period,” Westerman
et al. conclude, “there are certain types of social information that users
can parse and use to make social judgements” (p. 205).
Some insight into the richness of online information, vis-à-vis its
ability to support person perception processes, is revealed by studies that
attempt to predict personality traits from social media profiles [19, 190,
397]. In one study, Bachrach et al. [19] examined the correlation between
personality traits and the properties of a user’s Facebook profile (e.g.,
the size and density of the user’s social network, the number of photos
the user had uploaded, and the number of groups the user had joined).
The results of this study revealed a number of correlations between
online social cues and user personality traits. In particular, the best
correlations were obtained in respect of extraversion and neuroticism,
followed by openness and conscientiousness. By themselves, of course,
these results are not sufficient to warrant conclusions regarding the
social cognitive utility of online information, since there is no evidence
to suggest that human users are able to detect the sort of correlations
revealed by statistical methods. Nevertheless, the results do suggest
that it is possible, at least in principle, for online social cues to provide
the kind of information that could be used to guide person perception
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processes. Given that such cues track user behavior over extended time
periods, they may very well turn out to be more reliable indicators of
(e.g.) user personality than the sorts of cues typically available in face-to-
face contexts—and this is despite the fact that face-to-face encounters
have traditionally been seen to provide a far richer informational context
for person perception.
The process of forming accurate impressions of another individual
(the alter) requires the perceiver (the ego) to exhibit a number of cogni-
tive abilities (e.g., the ability to perceive person-relevant information
and make inferences based on that information). Interestingly, this
emphasis on cognitive abilities provides the basis for an epistemological
approach to person perception. In particular, we can view the overall
goal of person perception as an attempt to acquire knowledge about (the
properties of) other agents. Such knowledge is sometimes referred to as
interpersonal knowledge or interpersonal epistemology [40]. According to
Berger et al. [40], interpersonal knowledge is achieved when the ego de-
velops individuating impressions of the alter, including representations
of the alter’s beliefs. Such impressions are typically formed as the result
of an ongoing interaction between the ego and the alter. In particular,
Berger et al. cast person perception as an active, temporally-extended
process, in which knowledge is acquired as the result of a variety of
knowledge-generating strategies, such as interrogation, self-disclosure,
deception detection, environmental structuring and deviation testing.
Cast in this light, the concept of interpersonal knowledge is one that
dovetails with recent work in both cognitive science and contemporary
epistemology. From a cognitive science perspective, the emphasis on
knowledge-generating strategies establishes a natural point of contact
with work that emphasizes the role of actions in helping to support
the acquisition of task-relevant information [see 277]. The concept of
interpersonal knowledge is also nicely aligned with issues in contem-
porary epistemology. In particular, the emphasis on cognitive abilities
(e.g., the ability to infer person-related properties from a limited set of
informational cues) is in perfect accord with virtue-theoretic approaches
to knowledge [see 204], especially when it comes to the epistemological
position known as virtue reliabilism [203, 392]. A key feature of such
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approaches is that knowledge is seen to be grounded in the exercise of
an agent’s cognitive abilities. In fact, inasmuch as we are prepared to
accept that elements of the online environment are actively involved
in the realization of person perception processes, then we may have an
opportunity to combine a virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge with
the notion of extended cognition [see 393]. In this case, we can perhaps
see social media systems as working in concert with individual human
cognizers to form a hybrid organization whose doxastic outputs reliably
track the properties of other Web users.
6.2 Social Bots
The Turing Test [514] has, for many years, been a driving force in AI
research. Inspired by the idea of designing a computer algorithm that
could pass the Turing Test, researchers have long sought to develop
systems with human-like capabilities, especially in the areas of natural
language processing and natural language generation. The advent of
social media systems has yielded a surprising twist to this decades-long
aspirational effort. The twist comes in the form of what are called social
bots [170]. These are systems that attempt to infiltrate the social media
ecosystem, typically by masquerading as human users:
A social bot is a computer algorithm that automatically pro-
duces content and interacts with humans on social media, try-
ing to emulate and possibly alter their behavior. [170, p. 96]
In essence, we can think of a social bot as a system that attempts to
pass the social media equivalent of the Turing Test. A social bot is thus
a system that aims to behave in a manner that is sufficiently human-
like so as to be indistinguishable from a genuine human user. This is
obviously a different sort of challenge to that posed by the original
Turing Test. In particular, the nature of the formats and protocols
adopted by social media systems may make it easier for a social bot
to emulate the behavior of human users (consider, for example, how
the 140 character limit in Twitter may simplify the task of generating
suitably convincing linguistic content). In addition, the fact that social
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bots are embedded within the social media environment provides an
interesting set of opportunities for behavioral emulation. Social bots
may, for example, monitor the behavior of Web users and attempt to
model their behavior based on the insights they glean from the resultant
data sets. They may also access the online profiles of Web users and
attempt to imitate or impersonate those users [187]. Finally, social bots
may attempt to mask their true identity by exploiting Web-accessible
content. As noted by Ferrara et al. [170]:
. . . social bots can search the Web for information and me-
dia to fill their profiles, and post collected material at pre-
determined times, emulating the human temporal signa-
ture of content production and consumption—including
circadian patterns of daily activity and temporal spikes
of information generation. (p. 99)
One reason why social bots are interesting in the context of social
cognition research is because issues of social sensemaking, impression
formation and person perception lie at the heart of the original Turing
Test. In order to pass the Turing Test, a synthetic agent needs to behave
in a manner that is suitably aligned with the social cognitive capabilities
of a typical human interlocutor. Inasmuch as the social bot achieves
this goal, then it is likely to be regarded as a human agent. This is
important, because in an online context such perceptions are apt to
alter the cognitive and behavioral responses of large swathes of the
human user community. Indeed, much of the recent research on social
bots has focused on the potential threat they pose to the online social
environment.2 In the aftermath of the 2013 Boston bombing incident,
2It should also be noted that social bots pose a threat to the integrity of
empirical research that seeks to use the Web as a platform for social and cognitive
research. The failure to disambiguate social bots from genuine human users may, for
example, undermine the validity of research that seeks to understand the dynamics of
collective cognition (see Section 7). A related point concerns the attempt to monitor
and predict worldly events using social media systems. The real-time analysis of
Twitter tweet streams, for example, has been used to predict or detect the outbreak
of epidemics [296], election results [513], and earthquakes [419]. The extent to which
these predictive efforts are compromised by the presence of social bots is, at the
present time, unclear.
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for example, a number of false accusations were widely circulated on
Twitter, mostly as the result of social bots automatically retweeting
existing posts [213]. The widespread dissemination of this sort of false
information is apt to nullify the otherwise positive role that social media
systems may play with respect to the performance of collective cognitive
tasks (e.g., collective sensemaking tasks) [284, 363] (see Section 7.1). A
related concern arises in respect of political campaigns. As noted by
Ratkiewicz et al. [402], social bots are a potential threat to democracy,
in the sense that they may artificially inflate support for a political
candidate and thus influence the outcome of political elections. What is
interesting here, is that social bots are perceived to be a threat precisely
because they are apt to be confused with human users. This suggests
an interesting reversal of the challenge posed by the original Turing
Test. The current difficulty, it seems, is not so much the development
of synthetic agents that are able to emulate human behavior; rather,
it is the development of algorithms that are sufficiently discerning
as to discriminate bona fide human agents from their more ersatz
counterparts [170]. The upshot of all this is likely to be an ‘arms
race’, in which advances in bot detection methods are paralleled by
the attempt to develop ever-more sophisticated (i.e., human-like) social
bots. Predicting the outcome of this arms race is difficult; however, one
possibility is that (in the specific socio-ecological niche of the Web)
human and synthetic agents will be, in large part, indistinguishable.
Future social bots may thus be treated as kindred social cognizers of
the online social realm.
6.3 Social Influence
Among the many topics that are of interest to social psychology, social
influence is perhaps one of the most important. As noted by Mason et
al. [329], “The study of social influence—the ways other people affect
one’s beliefs, feelings, and behavior—in large measure defines social
psychology” (p. 279). Much the same, of course, could be said about
disciplines whose focus of interest lies above the level of individual
agents, e.g., the disciplines of sociology, economics and political science.
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Social relationships are obviously key to understanding the nature of
social influence; for they are the conduits through which social influence
is often exerted. Every relationship that we establish with others is thus
a channel that supports the flow of information, enabling our thoughts
and actions to influence the thoughts and actions of others, and enabling
our own thoughts and actions to be influenced in return. It is partly
for this reason that the study of social influence often goes hand in
glove with the study of social networks. By understanding something
about the structural organization of social networks, scientists hope to
acquire insight into how the properties of both individuals and groups are
affected by issues of social structure [61, 95, 446, 555]. Such goals are not,
of course, exclusive to social science, and the scientific study of networks—
the basis of the nascent discipline of network science [25, 121]—is one
that is common to a number of scientific disciplines [24, 68], including
the disciplines of both cognitive science [26] and Web Science [504].
The Social Web is perhaps the most obvious point of interest for those
concerned with issues of social influence. Social Networking Sites (SNSs),
such as Facebook, for example, provide a relatively new means by which
social networks can be managed, maintained and sometimes modified,
and we would therefore expect such systems to play an important role
in social influence. Of particular significance is the fact that many
SNSs provide APIs to support the derivation of population-scale data
sets, yielding insight into the time-variant structural profile of online
social networks and supporting studies into the factors that regulate
social influence.3 One example of a study that combines the use of
network analytic techniques with an attempt to monitor social influence
in an online SNS is provided by Aral and Walker [13]. Aral and Walker
monitored the tendency of Facebook users to adopt a commercial
Facebook application in response to messages sent from a peer in
their local social network. The subsequent analysis of data from 1.3
million Facebook users yielded a number of interesting results, including
the finding that younger users are more susceptible to influence than
3As is evidenced by the comments of those who work in computational social
science [123, 185, 302, 485], such data sets are often seen to provide an opportunity
to improve our understanding of social processes.
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older users, men are more influential than women, women influence
men more than they influence other women, and married individuals
are the least susceptible to social influence. These results, it should
be clear, reveal something about the moderating effect of individual,
agent-level properties—e.g., age, gender and marital status—on the
influential status of a given individual. But in addition to this, Aral and
Walker suggest that the structural organization of a social network is
also relevant to social influence. In particular, the connections between
influential individuals appears to accentuate their influential capacity.
This suggests that when it comes to product adoption decisions on
Facebook, the tendency of a group of influential friends to act in concert
with one another may be a significant factor in determining the extent
of social influence [13].
It is natural to think of social influence as something that occurs in
a ‘peer-to-peer’ fashion, with one agent influencing the thoughts and
actions of their network neighbors (e.g., friends on Facebook). But these
are not the only forms of social influence that can be found on the
Web. Web-based systems thus provide a rich array of (socially-derived)
informational cues that can serve as the basis for indirect forms of
social influence. To help us see this, consider the kinds of cues that were
discussed in Section 6.1. These cues (e.g., the number of Twitter followers
associated with a user account) represent information about a social
property, and we have already seen that such cues are apt to influence
the thoughts and actions of the average Web user. What we seem to
have here is a form of influence that connects the realm of individual
thought and action to the realm of social or collective phenomena
(i.e., phenomena that apply to collections of individuals). As another
example of this sort of influence, consider the way in which YouTube
provides an indication of the popularity of uploaded digital resources
(i.e., videos) by explicitly representing information about the number of
times such resources have been viewed (or downloaded) by other users.
This particular informational cue provides an explicit representation
of an aggregate measure of collective behavior (i.e., it is a cue that
provides information about a collective phenomenon). In addition to
this, however, it is also a cue that human Web users can perceive and
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process. In other words, the cues in question are ones that are apt to
mediate the cognitive and behavioral responses that individuals have in
response to specific aspects of the online social environment.
One way of understanding these sorts of social influence is via the
sociological notion of immergence [12, 122]. This is a particular form
of social influence that occurs in response to information about social
or collective phenomena. In a Web-based context, immergence occurs
when individual behavior is influenced by the presence of representations
that refer to patterns of collective behavior, or (more generally) some
property that is pitched at the social level of analysis.4
• Access to information about the social position of others (e.g.,
the number of followers on Twitter or the number of friends on
Facebook) can impact person perception processes [508, 541]. Such
processes are poised to affect the responses directed towards other
individuals (see Section 6.1).
• Cues indicating the popularity of certain kinds of ‘deviant’ behav-
ior can help to normalize those behaviors and facilitate their more
general expression. Examples, in this case, include the normal-
ization of self-harm behavior through social media [162] and the
use of social frequency information as a means of justifying cy-
bercriminal activity [486]—the so-called “everyone else is doing it”
rationalization [358].
4This is similar to the forms of influence proposed by social scientists in attempt-
ing to understand the relationship between social phenomena and individual action.
Social phenomena (which arise as the result of social interaction) are thus seen to
shape and constrain the actions of the individual agents that are (in some way)
exposed to the phenomena. This sort of idea is commonly encountered in the social
science literature. In their discussion of causal mechanisms in the social sciences, for
example, Hedström and Ylikoski [227] suggest that progress in our understanding of
social phenomena requires the identification of “situational mechanisms by which
social structures constrain individuals’ action and cultural environments shape their
beliefs and desires” (p. 59). In essence, we can see the Web as providing the means
by which social phenomena are able to effect changes in individual thought and
action. The following are some of the more obvious examples of immergence in
an online context:
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• The availability of cues concerning the social popularity of certain
actions, topics, content and so on can, in some cases, provide
the sort of influence that is unable to be exerted through more
direct, inter-individual forms of communication. Trending topics
on Twitter are one example of this sort of influence [see 199].
• Traces of past behavior (e.g., purchasing decisions) can sometimes
influence future behavior. An example is provided by collective
attention effects in YouTube [250]. In this case, the future produc-
tivity of individual users is influenced by explicit representations
of the number of times a user’s videos are downloaded.
From the perspective of social cognition, cues that provide informa-
tion about collective cognitive (or socio-cognitive) phenomena are of
particular interest. Such phenomena concern the cognitive responses
of multiple individuals as expressed through (e.g.) aggregate measures.
Consider, for example, cues that track levels of collective interest or
collective attention in an online resource [32]. Prominent examples are
the number of times a particular resource has been read (as in the
case of academic paper citations) or the number of times a particular
resource has been downloaded (as in the case of YouTube videos). As we
have seen, the information provided by such cues can exert a significant
influence on one’s future patterns of behavior [see 250]. All this, we
suggest, leads to a specific hypothesis regarding the cognitive impact of
socio-cognitive cues. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to this
as the socio-cognitive feedback hypothesis:
Socio-Cognitive Feedback Hypothesis
Informational cues that track the cognitive responses of
other users (e.g., indicators of collective attention) play
an important role in determining the nature of one’s fu-
ture interactions and engagements with the online realm.
This is especially so when it comes to the social evaluation
of one’s own contributions.
There is, of course, nothing that is particularly radical about this
hypothesis: it is simply a reminder that the Web can, on occasion,
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help to shape human behavior by virtue of its ability to confer social
rewards and mete out social punishments. The socio-cognitive feedback
hypothesis thus serves as an important reminder of the power and
potential of the Web as a source of information to which we, as a social
species, are exquisitely (and sometimes painfully) attuned. It is well
known, for example, that social recognition and social status are valuable
commodities that can be used to incentivize human behavior in lieu of
financial remuneration [249], and this perhaps helps to reveal one of
the factors that motivates participation in online systems [295]. Indeed,
it is the perhaps the capacity of the Web to deliver social rewards
that explains why we humans are so inclined to devote ever-increasing
amounts of time and energy to it.
The socio-cognitive feedback hypothesis is of particular interest
and relevance in the context of the Web. One of the reasons for this
relates to the fact that the kind of information that can be acquired
in the online realm is not the same as that provided by conventional
forms of face-to-face social interaction. As was mentioned above (see
Section 6.1), the Web provides a means of tracking and explicitly
representing socially-relevant information (e.g., details of one’s social
network), and this information may not be so readily available in an
oﬄine (i.e., face-to-face) context. In addition, it should be clear that
the kind of informational cues we are dealing with here are relatively
easy to manipulate (imagine a state-of-affairs in which the number of
downloads for a particular YouTube video was artificially elevated by a
warm-hearted hacker). Setting aside the ethical quandaries associated
with such forms of deliberate manipulation (of which there are no doubt
many—both pro and con), it follows from the socio-cognitive feedback
hypothesis that the manipulation of socially-relevant information (e.g.,
online social cues) may, at least in some cases, yield patterns of user
behavior that are commensurate with the goals of an online system (or
at least the goals of the system’s corporate sponsors).
6.4 Social Brains, Extended Minds
Recent theories concerning the evolution of the human brain have fo-
cused their attention on the challenges and constraints imposed by the
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human social environment. Social cognitive capacities often lie at the
heart of such theories. The general idea is that in the attempt to deal
with the vagaries of human social life, our species evolved specialized
skills of social cognition [237]. The Machiavellian intelligence hypothe-
sis [72, 546], the social intelligence hypothesis [287], and the social brain
hypothesis [155, 156, 158], are some examples of theoretical proposals
that appeal to this sort of idea, or at least some variant thereof.
One of these proposals, we suggest, is of particular interest and
relevance to Web Science, especially when it comes to a consideration
of the Social Web. This is the social brain hypothesis. The social brain
hypothesis assumes that some aspect of brain size determines, or sets
limits on, core social cognitive abilities. These limits, in turn, determine
the number of relationships (and hence group size) that social animals
can effectively maintain as coherent entities. Such constraints yield
a species-specific cognitive group size [158], which in the case of our
own species is postulated to be around 150 [157]. This is the so-called
Dunbar’s Number.
Relative to the constraints on social cognitive capacity imposed
by the social brain hypothesis, the advent of the Web (and especially
the Social Web) raises an important question: Is it possible for the
Social Web to support a form of cognitive enhancement that surpasses
the neurologically-determined performance limits associated with the
‘social brain’? This question strikes a chord with the earlier discussion
on extended cognition (see Section 4). For if we accept that extended
cognition provides a means by which human agents are able to expand
the cognitive reach of the biological brain, then perhaps the Social Web
can be seen to yield an extended cognitive capacity that transcends
the neurological limits imposed on social cognitive processing. In other
words, perhaps by factoring in the resources of the Social Web, we hu-
mans are able to deal with social environments of far greater complexity
than would otherwise be suggested by the social brain hypothesis.
For the sake of convenience, let us refer to this idea regarding
materially-extended social cognitive capacities as the extended so-
cial intelligence hypothesis:
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Extended Social Intelligence Hypothesis
The advent of the Social Web transforms the social cognitive
capabilities of the biological brain. By virtue of our ability to
incorporate the resources of the Social Web into our cognitive
processing routines, we are able to enhance our capacity
to process social information. Relative to the Social Web,
the capacity for cognitive extension leads to an inflation of
social cognitive capacities: the Social Web-extended mind is
(perhaps) a supersized social cognizer.
The extended social intelligence hypothesis proposes that some of the
cognitive mechanisms that underpin our processing of social information
are realized by circuits that extend beyond the neural realm. Inasmuch
as this is the case, then there seems little reason to assume that the
social cognitive limits of the human individual are always the same as
those mandated by the social brain hypothesis.
A number of commentators have voiced opinions consistent with
this idea. Wellman [540], for example, suggests that “social media have
increased the carrying capacity of relationships, with heavy internet
users having more close ties” (p. 174). Similarly, de Ruiter et al. [416]
note the potential of contemporary technologies to expand our social
horizons, extending the reach of our social cognitive capabilities beyond
their neurologically-determined limits:
Dunbar’s assumption that the evolution of human brain
physiology corresponds with a limit in our capacity to main-
tain relationships ignores the cultural mechanisms, practices,
and social structures that humans develop to counter poten-
tial deficiencies. [416, p. 559]
de Ruiter et al. go on to suggest that:
The human neocortex may be finite, but human capacity
appears malleable and expansive in different sociocultural
and technological contexts. [416, p. 562]
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Figure 6.1: Frequency distribution of reported number of Facebook ‘friends’ for
male and female respondents (N = 2000) (source: Dunbar [160]).
These claims regarding the augmentative potential of the Social Web
have been disputed by Dunbar [159, 160]. In one study, Dunbar [160]
examined the number of friends listed on Facebook as a means of
evaluating the claim that social media allow us to increase the size
of our social networks. In fact, he found that the size of online social
networks resembled those of oﬄine social networks (see Figure 6.1). On
the basis of this result, Dunbar concludes that cognitive constraints
pertaining to social network size are not alleviated by the adoption of
social media technologies:
. . . on the evidence available so far, it seems unlikely that
the digital media will significantly change our social lives, at
least in terms of the number and intensity of different kinds
of relationships. Our cognition, inherited as it is from our pri-
mate ancestry, seems to make that impossible. [159, p. 2199]
Despite the negative result, the issue of whether the Social Web can
enhance aspects of social cognitive functioning remains an important
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one for the philosophical, scientific and engineering community. In
particular, future work in this area should aim to determine whether
Web technologies are able to improve the processing of social information
as the result of cognitively-potent forms of bio-technological merger.
One reason for continued research in this area relates to the changing
nature of our contemporary society, as captured by the notions of
network individualization [400] and the network society [85, 144, 400].
According to the proponents of these concepts, we are moving away from
an era in which society is organized around fixed and relatively enduring
collectives (such as families, traditional friendship circles, organizations
and communities) and entering an era in which society is increasingly
organized along the lines of multiple, overlapping social networks. One
consequence of this transition is that individuals are under increasing
pressure to form more fluid and flexible social networks as a means of
satisfying basic needs, such as those pertaining to the social, emotional,
sexual, physical, and financial aspects of human life.
Inasmuch as we accept all this, then it seems that social media and
social networking systems may be able to play an important role in
helping our species adapt to our new socio-ecological niche. Just as
the aqueous environment of dolphin society is believed to lie at the
heart of their tendency to form highly dynamic and fluid task-oriented
social groups [401], so perhaps we can think of the Social Web as an
environment that supports our ability to form fluid, flexible and multiply
overlapping social networks. Perhaps, in other words, the Social Web is
just that part of the online cognitive ecology [460] that enables us to
cope with the ever-shifting sands of the human social world.
7
Collective Cognition
Ever since the advent of Web 2.0, which is characterized by greater
levels of user participation in the creation, maintenance and editing of
online content, the Web has provided ample opportunities to support
socially-distributed information processing. This highlights the potential
role of the Web in supporting episodes of collective and specifically
distributed cognition, i.e., cognition in which the relevant cognitive
processes (e.g., reasoning, remembering and problem-solving) are dis-
tributed across a mixture of multiple individuals and technological
artefacts (see Section 2.3.2). A considerable amount of interest has been
expressed by the Web Science community in this particular form of
cognition [90, 91, 92]. Previous work, for example, has studied the Web
in relation to a variety of socio-cognitive phenomena (the collective
variants of individual-level cognitive phenomena). This includes work on
collective problem-solving [350], collective sensemaking [284], collective
attention [32], collective creativity [557] and collective memory [367].
Issues of distributed cognition also lie at the heart of a number of
prominent research areas relevant to Web Science. This includes work
relating to social computation [270], human computation [300, 348, 350,
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398], collective intelligence [59, 215, 322, 323], social machines [236, 382,
466], and the global brain [47, 238].
Given the quantity of Web Science work that has been undertaken
in relation to collective cognition, it is unlikely that any single review
will be able to do justice to the existing literature in this area. The
current review is, of course, no exception. Rather than attempt to
provide a comprehensive overview of existing work, the current section
focuses on a number of topics that are likely to be of common interest
to those working in Web Science, cognitive science and the philosophy
of mind. Such topics include the relationship between network structure
and collective cognitive performance (see Section 7.1), the relationship
between social feedback and certain forms of collective intelligence
(see Section 7.2), the role of technology-mediated social participation
in the construction of cognitively-potent informational ecologies (see
Section 7.3), the status of some Web-based socio-technical systems as
problem-solving organizations (see Section 7.4), the status of Web-based
systems as the engines of knowledge discovery (see Section 7.5), and
the extent to which the social properties of the Web support socially-
extended forms of cognition (see Section 7.6). The section concludes
with a discussion of mandevillian intelligence (see Section 7.7). This is
a specific form of collective intelligence, in which cognitive constraints,
limitations and biases at the level of individual agents are seen to play a
positive functional role in yielding collective forms of cognitive success.
7.1 Socio-Cognitive Circuits
In order to support effective forms of collective cognition on the Web,
it is important to develop a better understanding of the forces and
factors that shape collective cognitive outcomes. One factor that has
been the focus of considerable research attention is the structure of
the communication network in which agents are embedded [270, 328,
330, 331, 461]. Network structure is important because it influences the
dynamics of information processing. Communication networks are thus
somewhat similar to neural networks or electrical circuits, in that the
topological structure of the network—the pattern of connections between
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nodal elements—can be seen to exert a significant influence on the kind
of information processing implemented by the networked ensemble.
It has long been known that network structure is important to at
least some forms of collective cognizing. Classic studies by Bavelas [33]
and Leavitt [303], for instance, revealed that the structure of a com-
munication network affects the performance profile of problem-solving
groups, with more centralized structures yielding the best results. Sub-
sequent research yielded a twist to these early findings, showing that the
relation between network structure and task performance is modified
by task properties [436]. It is thus not the case that a particular kind
of network structure is best for all kinds of tasks (or variations of the
same task): different networks exert different effects depending on the
nature of the task that is being performed.
One task property that seems to be relevant to collective performance
is task difficulty, i.e., the difficulty of the problem that must be tackled
by a community of problem-solving agents [330, 436]. When subjects
are confronted with a simple problem, it seems that the best network
structure is one that connects every individual to every other individual,
thereby yielding a fully-connected network. On more complex problems,
however, it seems that more limited forms of connectivity are preferable.
The reason for this is not always clear, although limited connectivity
may help to impede the rate of information flow between individuals
and thus prevent premature convergence on sub-optimal or inaccurate
solutions [253, 301, 455, 461].
Studies using social computation experiments have also contributed
to our understanding of the relationship between task properties and
network structure [270]. One of the findings to come out of this body
of research is that even subtle differences between tasks can influence
the performance outcomes associated with different network structures.
In one study, for example, Judd et al. [264] compared the impact of
multiple network structures across two tasks. They found that network
structure elicited opposing behavioral effects in the two tasks, and this
was despite the fact that the tasks were judged to be somewhat similar
from a cognitive perspective. These results lend support to what we
will call the task specificity hypothesis:
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Task Specificity Hypothesis
Different network structures (e.g., small-world, fully-connected,
etc.) yield differential effects on collective cognitive out-
comes based on the properties of the cognitive task that
is being performed.
For the most part, studies exploring the effect of network structure
on collective cognition have been undertaken in controlled laboratory
environments where it is relatively easy to impose limits on inter-agent
communication. When it comes to the Web, however, it is much more
difficult to determine the structural profile of the socio-cognitive circuits
associated with specific episodes of collective cognitive processing. In
fact, it might be thought that the Web acts to remove barriers to
information flow, enabling agents to share information in an environment
that is (more-or-less) accessible to all agents. Once an item of task-
relevant information has been posted online, for example, it becomes
available to everyone who accesses the online environment, and this
suggests that the Web might act to reduce the path length of a socio-
cognitive network. In other words, the Web seems to afford the possibility
for highly efficient and widespread forms of information dissemination—
the forms of information dissemination that are typically associated
with fully-connected networks (see Figure 7.1).
This vision of the Web as yielding something akin to a fully-
connected network presents us with a potential dilemma. For inasmuch
as we embrace the task specificity hypothesis, then it should be clear
that the Web is likely to be suited to some kinds of tasks (i.e., those
benefiting from fully-connected network structures) but not others. In
fact, the extent to which the Web can exert a positive effect on col-
lective cognition is still far from clear. One problem is that rapid and
widespread forms of information dissemination may lead to situations
in which the creativity of a group is undermined. Consider, for example,
the phenomenon of production blocking, which occurs in group solving
situations, specifically brainstorming sessions [142]. Production blocking
is the tendency for the contributions of one individual to block or inhibit
contributions from other group members, resulting in reduced levels
of creativity relative to what might have been expected if the group
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Figure 7.1: The status of the Web as a shared information space (a) yields
the same pattern of information flow as that encountered in the case of a fully-
connected network (b).
members had worked independently. It thus seems that the form of
information dissemination enabled by the Web might act to undermine
the collective creative potential of a group of agents: instead of stimu-
lating a greater number and diversity of ideas, the Web might work to
impede rather than improve the creative process.
Much the same could be said of another form of collective cognition,
namely, collective sensemaking.1 In this case, rapid forms of information
dissemination have been shown to impair performance, especially in sit-
uations where the information to be processed is conflicting, ambiguous
or incomplete [253]. This may help us understand why Web-based forms
of collective sensemaking sometimes go awry. Consider, for example, the
use of Reddit to support large-scale collective sensemaking efforts in the
case of the 2013 Boston bombings [363]. Despite providing a potentially
1Collective (or team) sensemaking is a specific form of collective cognitive activity,
in which multiple individuals attempt to resolve the features of objects or situations
based on incomplete, ambiguous and/or conflicting information [278, 467]. Note
that the meaning of the term “sensemaking” in the present context is somewhat
different to that typically encountered in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
science literature [e.g., 502].
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useful platform for users to upload and analyze images, identify potential
suspects, and highlight topics for further analysis, the user community
ultimately failed to identify the bombing suspects.2 This failure is dis-
appointing in view of the wealth of material available, and it highlights
the need for further work to improve our understanding of the factors
that affect the collective cognitive performance of online communities.
It is in the attempt to improve our understanding of collective
cognition that we encounter an important point of contact between
Web Science and cognitive science. In particular, the Web provides us
with a valuable opportunity to observe the dynamics of information flow
within a collective cognitive organization. In Section 4.7, we encountered
the idea that the Web enables us to monitor an individual’s cognitive
processing routines—to “see the mind in action,” as Krueger [286] puts
it. A similar idea can now be rolled out in respect of collective cognition.
The basic idea is to use the Web as an observational platform to track
the cognitive consequences of particular forms of (online) information
flow. The goal of such observational efforts resembles those of digital
cognitive ethnography [257], which is a well-established technique to
study the behavior of small-scale (typically team-based) socio-technical
systems. One example of digital cognitive ethnography is provided by
Hutchins et al. [258]. In this case, digital cognitive ethnography was
used to study the socio-technical interactions involved in piloting the
Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft. Hutchins et al. describe how the use
of digital recording technology yielded a rich array of performance-
relevant behavioral data, including “digital audio recordings, digital
pen data (recording notes made by the pilots as well as notes made by
observers), wearable eye tracking on both pilots, and digital data from
the simulator itself” [257, p. 43].
Of course, the data obtained from the Web is unlikely to be as
rich or as detailed as that provided by digital cognitive ethnography.
Nevertheless, there is evidence of such methods being used to support the
analysis of Web-based systems. In their analysis of distributed cognitive
processes in Wikipedia, for example, Geiger and Ribes [184] discuss the
use of trace ethnography, which they describe as “a novel method for
2See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22214511.
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studying the complex interactions that occur in sociotechnical systems.”
The further development and application of such methods may be
useful in helping us gain a better understanding of the socio-cognitive
machinery associated with certain kinds of Web-based system.
7.2 Social Feedback
In addition to issues of network structure, the access that individuals
have to information about the progress or status of some form of collec-
tive cognitive processing has also been the focus of research attention.
This is of particular interest in a Web Science context, because the
Web provides a unique opportunity to gather and exploit information
about the judgements, decisions or activities of other individuals (see
the discussion of the socio-cognitive feedback hypothesis in Section 6.3).
Consider, for example, a situation in which a group of Web users are
asked to derive an estimate of some unknown parameter. For the sake
of argument, let us assume that users are asked to estimate the number
of crimes that are recorded annually in the city of London. In this situa-
tion, the statistical average of everyone’s estimates should approximate
the actual number of crimes recorded, and this exemplifies one way in
which a system like the Web may be used to exploit what is commonly
referred to as the Wisdom of Crowds [490]. Imagine, however, that a
Web-based system that mediates this particular instance of collective
intelligence provides feedback on the estimates made by other users.
How will the provision of this information influence user behaviour?
And, in the long-term, will the feedback lead to better or worse perfor-
mance relative to what might have been expected in situations involving
the absence of feedback?
In order to answer this question, Lorenz et al. [313] devised an
experiment in which participants were asked a number of questions—
the answers to which were not known in advance by any one individual.
They then manipulated the level of feedback that participants were
given about the responses of other participants across a number of trials.
The results revealed that feedback often works to undermine collective
performance. Rather than being able to derive estimates that were,
at the collective level, close to the actual answer, subjects given high
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levels of feedback settled on responses that were, again at the collective
level, worse than those seen in situations where subjects were given no
feedback at all. In accounting for these results, Lorenz et al. [313] posit
a social influence effect, in which the feedback about subject ratings
is deemed to progressively reduce the diversity of ratings within the
group without a corresponding improvement in group-level accuracy.
These results suggest that although the Web provides an environment
in which a variety of kinds of information can be gathered during the
course of socially-distributed information processing, not all of this
information should be made available to the individual agents engaged
in the process. Instead, the results call for a more nuanced approach:
one in which the system works to adaptively regulate the availability of
different kinds of information in ways that are sensitive to the nature of
the task being performed. In essence, what is required here is a way of
dynamically organizing the setup of Web-based socio-technical systems
in order to meliorate group-level cognitive processes within a variety of
different task contexts. As our understanding of the factors that govern
collective cognitive success improves, so it is likely that systems will
emerge in which the pattern of information flow and influence between
problem-solving agents is deliberately monitored and controlled so as
to improve the prospects for collective cognitive success.
7.3 Collaborative Construction
In some cases, the processes by which specific informational ecologies
come into being on the Web are glossed in distributed or collective
cognitive terms. Consider, for example, the way in which the linking
behavior of Web users yields a body of information that can be used to
support the operation of Web search engines. The most popular example
is perhaps the PageRank algorithm, as used by Google Search [66]. Here,
the editing actions of countless numbers of Web users serves as the
analytic substrate for machine-based processes that seek to enhance the
accessibility of online information. Heintz [233] suggests that we should
see such processes as a specific form of distributed cognition:
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An essential aspect of second generation search engines
is that their ranking algorithms take as input the linking
behaviour of web-users. The consequence is that search
engines together with web-users constitute a distributed
cognitive system for the attribution of reputation, visibility,
and, eventually, credibility. [233, p. 388]
Appeals to the notion of distributed cognition have also been made
in respect of collaborative tagging [478]. Collaborative tagging refers to
the process by which descriptive ‘tags’ are added to online resources as a
means of supporting subsequent search and retrieval efforts. Prominent
examples include sites such as de.licio.us3 (for websites) and Flickr4 (for
photographs). Such forms of collaborative editing and enrichment are
of particular importance when it comes to non-textual media resources,
such as images, videos and audio resources. Given the inherent difficulties
in using automated techniques to resolve the semantic content of such
resources, the ability to rely on the human user community is of obvious
benefit in addressing what is sometimes referred to as the “semantic
gap,” a term that refers to “the discrepancy between low-level technical
features of multimedia, which can be automatically processed to a great
extent, and the high-level, meaning-bearing features a user is typically
interested in and refers to when searching for content” [442, p. 37].
Collaborative tagging is perhaps best thought of as a form of en-
richment activity—it is a way of enhancing the structure of an existing
informational ecology in a manner that (hopefully) supports all man-
ner of subsequent cognitive activities. But there is another sense in
which issues of collective cognition have been deemed relevant to the
process of collaborative construction. This emerges in respect of recent
attempts to understand the mechanisms that underlie the generation of
Wikipedia content. In particular, the creation and editing of Wikipedia
articles has been characterized as a form of human stigmergy [239, 385],
similar to the forms of stigmergy exhibited by eusocial insects.5 To help
3https://del.icio.us/
4https://www.flickr.com/
5The notion of stigmergy is typically encountered in the fields of swarm intelli-
gence [60] and swarm cognition [509, 516]. The term was originally used to account
138 Collective Cognition
us understand this claim, it will be useful to consider how stigmergic
processes operate in the case of swarm cognition [509, 516]. Swarm
cognition is a term that is applied to species of eusocial insects, such as
termites, ants, bees and wasps. It refers to the surprising intelligence
that is exhibited by these species in solving certain kinds of problem.
The ability of termites to construct architecturally elaborate termite
mounds, for example, has been linked to the operation of stigmergic pro-
cesses: as one termite drops a mud-ball, so it leaves a pheromone marker
that encourages other termites to deposit mud-balls nearby, and as the
collection of mud-balls increases in size, so macro-level architectural
structures begin to emerge as the result of collective, pheromonally-
mediated behaviors [516]. A similar sort of explanatory account emerges
in respect of the foraging behavior of ants. In this case, the ability of ants
to coordinate their collective efforts is deemed to rely on the deposition
of behavior-modifying scent trails [489]. What is common to these (and
other) cases of swarm cognition (or swarm intelligence) is the idea that
the solution to some (otherwise intractable) problem emerges as the
result of individual responses to a collectively-configured environment.
The parallels with Wikipedia now start to become clear. For one way
to think about Wikipedia is as a collectively-configured environment in
which individual editing actions occur in response to the (sometimes
subtle) changes made by other users. As each user edits a Wikipedia
article, so they alter the online environment in ways that shape, stimulate
and support the editorial responses of other users. Played out over
sufficient time, such processes lead to the informational equivalent of
the termite’s mound: a complex informational edifice that no individual,
working by themselves, could ever hope to construct.
It is thus by virtue of the appeal to stigmergic mechanisms that
we are able to identify an important link between two ostensibly dis-
parate areas of research: the study of eusocial insects on the one hand,
for the capacity of certain species of eusocial insects to create complex structures
(e.g., termite mounds) and exhibit complex behavioral patterns (e.g., trail following).
A useful definition of stigmergy is provided by Heylighen [239]. He suggests that
stigmergy is “an indirect, mediated mechanism of coordination between actions,
in which the trace of an action left on a medium stimulates the performance of a
subsequent action” (p. 6).
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and the collaborative construction of online, Web-based resources (e.g.,
Wikipedia) on the other. One reason this link is important is because it
helps to reveal commonalities in the mechanistic underpinnings of two
forms of collective cognition, namely, swarm cognition and distributed
cognition. Another reason the link is important is because it helps to
highlight the role of the environment in yielding certain forms of collec-
tive cognitive success. In the case of the termite mound, for example, the
interaction between structural, atmospheric and hydrological parame-
ters plays a crucial role in fixing the functional significance of individual
responses [516]. Similarly, when it comes to Wikipedia, we can see
the properties of the online environment—the way in which Wikipedia
presents information to its user community—as playing a crucial role
in enabling the larger socio-technical organization (Wikipedia+users)
to produce a successful outcome. What is crucial, here, is the idea of
some form of adaptive alignment between the properties of the on-
line technical environment and the cognitive/behavioral dispositions
of the human user community. When such forms of alignment are es-
tablished, the online technical system can be seen to work in concert
with the human community, yielding (in the case of Wikipedia) a rich
and reliable source of information that is relevant to a broad array of
epistemic activities [166, 167].
All this talk of collectively configured environments and the osten-
sible link between distributed and swarm cognition helps to reveal a
couple of additional points that are likely to be of common interest to
Web Science, cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. The first
point relates to issues of social scale. In particular, large-scale forms of
social participation involving thousands (if not millions) of individuals
are a common feature of many forms of Web-based distributed cognition.
In the case of Wikipedia, for example, tens of thousands of individuals
participate in the editing of online articles, and Google Search requires
even larger numbers of individuals (hundreds of thousands to millions).
Crucially, large-scale forms of social participation are often critical to
the success of these systems. In the absence of large-scale social partici-
pation, for example, Wikipedia could not have the coverage it does, nor
could it update its articles in a timely fashion. (Both of these features, it
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should be clear, are important when it comes to Wikipedia’s status as a
source of epistemically-significant information [167].) It is here that we
encounter a potentially important difference with the kinds of systems
that are the traditional empirical targets of distributed cognitive science;
for such systems—the classic case being the U.S. Navy ship studied
by Edwin Hutchins [254]—seldom exceed more than a few hundred
individuals. In this sense, systems such as Wikipedia seem to have more
in common with the entomological systems studied by the proponents
of swarm cognition and swarm intelligence. Such forms of correspon-
dence are interesting when one considers the supposed scale-dependent
nature of different social coordination protocols (i.e., the possibility that
specific social coordination protocols require a minimum group size in
order to be effective) [e.g., 389].
Another point to note is that with all the cases of collaborative
construction reviewed above, human collective efforts are helping to
shape the structure of the online informational environment. There
is, of course, nothing that is particularly remarkable about this claim:
every form of interactive engagement with the Web (especially since
the advent of Web 2.0) is likely to alter the online environment in some
way or another, even if the changes simply relate to the imprints of
our digital footprints as we traverse the online realm. But beneath
the seeming banality of this claim, there lies something of crucial
significance. And once again, it is the domain of entomology that serves
as the source of inspiration. The point of interest comes in respect of the
way in which processes of collaborative construction in eusocial insects
have been glossed as a form of ecosystem engineering [see 136]. This
establishes a natural point of contact with recent work in the philosophy
of mind concerning the notions of cognitive niche construction [102]
and ecological engineering [480]. The basic idea is that, inasmuch as we
regard the Web as a resource that influences the course of our individual
and collective cognitive endeavors, then perhaps our engagements with
the online environment can be viewed in similar terms, i.e., as a form of
cognitively-relevant ecological engineering [see 460]. Even if we demur
from the conclusion that the processes by which online informational
ecologies come into being should be counted as bona fide cases of
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collective or distributed cognition, we can surely accept the idea that
many of our forays into the online realm lead to the creation and
configuration of an environment that is poised to exert an ever-more
pervasive influence on the things we think, feel and do.
7.4 Social Machines
Many of the most popular systems on the Web today are ones whose
content is provided by their user communities. In the case of Wikipedia,
for example, the majority of the online content is not provided by a select
group of system developers—as might very well have been the case prior
to the advent of Web 2.0. Instead, the majority of the content is supplied
by the actual users (or, more accurately, the editors) of the Wikipedia
system. System developers, of course, still have an important role to
play here; for it is they who provide the infrastructure that enables the
user community to supply the actual content. Nevertheless, it is clear
that something has changed since the early days of the Web. Instead of
pre-populating an online system with content in advance of its actual
use, we have witnessed the rise of an alternative development model: one
where the process of content generation is delegated (or outsourced) to
the user community. As is evidenced by the likes of Wikipedia, Twitter,
Facebook, YouTube and Flickr, this approach has turned out to be
extraordinarily successful. In the absence of user contributions, it might
be difficult (not to mention costly) for online systems to garner the
sort of content that maintains their popularity (and sustains a steady
stream of advertising revenue for their commercial sponsors).
Systems that provide support for the social creation of content
are sometimes referred to as social machines [43]. These systems have
been the focus of considerable research attention by the Web Science
community [234, 236, 243, 382, 427, 431, 464, 466]. Social machines
were originally understood in terms of a division of labor between the
social and technological elements of an online system, with human
agents performing a creative role and technological elements assigned to
more administrative duties [43]. This early approach to understanding
social machines has since expanded to include a bewildering array of
different views. Social machines have thus been understood as problem-
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solving organizations [236, 243], as systems that feature the participatory
involvement of social and technological elements in the realization of
system-level phenomena [464], as distributed cognitive systems [382], as
purely technological systems that are able to engage in social exchanges
with other systems [70, 338], and as systems in which human agents
participate in computational processes [244, 410].
Given the scope of the present review, this is clearly not the place
to undertake a comprehensive survey of social machine research efforts.
It is, however, worth highlighting the relevance of social machines from
a cognitive science perspective. There are, in fact, a couple of points
that are worth mentioning here. The first is that social machines are
typically conceived as socio-technical systems, i.e., as systems that
feature some form of interactive engagement between a set of social
and technological elements. This establishes an obvious point of contact
with work in distributed cognitive science [254, 255], especially since
the systems of interest in distributed cognitive science are (mostly)
systems that involve cognitively-relevant forms of causal commerce
between a set of social and technological elements [see 382]. The link
with distributed cognition is perhaps all the more obvious if we view
social machines as problem-solving organizations [236, 243]. In this case,
we can see social machines as being involved in an activity (i.e., problem-
solving) that is typically glossed in cognitive terms. The result is that
when we view social machines as problem-solving organizations, we are
presented with an important opportunity to study social machines as
distributed cognitive systems [382].
A second point to note is that issues of complementarity often emerge
as a focal point of social machine research. In particular, by virtue of their
socio-technical nature, social machines are ideally poised to exploit the
respective capabilities of human agents and conventional computational
systems [135, 139, 349]. Indeed, it is often the distinctive capabilities
of human and machine elements that underlies the interest in social
machines as systems with advanced problem-solving capabilities [236].
This emphasis on complementarity opens up important links with work
in other areas of computer science, most notably work on complementary
computing [269], mixed-initiative computing [245], human–machine
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symbiosis [261] and heterotic computing [271]. But in addition to this,
issues of complementarity also help to establish a point contact with
cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, especially in respect
of work into extended cognitive systems (see Section 4). In this case,
it is often the complementary nature of a set of biological and non-
biological resources that is seen to provide the basis for advanced forms
of intelligence [98]. Such claims strike a chord when it comes to the
kinds of problems (e.g., disease, world hunger and global climate change)
that are typically mentioned in relation to social machines [see 236].
Such problems may be sufficiently taxing as to require the assembly of
socio-technical systems that co-opt the complementary computational
and representational capabilities of both humans and machines. Indeed,
it is perhaps only by merging the properties of human and machine
components into some larger functionally-integrated problem-solving
ensemble that we will be able to gain sway over problems that lie
beyond the computational ambit of either the biological brain or our
most advanced forms of technological contrivance.6
7.5 Knowledge Engines
Although it is no doubt possible to identify many different kinds of
social machine, one kind of social machine is of particular interest. These
are social machines that are involved in some form of knowledge-related
activity [427, 458], such as the elicitation, acquisition, representation,
discovery and exploitation of knowledge. Social machines of this ilk
have been referred to as knowledge machines [345, 458].
Wikipedia is perhaps the most prominent example of a knowledge
machine. It supports a particular form of knowledge acquisition, in which
epistemic outputs are generated and refined as a result of collective
editing actions (see Section 7.3). The outputs of such processes are, of
6Such claims resonate with the views of philosophers like Verdoux [522] who
see technologically-mediated cognitive enhancement as a means to circumvent the
inherent limitations of the human cognitive system. A similar idea is encountered
in respect of the notion of heterotic computing [271]. In this case, socio-technical
hybridization is seen to yield a ‘social computer’ whose computational power exceeds
the limits of silicon-based digital circuits [244].
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course, primarily intended for human consumption, and they thus tend
to diverge from the sort of outputs (e.g., computational ontologies) that
are delivered by conventional knowledge engineering efforts. Other kinds
of knowledge machine, however, participate in the production of more
formal knowledge-related resources. These include collaborative ontology
authoring environments [438], semantic wikis [285], and a variety of
online multiplayer games that provide support for the processes of
semantic annotation and ontology alignment [441, 442, 496].
A particularly interesting class of knowledge machine is concerned
with the processes of knowledge discovery. For the sake of convenience,
we will refer to these knowledge machines as discovery-oriented knowl-
edge machines. Discovery-oriented knowledge machines typically rely on
large-scale social participation as a means of analyzing bodies of scientific
data. Citizen science systems, such as Galaxy Zoo, are one example of
this sort of knowledge machine [see 308]. Such systems often contribute
to important scientific discoveries. The Galaxy Zoo system, for example,
has contributed to the discovery of an astronomical phenomenon known
as Hanny’s Voorwerp [309], as well as a previously unknown class of
greenish-colored galaxies, aptly called Green Pea galaxies [76].
Games With A Purpose (GWAPs) are another important category of
discovery-oriented knowledge machines. These are systems that attempt
to exploit peoples’ enthusiasm for playing computer games in order to
perform some form of scientifically-relevant information processing [200].
The protein-folding game, Foldit, is a particularly well-studied example
of this sort of system [130, 273]. Foldit is an online multiplayer game
that aims to derive accurate protein structure models via game-play
responses. The game involves the presentation of improperly folded
protein structures to human game-players, and the protein structure is
then manipulated using a combination of manual and automatic actions
so as to maximize the score associated with a computed evaluation
metric. The game is interesting because it provides a compelling example
of the way in which knowledge machines (and social machines, more
generally) can be used to maximally exploit the distinctive (albeit
complementary) capabilities of human and machine components [135].
For example, in attempting to maximize their score, an individual user
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can interact with the protein structure, tugging and twisting the protein
backbone as a means of exploring the target solution space. In the
course of these activities, human game-players are deemed to rely on a
set of visual and spatial cognitive abilities that are, as yet, unmatched
by the capabilities of existing AI algorithms. There is, however, an
important role for machine-based processes in supporting the user’s
search for optimal protein conformations. In particular, the Foldit
interface provides access to a range of tools that implement so-called
“automatic moves.” These include, for example, a “wiggle” routine that
attempts to perform a localized search for high-scoring protein structures
in the vicinity of the current structural candidate [see 130].
Perhaps one of the most impressive accomplishments of the Foldit
system, at least from the perspective of knowledge discovery, relates
to its success in deciphering the crystal structure of the retroviral
protease of the Mason-Pfizer monkey virus, a simian AIDS-causing
virus [274]. The structure of this protein (an enzyme) had remained
elusive despite attempts to solve the problem using conventional com-
putational and experimental methods. When assigned to the Foldit
system, a group of Foldit players were able to produce an accurate
3D model of the target protein within the space of just three weeks!
This represents an important breakthrough for the biomedical research
community, especially given the importance of retroviral proteases to
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) research [e.g., 280]. Such results
provide us with an important demonstration of the power and potential
of GWAPs with respect to their ability to contribute to the process
of scientific discovery.
Aside from citizen science systems and GWAPs, it is possible to
discern a third type of discovery-oriented knowledge machine. These
are systems that attempt to yield insights into a broad array of social
phenomena. The general idea is that the Web provides us with an im-
portant opportunity to see ‘society in action’ [cf. 286]. Thus, just as the
Web has provided the basis for large-scale forms of social participation
in any number of online activities, so too it has also opened the door to
novel forms of social observation and analysis [see 485]. Crucially, as
our everyday social activities and endeavors become ever-more closely
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entwined with the online realm, so it becomes increasingly tempting
to see the Web as part of the causally-active physical fabric that re-
alizes social processes [see 464]. In other words, the Web presents us
with a vision of a networked society in which at least some kinds of
social phenomena are subject (at least in part) to Web-based forms
of computational realization. This raises a host of important issues
concerning our ability to use the Web (or parts thereof) as a form of
“digital socioscope” [339] or “social observatory” [87].7
As an example of work in this area consider a study by González-
Bailón et al. [199], which sought to understand how the distribution
of participation thresholds within the Twitter community may have
contributed to the emergent profile of the Spanish Indignados protest
movement. Here we see a noted social machine—namely, Twitter—being
implicated in the forces and factors that work to drive a specific form
of collective action. Indeed, González-Bailón et al. [199] suggest that
their study helps to illuminate the role of individual communication in
shaping patterns of collective behavior:
We use this case to analyse the way in which individual
communication patterns concatenate in complex networks of
interaction that can ultimately lead to an explosion of activ-
ity on the aggregate level, hence boosting the global visibility
of social movements and political protests. [199, p. 264]
Using the Web as a platform for social observation and monitoring
clearly raises a host of important ethical issues relating to privacy,
surveillance and social control. Nevertheless, the ability to observe and
monitor social activity in the online realm does provide us with a valu-
able opportunity to improve our understanding of social processes. This
is important, because our contemporary society is a system of such
7Interestingly, work in this area often embraces a mechanistic approach to under-
standing social phenomena—an approach that is in perfect accord with the mechanis-
tic view of social machines alluded to by some social machine researchers [e.g., 464].
Aharony et al. [6], for example, suggest that network-based monitoring techniques can
be used to investigate the mechanisms that give rise to social or collective phenomena,
in a manner that resembles the use of neuroimaging techniques to help tease apart
the mechanistic realizers associated with brain-based cognitive phenomena.
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complexity that its dynamical profile often resists our best attempts
at prediction and explanation. In the wake of such complexity, it is
perhaps tempting to think that the mechanistic underpinnings of social
phenomena are doomed to forever lie beyond the reach of our (social)
scientific grasp. However, when we see the Web as part of the material
fabric of society (i.e., as part of the physical machinery that realizes
social phenomena), then we are afforded a much more positive perspec-
tive on the empirical and theoretical prospects of contemporary social
science. This is because advances in mechanistic understanding (across
all the sciences) are often linked to an ability to subject some target
system to sophisticated forms of instrumentation and measurement.
Perhaps, therefore, we can see the advent of the Web, and the current
eﬄorescence of Web-enabled devices, as marking a potential sea change
in our ability to establish an explanatorily- and predictively-potent
grip on the social realm. Just as progress in other areas of science
has followed hot on the heels of our ability to observe, measure, and
monitor—consider the impact of the microscope and telescope on the
fields of biology and astronomy—perhaps the Web is poised to progress
the cause of the social sciences in a similar manner. In essence, what
the Web gives us is an ability to observe (in more-or-less real time) the
ebb and flow of social processes on a (potentially) global scale. As a
result of such newfound abilities, we may, at last, be able to acquire the
sorts of data that informs our search for the mechanistic bases of (at
least some kinds of) social phenomena.
It should, of course, be noted that these categories of discovery-
oriented knowledge machine (i.e., citizen science systems, GWAPs and
social observatories) are not mutually exclusive. There is, as such, no rea-
son why a system such as Foldit could not be regarded as both a GWAP
and a citizen science system. Likewise, there may very well be systems
that qualify as members of all three categories of discovery-oriented
knowledge machine—social science experiments using virtual worlds,
such as Second Life or Pokémon Go, may be a case in point [see 22].
It is also important to note that each kind of discovery-oriented
knowledge machine may be amenable to further forms of conceptual
decomposition. When it comes to GWAPs, for example, Smart [458]
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Figure 7.2: A taxonomy of knowledge machines, with a particular focus on discovery-
oriented knowledge machines. The knowledge machine instances referred to in this
figure (symbolized with dashed lines and italicized font) include Galaxy Zoo [310],
Planet Hunters [425], eBird [488], Foldit [130], Genes In Space [118], Sea Hero
Quest [359, 473], and Twitter [199].
suggests that we should recognize at least two kinds of GWAP, namely,
goal-transparent and goal-opaque GWAPs. The difference between these
two subcategories is said to be grounded in the relative ‘visibility’ of the
game’s epistemic objectives to the end-user. In the case of Foldit, for
example, the link between game-play responses and the epistemic (or
scientific) objectives of the game are easily accessible to members of the
game-playing community. Such is not the case, however, for goal-opaque
GWAPs. In this case, the game-playing community may not even be
aware that their game-play responses are being used for the purposes
of scientific analysis.
Finally, it is important to note that many other categories of knowl-
edge machine could be identified in future work. The focus of the present
section has been on one particular kind of knowledge machine—i.e.,
discovery-oriented knowledge machines (see Figure 7.2)—but this does
not necessarily reveal the true extent of the knowledge machine con-
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cept. In addition to discovery-oriented knowledge machines, future work
is likely to reveal knowledge machines that support other kinds of
knowledge-oriented process, such as those associated with the acquisi-
tion and representation of existing (i.e., pre-discovered) knowledge. The
result is likely to be an extended taxonomy that highlights the scope
and richness of the knowledge machine concept. Given that such forms
of conceptual analysis fall within the remit of conventional knowledge
engineering [429], we can easily envisage a state-of-affairs in which the
process of deriving an extended taxonomy of knowledge machines is
itself something that is performed by a knowledge machine [see 466].
7.6 Leaning on the (Social) Environment
In Section 7.1, we saw that issues of network structure are relevant to
our understanding of collective cognitive organizations. In particular,
network structure emerged as one of the factors that influenced the
cognitive performance of a group, team or some other collective. This
highlights one of the major goals of contemporary network science: to
identify those network-related properties that provide us with a pre-
dictive or explanatory grasp of social (i.e., system-level) phenomena.
However, it is not just the properties of the larger networked ensemble
that are of interest to network scientists. Network scientists also seek to
understand how structural or topological properties affect the behavior
of the network’s nodal elements (e.g., human individuals). To help illus-
trate this, consider a classic ethnographic study by Elizabeth Bott [62].
Bott examined 20 urban British families and attempted to explain
the considerable variation in the way husbands and wives performed
their family roles. In some families, there was a strict division of labor:
husband and wife carried out distinct household chores separately and
independently. In other families, the husband and wife shared many of
the same tasks and interacted as equals. Bott found that the degree of
segregation in role-related behavior varied with the connectedness (or
density) of the family’s social network: the more connected the network,
the more likely the couple were to maintain a traditional segregation of
husband and wife roles. This showed that the structure of the larger
network in which the couple were embedded played an important role
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in influencing the couple’s behavior. From an explanatory perspective,
what we encounter here is a shift in explanatory focus. In particular,
by focusing on the structure of a social network we are adopting some-
thing of an ‘externalist’ perspective with respect to the explanation of
individual (agent-level) properties. This is important, because it might
be thought that the best place to look for factors that explain or pre-
dict the properties of individual agents is at the level of the individual
agents themselves. Thus, if we wanted to predict whether a particular
individual was likely to be depressed or obese, we might be inclined to
focus our attention on the characteristics of the individual rather than
the features of the environment in which that individual was situated.
And yet, the results of recent work in network science suggests that
the structure of the social environment, specifically the relationships
between individuals, may be of explanatory relevance with respect to
both depression [411] and obesity [94] (see Christakis and Fowler [95]
for a review).
When it comes to understanding the properties of individual’s agents,
therefore, network science encourages a shift in attention—away from the
individual agent and towards aspects of the agent’s (social) environment.
This point is nicely summarized by Borgatti et al. [61]:
Whereas traditional social research explained an individual’s
outcomes or characteristics as a function of other character-
istics of the same individual (e.g., income as a function of
education and gender), social network researchers look to the
individual’s social environment for explanations, whether
through influence processes (e.g., individuals adopting their
friends’ occupational choices) or leveraging processes (e.g.,
an individual can get certain things done because of the
connections she has to powerful others). [61, p. 894]
Interestingly, this shift in explanatory focus—from the individual to
the environment—resembles the sort of shift encountered in the case of
extended cognition (see Section 4). In fact, the only substantive differ-
ence is that extended cognition is concerned with cognitive phenomena,
while network science (at least in a social science context) restricts
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(a) Technological Network. (b) Social Network.
Figure 7.3: Network-oriented analyses of agent-level properties with respect to (a)
technological resources and (b) other agents. In both cases, the properties of the focal
agent (shaded icon) are explained (at least in part) by referencing the relationships
established with extra-agential elements.
its empirical focus to social relationships. In other words, extended
cognition imposes a constraint on the nature of the explanandum (i.e.,
cognitive phenomena), whereas social network analysis imposes a con-
straint on the explanans (i.e., social network structure). Apart from this
difference, however, there is an obvious commonality between the two
approaches in terms of the appeal to explanatorily-significant factors
that lie beyond the traditional biological borders of the individual agent.
If, for example, we broadened the remit of social network analysis to
include the linkages with artefactual (as opposed to purely social) ele-
ments, then it seems perfectly possible that we would seek to explain
the cognitive properties of the individual agent with respect to the
time-variant structural profile of informational circuits that connect the
biological brain with a surrounding nexus of extra-agential (artefactual)
resources (see Figure 7.3). This helps us see the theoretical and em-
pirical relevance of network science to our understanding of extended
cognitive systems [see 459].
This way of thinking about the relationship between extended cog-
nition and social network analysis is also something that is relevant to
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debates about a specific kind of extended cognition, namely, socially-
extended cognition [182, 505]. For the most part, philosophical treat-
ments of extended cognition tend to limit their scope to systems that
involve bio-technological forms of bonding. Socially-extended cognition,
however, extends the scope of extended cognition to include the social
environment. In this case, the main focus of attention relates to whether
the elements of the social environment (e.g., other human agents) are of
constitutive relevance to the realization of an individual’s cognitive pro-
cessing routines. From a network-theoretic perspective, socially-extended
cognition requires us to focus our attention on the informational circuits
that connect a focal individual with other individuals. Inasmuch as
we see such agent-involving circuits as forming part of an extended
cognitive mechanism that realizes the cognitive states and processes of
a particular individual, then we have a form of cognition that is both
a form of extended cognition (i.e., socially-extended cognition) and a
form of collective cognition (in the sense that multiple individuals are
component elements of an extended cognitive mechanism).
The possibility of socially-extended cognition is recognized by at least
some proponents of extended cognition. In their original treatment of
the extended mind thesis, for example, Clark and Chalmers [108] suggest
that there is no reason, at least in principle, why socially-extended forms
of cognition should not exist:
Could my mental states be partly constituted by the states
of other thinkers? We see no reason why not, in principle.
In an unusually interdependent couple, it is entirely possible
that one partner’s beliefs will play the same sort of role for
the other as the notebook plays for Otto. [108, p. 17]
In spite of all this, claims about socially-extended cognition remain
controversial. This is due, at least in part, to worries about the extent
to which other agents can meet the sort of criteria required for cog-
nitive extension, for example, the trust-and-glue criteria proposed by
Clark and Chalmers [108].
It is here that a focus on the Web, and especially the Social Web,
could be philosophical value. This is because the Web plays a crucial
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role in shaping the nature of our social interactions and engagements,
transforming the way in which a broad array of social activities are un-
dertaken. As a result of this transformation, it is possible that the Web
may help to surmount (via technological means) some of the barriers that
would otherwise prohibit the practical realization of socially-extended
forms of cognition. Thus, while conventional forms of social interac-
tion are clearly limited by a range of practical issues and concerns
(e.g., the need for co-location), it is possible that Web technologies are
able to alleviate some of these constraints. We can thus imagine Web
technologies being specifically designed so as to yield conditions that
are conducive to socially-extended cognition. Such conditions may be
difficult to achieve in the case of conventional face-to-face interactions,
and it is for this reason that the (Social) Web can be seen to provide a
new impetus to debates regarding the practical possibility of Web-based
forms of socially-extended cognition [see 454].
Some insight into the opportunities the Web provides for socially-
extended cognition comes from applications that rely on real-time or
continuous crowdsourcing [see 299]. In general, these applications seek
to provide cognitive support to a particular individual by enlisting the
help of other individuals. The VizWiz system, for example, is a system
that seeks to support blind people in dealing with the challenges of a
visual environment [50]. VizWiz enables blind individuals to upload
images from a smartphone and then receive descriptions of the image
from other individuals in what is described as “nearly real-time.” Such
systems provide a clear and compelling demonstration of the idea that
the wider social environment can be recruited into a form of cognitively-
potent information processing—one that influences the thoughts and
actions of the visually-impaired individual. There is an obvious parallel,
here, with the classic case of Otto and his notebook in the conventional
extended mind case [108]. Despite some clear differences in the nature of
the cognitive processing routines that are being performed (e.g., visual
processing versus mnemonic recall), as well as differences in the nature
of the relevant material realizers (i.e., socio-technical system versus
notebook), the two cases are roughly equivalent: in both cases, we have
a form of disability that is being addressed by virtue of the kind of
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engagements that are made with respect to the extra-organismic (in
this case, socio-technical) environment.
Another case of real-time crowdsourcing comes in the form of the
Soylent system [48]. Soylent is a word processing technology that aims
to use crowdsourcing techniques as a means of supporting the task of
document writing and editing. In particular, Soylent is described as:
[A] word processing interface that utilizes crowd contri-
butions to aid complex writing tasks ranging from error
prevention and paragraph shortening to automation of tasks
such as citation searches and tense changes. [48, p. 85]
Such forms of socially-distributed document authoring establish an
interesting point of contact with debates about the extended mind.
This is because appeals to the role of extra-organismic resources in the
creation of written artefacts are a common focus of attention for the
extended mind community. Consider, for example, the claim that writing
can (on occasion) be regarded as a form of extended thinking. In the
introduction to his book, Supersizing the Mind, Clark [102] reflects on a
discussion between Richard Feynman and Charles Weiner concerning the
role of writing in Feynman’s intellectual activity. Clark proposes that:
. . . Feynman was actually thinking on the paper. The loop
through pen and paper is part of the physical machinery
responsible for the shape of the flow of thoughts and ideas
that we take, nonetheless, to be distinctively those of Richard
Feynman. [102, p. xxv, original emphasis]
Needless to say, the kind of interactions that users have with col-
laborative authoring systems like Soylent are probably unlike the bio-
artefactual exchanges associated with more insular forms of writing
activity. Nevertheless, in accounting for why it is that we are able to
generate a written text using Soylent, it may be that the contributions of
others are seen to play an explanatorily-crucial role—one that is perhaps
functionally akin to the sort of role played by extra-organismic resources
in shaping the profile of our more solitary orthographic endeavors [see
96, pp. 206–207]. The key point, here, is not that Soylent serves as the
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de facto technological substrate for a specific form of socially-extended
cognizing. Rather, the point is that, in view of the present discussion,
we can perhaps begin to see how research in Web Science is able to
establish a productive point of contact with contemporary philosophical
debates regarding the role of extra-organismic resources in extending
the reach of the human cognitive system.
7.7 Mandevillian Intelligence
When it comes to issues of collective cognition and collective intelli-
gence, a common focus of research attention relates to the forces and
factors that determine the quality of cognitive outputs. In the case of
collective sensemaking, for example, it is common to direct attention to
those features that enable a group of sensemaking agents to interpret
situation-relevant information in ways that line up with facts about
reality. Such features include the properties of individual agents (e.g.,
their susceptibility to confirmation bias), the patterns of communication
established by the agents, and the properties of the technological system
that works to coordinate collective efforts. In many cases, the properties
of the technological system are of particular interest, for these are the
properties that can be tweaked as part of the design and development
process. In attempting to optimize the performance of (e.g.) a collective
sensemaking system, it thus makes sense to design the technological
components in such a way as to ensure that the larger systemic organiza-
tion achieves the best sensemaking outcome, perhaps by regulating the
flow of information between individual sensemakers, or by attempting
to mitigate the presence of individual forms of cognitive bias [see 124].
It is at this point that we encounter a novel proposal concerning
the cognitive properties of individual agents and the quality of the
outcomes that are delivered as a result of collective cognitive processing.
According to this proposal:
Cognitive and epistemic properties that are typically seen
as shortcomings, limitations or biases at the individual level
can, on occasion, play a positive functional role in support-
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ing the emergence of intelligent behavior at the collective
level. [455, p. 3]
In other words, the claim is that the seemingly sub-optimal cognitive
performance of individual agents can, on occasion, play a productive
role in helping to bring about desirable outcomes at the collective level
of analysis. The form of intelligence that emerges in these situations
is called mandevillian intelligence [455, 456]. Mandevillian intelligence
is thus a specific form of collective intelligence, in which intelligent
outcomes at the collective level are seen to arise from the presence of
cognitive properties that we generally associate with poor performance
at the level of individual agents (e.g., poor mnemonic recall, defective
reasoning, limited attentional capacity, and so on).
Although mandevillian intelligence is no doubt contentious, it is an
idea that is of considerable importance to cognitive science, philosophy,8
and (as we shall see) Web Science. From the standpoint of cognitive
science, the notion of mandevillian intelligence encourages us to rethink
our traditional approach to the design of collective cognitive systems.
If, for example, we accept that individual cognitive limitations can
sometimes play a productive role in yielding collective forms of cognitive
success, then it behooves the designers of collaborative technology to
question the logic of design strategies that always attempt to eliminate
(or at least attenuate) such limitations. Indeed, it may very well be the
case that in our attempts to maximize collective cognitive performance,
we should consider design strategies to that seek to degrade and diminish
the cognitive capabilities of the individual [455].
Such claims obviously raise a host of ethical issues concerning the
extent to which the cognitive competencies of the one (the individual)
should be traded against the cognitive capabilities of the many (the
collective), and few will probably be willing to embrace an approach
to technology design that sacrifices the capabilities of the individual
agent for the sake of the collective cognitive good. But even if we
retreat from the idea of diminishing individual cognitive capabilities
8The philosophical implications of mandevillian intelligence are perhaps
most keenly felt in the case of contemporary epistemology, especially virtue
epistemology [see 456].
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via the introduction of new technologies, we can at least begin to see
how the notion of mandevillian intelligence alters our view as to the
cognitive and epistemic value of a particular technology. A technology
that degrades the cognitive capabilities of a given individual may thus be
subject to negative evaluation, and rightly so. But from the standpoint
of mandevillian intelligence, such evaluations are specific to individual
cognition. Once the focus of our analytic gaze shifts from the individual
to the collective level—from individual cognition to collective cognition—
we might be able to see the technology in a somewhat different light. The
technology may, in fact, be subject to positive evaluation on the grounds
that it exploits an individual cognitive shortcoming for the purposes of
enhancing the performance profile of a collective cognitive system.
In a Web Science context, the significance of mandevillian intelligence
starts to come into clearer view once we reflect on claims about the
cognitive impacts of the Web. Such impacts have seldom been viewed
in a positive light. Carr [80, 81], for instance, has expressed concerns
about the deleterious effects of the Web and Internet on aspects of
(individual) cognitive performance. He worries that the nature of our
current engagement with the Web is leading to a general decline in
mnemonic and attentional functioning. Similar concerns are sometimes
expressed in relation to specific Web technologies, such as personalized
search engines [351, 439]. The worry, in this case, is that by delivering a
set of personalized (and therefore filtered) search results, personalized
search engines have the potential to undermine epistemic standing
by accentuating existing forms of cognitive bias. The result, in most
cases, is an appeal to interventions that are intended to ameliorate the
negative epistemic sequelae of personalized search technology. These
include changes in user behavior and corporate policy, backed up by
government regulation [439].
It is here that the notion of mandevillian intelligence helps to reshape
(or at least refocus) the nature of the ongoing debate. For even if we
accept that personalized search is, in general, injurious to an individual’s
epistemic health, this does not mean that personalized search is bereft
of any sort of epistemic benefit. In particular, it is far from clear that
the epistemic consequences of personalized search for a community
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of Web users is exactly the same as for the individual members of
that community. From the perspective of mandevillian intelligence, for
example, we might view personalized search as playing a productive
role in maintaining a degree of cognitive diversity within a community
of Web users. Given that such diversity is sometimes seen to play an
important role in enabling a collection of human individuals to discover,
resolve or otherwise track the truth in some domain of interest [341,
563],9 it seems that personalized search may, in fact, help to support
the epistemic functioning of a community, even if the same technology
also acts to undermine the epistemic credentials of the individual agent.
In essence, what the notion of mandevillian intelligence gives us is a
means of avoiding a rush towards premature judgements regarding the
cognitive or epistemic value of the Web, or a particular component
thereof. Just because a particular technology, such as personalized
search, turns out to have little or no benefit at the level of individual
agents, this does not mean that it has no benefits tout court. This
is perhaps of particular importance when one considers the recent
criticisms that have been leveled at major technology providers (e.g.,
Facebook and Google) by a number of prominent political leaders.10
The main value of mandevillian intelligence, in this respect, is that it
helps to inject an additional epistemological dimension into the ongoing
political debate. In particular, it is unclear whether the criticisms
of major technology vendors are justified in the absence of a better
understanding of how (e.g.) information filtering algorithms affect the
cognitive performance of teams, groups, communities and societies—and
not just the performance of human individuals. Only in the light of
this enhanced (and empirically-informed) understanding will we be in
a position to make judgements concerning the cognitive and epistemic
consequences of the Web and the particular kinds of interventions (e.g.,
government regulation) that might be required to ensure its virtuous
(i.e., cognition-friendly) operation.
9In particular, by limiting attention to specific subsets of information based on
(e.g.) a user’s browsing history, personalized search may work to diversify access to
information and thus prevent premature forms of cognitive convergence.
10See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37798762.
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Extending the Butterfly
Web Science is a highly interdisciplinary endeavor, with well-established
links to physics, mathematics, computer science, AI, sociology, psy-
chology and other disciplines [235, 428]. As we saw in Section 1, the
interdisciplinary nature of Web Science is nicely captured by the Web
Science Butterfly Diagram (see Figure 1.1), which highlights some of
the topics belonging to the Web Science research agenda. In its original
form, however, the Butterfly Diagram does not include the disciplines
that have been the focus of the present review, i.e., philosophy of mind
and cognitive science. In the wake of the present review, this seems
like an important omission. Although some of the topics highlighted
by the present review could perhaps be subsumed within the existing
disciplines of psychology, sociology, and artificial intelligence, it should
by now be clear that the Web raises a host of issues that dovetail specif-
ically with the interests of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.
The present review helps to reveal at least some of these issues; however,
it is by no means an exhaustive survey of this part of the intellectual
terrain. The cognitive properties of the Web (or at least the points of
cognitive scientific interest for Web Science) include an array of issues
that were not part of the present review (e.g., the implications of the
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Enhancement vs. Diminishment…
Philosophy of
Mind
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Figure 8.1: The Web Science Butterfly Diagram (extended).
Web for machine-based cognitive capabilities [451, 452]). In addition,
some of the issues that did form of the part of the present review could
have benefited from a more detailed discussion. The work relating to
memory, for example, is of sufficient complexity as to warrant separate
treatment [71, 110, 113, 114, 232, 281, 335, 337, 367, 445, 472, 531].
The upshot of all this is a proposal to ‘extend the butterfly’—to
incorporate cognitive science and the philosophy of mind into an ex-
tended version of the Web Science Butterfly Diagram (see Figure 8.1).
The primary aim of such extensions is, of course, to highlight the points
of interdisciplinary contact between Web Science, cognitive science, and
the philosophy of mind. In addition to this, however, the extensions also
tell us something about the transformational nature of the Web and
the metamorphic character of the science that studies it. The Web is
not a static system with immutable properties; rather, it is a constantly
changing, dynamic system. In view of the Web’s protean nature, it is
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perhaps incumbent on all disciplines to periodically assess the relevance
of the Web to their own areas of intellectual study. Cognitive science
and philosophy of mind are, of course, no exception. Not only do such
disciplines bring a range of insights, ideas, methods, and techniques
that are relevant to Web Science, they are also disciplines whose own
research agendas are likely to be influenced by the shifting technological
and social landscape of the Web.
The aim of the present section is to reinforce the case for an expansion
of the interdisciplinary borders of Web Science. In other words, we aim
to highlight some of the reasons why the wings of the butterfly should
be extended to incorporate the disciplines of philosophy and cognitive
science. Our approach is to reach across the various issues and topics
that have been discussed in previous sections and identify some of the
more prominent cross-cutting themes. In doing so, we hope to make
the case for our particular form of ‘lepidopteran’ expansionism. But in
addition to this, we also hope to reveal a number of areas that could
serve as the basis for future work.
8.1 Cognitive Connections
Although it is probably fair to say that cognitive science and the
philosophy of mind are seldom seen to lie at the heart of the Web Science
research agenda, it should by now be clear that a number of important
linkages exist between these disciplines. As a means of bringing these
linkages into sharper focus, Table 8.1 identifies a number of traditional
Web Science topics that were discussed as part of this review.
In addition to highlighting the nature of the interdisciplinary connec-
tions between Web Science, cognitive science and the philosophy of mind,
the present review also demonstrated the use of the Web to further our
understanding of the human cognitive system. In Section 3.6, for exam-
ple, we encountered the idea of the Web being used as an experimental
or observational platform—one that could be used to shed light on the
features of both individual and collective cognition [197, 327, 473].
We also sounded a cautionary note about claims concerning the
cognitive impacts of the Web (see Sections 4.1 and 4.3). In particu-
lar, we suggested that our interpretation of research results can be
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Table 8.1: Web Science topics discussed as part of the present review.
Web Science Topic Cognitive Relevance Sections
Semantic Web Extended Cognition 4.1
Linked Data Extended Cognition 4.1
Trust Extended Cognition 4.2, 4.6
Privacy Extended Cognition 4.7
Social Web Social Cognition,
Collective Cognition
6, 7
Human Computation Collective Cognition 7.5
Social Machines Collective Cognition 7.4
Quantified Self Embodied Cognition 3.5, 3.6
Personalization Embedded Cognition,
Extended Cognition
5.3, 4.2
Ambient Intelligence Embedded Cognition 5.2, 5.3
Wearable Devices Extended Cognition 3.4
Social Bots Social Cognition 6.2
influenced by a number of factors, and these often limit the validity of
blanket statements to the effect that the Web is (e.g.) degrading our
cognitive capabilities. The following points are thus intended to serve as
a safeguard against what might be called the sin of over-generalization:
• Task Specificity: Research results can be influenced by the
nature of the task that is being performed by Web users. In the
case of neuroimaging studies, for example, the sorts of results
obtained with Web search tasks [443] are not necessarily the same
as those obtained in the context of socially-oriented tasks [343].
• Cognitive Function Specificity: The effects obtained in re-
spect of one particular kind of cognitive processing (e.g., memory)
should not be generalized to other kinds of cognitive processing
(e.g., problem-solving). This also applies to the distinctions be-
tween cognitive functions that are of the same type (e.g., different
forms of memory). For example, the cognitive implications of the
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Web may vary according to whether our research interests relate
to semantic memory or autobiographical memory.
• Cognitive System Specificity: We should recognize that the
cognitive gains/losses enjoyed/endured by individual cognizers
are not the same as those encountered in the case of collective
cognition (see Section 7.7). The nature of the focal cognitive
system (e.g., collective cognitive system or individual cognitive
agent) thus affects our interpretation of research results (see
Section 8.3 for more on this).
• Access Specificity: The ways in which we access the Web are
likely to affect the nature of research results. We should not as-
sume that the nature of our interactive engagements with the
Web are exhausted by the use of one particular kind of tech-
nology (e.g., search engines), or that HTML-based modes of in-
formation presentation limit the nature of our cognitive contact
with the online environment.
• User Specificity: Different categories of users may respond to
the Web in different ways. For example, the cognitive effects
observed with “digital natives” may not be the same as those
observed with “digital immigrants.”
• Historical Specificity: The Web is a highly dynamic system,
forever apt to change in response to technological innovation
and changes in social practice. We should not, therefore, see the
properties of the current Web as limiting the scope of its future
cognitive impact. To help us see this, we need only reflect on the
way in which our interactions with the Web have changed over
the course of the Web’s (rather brief) history.
We suggest that Web Scientists, cognitive scientists and philosophers
would do well to consider these forms of specificity in the context of
future research efforts.
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8.2 Boundary Dissolution
Entanglement, merger and incorporation are themes that can be found
throughout the Web Science literature. Such themes are especially
prominent in the more sociologically-oriented areas of Web Science. The
Web and Internet are thus sometimes seen to contribute to an important
form of boundary dissolution that blurs the traditional distinction be-
tween the ‘social’ and the ‘technological’ [316, 317]. “For some theorists,”
writes Lupton [317], “the very idea of ‘culture’ or ‘society’ cannot now
be fully understood without the recognition that computer software and
hardware devices not only underpin but actively constitute selfhood,
embodiment, social life, social relations and social institutions” (p. 2).
A similar view is expressed by Smart and Shadbolt [464]. They suggest
that the Web and society have become inextricably linked, to the point
where the Web serves as part of the physical machinery (the mecha-
nistic substrate) of the social world. The Web, in this sense, emerges
as part of the material infrastructure that (at least in part) makes our
contemporary society what it is.
In addition to the forms of boundary dissolution occurring in re-
spect of the social and the technological, the Web and Internet are
also seen to dissolve the boundaries that exist between a number of
other previously distinct concepts. Notable examples include the dis-
tinctions between work and leisure [183], between the public and the
private [503], between the physical and the virtual [317], between the
human and the machine [315, 521, 532], and between the online and
the oﬄine [175, 177].1
The present review expands on these forms of boundary dissolution.
One example of this comes from the discussion of corporeal extension
(see Section 3.3), which highlighted the forms of entanglement, merger
and incorporation that might occur between the biological body and
Web-enabled devices. Such ideas are consistent with views that have
been developed by both cognitive scientists and social scientists. In a
1O’Hara (personal communication, 10 October, 2013) notes that the boundary
between cybercrimality and libertarianism is also somewhat indistinct, with Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on corporate websites being viewed as a
crime by some and a legitimate form of civil disobedience by others.
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cognitive science context, for example, Gibbs [186] argues that the more
technological devices extend the body and integrate non-organic material
with human flesh, the more they “work to dissolve any clear boundary
between bodies and world” (p. 18). Similar views are expressed by the
sociologist Deborah Lupton [315]. She notes that wearable technologies
not only “become prosthetics of the body but extend the body into a
network with other bodies and objects” (p. 27).
An additional form of boundary dissolution can be found in respect
of the notion of extended cognition (see Section 4). The main focus of
attention, in this case, is the extent to which the Web supports a form
of bio-technological hybridization—one in which the informational and
technological elements of the online environment can be seen as literal
constituents of the physical fabric that realizes human cognitive states
and processes. Such forms of integration and merger are sometimes
seen to blur the boundary between the cognitive agent and the agent’s
‘local’ technological environment [99, 102]. The traditional biological
borders of the cognitive machine (i.e., the human brain) may thus be
breached as we begin to appreciate the way in which our cognitive
profiles are shaped by the forms of contact we have with the Web.
As Clark [99] notes:
As we move towards an era of wearable computing and ubiq-
uitous information access, the robust, reliable information
fields to which our brains delicately adapt their routines will
become increasingly dense and powerful, further blurring
the distinction between the cognitive agent and her best
tools, props and artifacts. (p. 275)
References to the notion of extended cognition can be found through-
out the present review. In addition to the primary discussion in Section 4,
issues of cognitive extension also emerged in relation to embodied cog-
nition (see Section 3.5), social cognition (see Section 6.4), and collective
cognition (see Section 7.6). These discussions drew attention to the
potentially hybrid character of human cognitive capabilities—the fact
that many forms of cognitive accomplishment may originate from in-
formation processing routines that straddle both the biological and
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technological domains. One of the points to emerge from the discussion
of cognitive extension was the mutability of human cognition—the idea
that the cognitive capabilities of the cognitive agent are seldom fixed
by the processing capacities of the bare biological brain. The curves of
the human cognitive system, if this is correct, can perhaps never be
fully resolved simply by virtue of our attempts to trace the convoluted
contours of the cerebral cortex. The notion of extended cognition thus
encourages us to see cognitive phenomena as tied to the operation of
environmentally-extended circuits, i.e., circuits that extend beyond the
brain to encompass the informational and technological elements of
the online, Web-based realm. The upshot of all this is that the human
cognitive system has something of a chameleonic character: by virtue of
our capacity for cognitive extension, we are able to extend the reach of
our cognitive capabilities, and in doing so, the profile of human cognition
is itself transformed. It is this capacity for mental metamorphosis that
is perhaps one of the defining features of human intelligence [see 98].
And yet, in the process of morphing from one kind of cognitive critter
to another, the inherent lability of human intelligence is itself revealed.
All of this helps to introduce us to a further form of boundary
dissolution—one that relates to our more general views of intelligence.
In Section 7, for example, we saw that the social and collaborative
properties of the Web help to lay the foundation for various forms
of collective cognition, including socially-extended cognition (see Sec-
tion 7.6). Such forms of collective cognizing challenge the erstwhile crisp
distinction the intelligence of the one (i.e., the human individual) and
the intelligence of the many: in leaning on the social environment, we
incorporate the cognitive capabilities of others into the material fabric
that makes ‘individual’ forms of intelligence materially possible.
Much the same could be said about the distinction between human
and machine intelligence. Although the present review did not aim
to assess the relevance of the Web from the perspective of machine
cognition, it is important to note that all the forms of cognition we have
discussed in the present review are applicable to cognitive systems of the
computational or technological kind [451, 452, 454, 463]. Of particular
interest, in this respect, is the notion of Human-Extended Machine
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Cognition (HEMC), which sees Web-based forms of socio-technical
entanglement as playing a crucial role in the realization of future forms
of ‘machine’ intelligence [452, 454, 457]. Relative to such a view, it
is, at best, unclear as to whether we should draw a neat dividing line
between natural and synthetic forms of intelligent system—between
the cognitive capabilities of the ‘human’ and the cognitive capabilities
of the ‘machine’.
There is thus a growing sense that claims about the extended charac-
ter of human cognition blur the distinctions between a number of forms
of intelligence. Once familiar dichotomies (e.g., human intelligence vs.
machine intelligence, natural intelligence vs. artificial intelligence, and
individual intelligence vs. collective intelligence) are called into question
as soon as we begin to appreciate the increasingly bio-technologically
hybrid and socially-distributed nature of our intellectual, scientific and
problem-solving accomplishments.
Having said all this, it is important to realize that cognitively-potent
forms of entanglement, merger and incorporation are not a given in the
future network society. As with other forms of boundary dissolution,
much depends on the properties of Web technology, as well as the social
responses elicited by those properties. As Norman Augustine’s [18]
Second Law of Socioscience puts it: “For every scientific (or engineering)
action, there is an equal and opposite social reaction.” Web-based
forms of bio-technological bonding provide us with opportunities for
cognitive and epistemic transformation, but they also present us with
a number of risks and challenges (recall the discussion concerning
the privacy implications of the Web-extended mind in Section 4.7).
Concerns over privacy, trust, and security may result in individuals
withdrawing from the Web, leading to the re-establishment of traditional
borders and boundaries.
8.3 Augmented Cognition?
A recent focus of debate within the Web Science community relates to
the impact of the Web and Internet on human cognitive capabilities [81,
312, 333, 448]. For the most part, the tenor of this debate has been largely
negative, with key protagonists, such as Nicholas Carr [80, 81], arguing
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that the Internet is undermining our ability to think, read and remember.
Instead of enhancing our ability to concentrate, Carr argues, the Internet
is undermining our capacity for sustained attention, as well as our ability
to think deeply about a topic. The result of all this, according to Carr,
is a curtailment and fragmentation of otherwise temporally-protracted
episodes of cognitive activity, coupled with the adoption of highly
superficial forms of cognitively-relevant information processing.
In the wake of the present review, it should be clear that claims of
this sort are in danger of committing the aforementioned sin of over-
generalization (see Section 8.1). In particular, when it comes to the
Web, it is important to remember that any cognitive effects are likely
to depend on our modes of access to the Web, and these are likely to
change as the result of technological innovation. A range of emerging
Web technologies, as well as changes in the way we use the Web, all
contribute to an ever-changing landscape against which our notions of
the Web’s cognitive impact are always likely to be somewhat ephemeral.
We should, as a consequence, be wary of blanket statements to the effect
that the Web is undermining our cognitive capabilities.
In addition to these objections, it should by now be clear that
appeals to the generic notion of cognition are themselves a potential
source of confusion when it comes to claims about the cognitive impact
of the Web. It is crucial, therefore, that in talking about the cognitive
sequelae of the Web, we are explicit about what we mean by the term
“cognition.” By this, we do not mean that it is important to stipulate the
kinds of cognitive processes one is interested in (e.g., memory, attention,
thinking, problem-solving, and so on); rather, we need to be mindful of
the distinction between different forms of cognition (e.g., the distinction
between extended, embedded and collective cognition). In discussing
the cognitive impacts of the Web, Carr and others focus their attention
at the level of individual human agents, and for the most part, their
worries and concerns relate to brain-based forms of cognitive processing.
The problem with this approach is that it ignores the variegated nature
of the cognitive systems that may be brought into existence on the back
of our interactions with the Web. In the section on collective cognition,
for example, we saw how the Web may yield collective cognitive systems
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whose cognitive capabilities are not the same as those exhibited by the
individual agents that make up those systems (see Section 7). In view
of this, we should ask ourselves whether it is particularly prudent to
overlook or disregard the purported benefits of the Web when it comes
to issues of collective cognition and collective intelligence. Similarly, why
should the notion of cognition be limited solely to the realms of human
intelligence? Perhaps the cognitive significance of the Web should be
judged relative to its implications for machine intelligence, in addition
to its purported effects on the human cognitive system [451, 452].
Much the same could be said about the putative role of the Web in
supporting the emergence of extended cognitive systems (see Section 4).
Indeed, the notion of extended cognition has often been seen as a fitting
antidote to the alarmist rhetoric sounded by Carr [81], Greenfield [206],
and others. Friends of extended cognition have thus sought to defuse
claims about cognitive diminishment by appealing to the cognitive
capabilities of the larger systemic organizations (e.g., Web-extended
minds) that emerge from human–Web interactions [444]. The key point,
here, is that the cognitive capabilities of the larger extended ensemble
are not the same as those of the biologically-bounded individual. Thus,
even if it could be shown that the Web was undermining the cognitive
capabilities of the bare biological brain, it does not follow that the
cognitive capabilities of the technologically-extended human individual
are similarly diminished. The result, perhaps, is that we should not
attempt to vilify the Web based on effects that pertain solely to the
bio-cognitive system: changes in neurocognitive function—as revealed
by (e.g.) neuroimaging studies [443]—do not necessarily impugn the
status of the Web as a cognitively-valuable resource.
8.4 Web Epistemology
The Web is emerging as an important focus of epistemological attention.
As is evidenced by the current preoccupation with “false facts” and
“fake news,” there is widespread concern (especially in the popular
press) about the potential of the Web to deceive and misinform [see
390]. Such concerns have become particularly apparent in the wake
of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, where issues of truth and the
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factive status of online information became a prominent focus of media
attention.2 Such issues and concerns dovetail with the interests of
contemporary epistemology, especially with the epistemological sub-
disciplines of social [195] and applied epistemology [88, 117, 465]. The
epistemic implications of the Web have, of course, been the target of
previous epistemological research [117, 166, 167, 194]; however, the
potential of the Web to inform (and misinform) arguably calls for a
much more directed epistemological effort, albeit one that co-opts the
empirical and technical expertise of the Web Science community.
The epistemological significance of the Web is highlighted by the
present review. Indeed, issues of epistemological significance can be
discerned for each of the forms of cognition discussed in previous sections.
These issues include the following:
• Self Knowledge (Embodied Cognition): Issues of self-related
knowledge surfaced in Section 3.5. We saw that the quantified-self
movement can be conceived as an epistemological exercise that
involves the tracking of personal information. The reliability of
the techniques and technologies associated with self-tracking may
contribute to improvements in self knowledge. However, in the
process of quantifying the self, a digital self may be created. The
emergence of this digital self, and the way it interacts with the
original self, potentially complicates our understanding of what it
means to know the ‘self’ [see 191].
• Extended Knowledge (Extended Cognition): Section 4.5
introduced the notion of extended knowledge, which has been the
focus of recent epistemological attention [107, 379, 393, 453]. The
extent to which we can think of the Web as effectively supersizing
our epistemic capabilities [see 314] was discussed in Section 4.6.
• Situation Awareness (Embedded Cognition): In Section 5.3,
we encountered the idea that Web-enabled devices, coupled with
the use of rule-based ‘programming’ techniques (e.g., IFTTT),
could be used to enhance an individual’s awareness of (possibly re-
2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-38168792
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mote) situations, events and contingencies. This establishes a nat-
ural point of contact with issues of situation awareness, knowledge
and understanding in the human factors community [23, 164, 462].
Such links may be of potential value in helping us understand the
notion of situation awareness from an epistemological perspective.
• Interpersonal Epistemology (Social Cognition): Interper-
sonal epistemology was discussed in Section 6.1. Interpersonal
epistemology concerns the knowledge that we have of others
via the social psychological processes of person perception and
impression formation [40]. In a Web-based context, such knowl-
edge derives from the properties of the online systems (e.g., so-
cial networking sites, dating sites, etc.) that we use to interact
with other individuals.
• Knowledge Engines (Collective Cognition): Section 7.5 tack-
led a topic of both theoretical and practical importance to the
epistemological community: the use of online socio-technical sys-
tems (social machines) to generate collective knowledge. This
is a topic that resonates with the interests of both social and
applied epistemology [195, 380, 382].
These issues reveal the scope and scale of the research effort that will
be required to advance our understanding of the epistemic implications
of the Web. As with the discipline of Web Science, this research effort is
very much an interdisciplinary endeavor, requiring collaboration between
members of both the philosophical (e.g., epistemology) and scientific
(e.g., computer science) communities. It is also a research effort that
is poised to influence the design of future Web technologies. Inasmuch
as we aim to press maximal epistemic benefit from the Web, both as
the producers (see Section 7.5) and the consumers (see Section 4.5) of
epistemic goods and services, it is essential that we provide a means
for philosophical and scientific outputs to influence the design of Web-
related technologies. Web Science is, of course, the natural home for
this interdisciplinary endeavor. But perhaps we should go further than
simply expand the existing intellectual remit of Web Science. Perhaps
the relevant research effort is of sufficient scope and scale as to warrant
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the creation of a new discipline. Such, at least, is the view of Palermos
(Orestis Palermos, personal communication, January 28, 2016). He
suggests that a new discipline—provisionally labeledWeb Epistemology—
should be established as a sub-discipline of Web Science. Hopefully, the
present review goes some way to limning the general contours of this
new region of the Web-related research landscape.
8.5 Ecological Engineering
Throughout this review, we have appealed to the idea that the Web
serves as a form of ecosystem or ecology [460]—one that helps to shape
cognitive processing at both an individual and collective level. Such a
view establishes a natural point of contact with ecologically-oriented
approaches in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind [30,
256, 321, 512]. However, it is also a view that changes the way we think
about human–Web interactions. From the standpoint of an ecological
perspective, we have suggested that our interactions and engagements
with the online environment should be seen as a form of ecological
(or ecosystem) engineering. There are deep continuities here with the
notion of niche construction in evolutionary theory [294, 366, 480,
482]. According to the proponents of niche construction, organisms
actively engineer their local environments (niches) in ways that alter
the kinds of selective pressure operating on future generations. This
idea contributes to our understanding of the evolutionary mechanisms
that may underlie the emergence of human cognitive capabilities [293,
480, 482]. But it is also possible to see ecological engineering as working
to shape human cognitive capabilities on a more restricted timescale.
Clark [102], for example, introduces us to the notion of cognitive niche
construction, which he defines as “the process by which animals build
physical structures that transform problem spaces in ways that aid (or
sometimes impede) thinking and reasoning about some target domain
or domains” (p. 62).3 When we combine these ideas with claims about
3The distinction between cognitive niche construction and niche construction is a
somewhat artificial distinction, since some philosophers, most notably Kim Sterelny,
also emphasize the cognitive relevance of niche construction processes. In the present
context, the primary distinction between these terms relates to the period of time
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the status of the Web as a form of cognitive ecology [see 460], the
nature of our interactions and engagements with the Web take on
a new significance. In particular, we can begin to see humanity as
actively engaged in a cognitively-potent form of ecological engineering,
progressively altering the specific mix of opportunities and affordances
that shape the cognitive profiles of both ourselves and the generations
that succeed us.
It is important to be clear what is meant by this particular proposal;
for the reference to “ecological engineering” perhaps invites a somewhat
limited view of the kinds of activity that are encompassed by the term.
There is obviously a sense in which we can think of the activities
of technology developers, software engineers and website designers as
a form of ecological engineering (literally, engineering of the online
environment). Similarly, it seems reasonable to think that the editing
of a Wikipedia article or the uploading of a YouTube video should be
regarded as forms of ecological engineering. But the notion of ecological
engineering is actually broader than this. It includes, for example, the
digital traces or ‘footprints’ that mark our treks through the online
environment. In this sense, practically every form of interaction we have
with the Web provides an opportunity for ecological engineering. Every
time we perform a Google search, for example, we provide data that
can be used for a variety of purposes (e.g., personalized search [439]
or query-based syndromic surveillance [154]). The same applies to
purchasing decisions on Amazon. Every time we make a purchase on
Amazon, we provide information that can be used to influence the kind of
informational contact that we (and others) have with the ‘Amazonian’
ecosystem [306]. The main point, here, is that the Web is a highly
dynamic system, and every interaction we have with that system alters
it in some way. As a result, we do not need to upload a video to
YouTube in order to alter the online environment; for even the act of
over which they operate. We can thus distinguish between two kinds of epoch: the
Clarkian (cognitive niche construction) and the Sterelnyian (niche construction).
The Clarkian (based on the work of Andy Clark [102]) emphasizes the processes
that operate in the here-and-now (i.e., on an intra-generational timescale). The
Sterelynian (based on the work of Kim Sterelny [480]), in contrast, emphasizes the
processes that operate across generations (i.e., on an inter-generational timescale).
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watching a YouTube video can alter the environment in such a way as
to influence the cognitive responses of ourselves and others (recall the
discussion of the socio-cognitive feedback hypothesis in Section 6.3). It
is in this sense that we are all (potentially at least) ecological engineers
of the online realm.
The cognitive significance of ecological engineering can be cashed
out in a number of ways. It is perhaps most obviously thought of as a
way of altering individual cognitive capabilities in the here-and-now,
or at least as a way of altering cognition over relatively short (intra-
generational) timescales. We encountered something along these lines in
Section 3.5, where we discussed the relationship between self-tracking
techniques and the technological transformation of the self. Such ideas
dovetail with claims about the role of information and communication
technologies in supporting the emergence of personal ecosystems [520]
and informational ecologies for the self [176]. They also chime with
claims about the role of ecological engineering in transforming our
cognitive power and potential. As Clark [102] notes, “[i]n building our
physical and social worlds, we build (or rather, we massively reconfigure)
our minds and our capacities of thought and reason” (p. xxviii).
Another route to cognitive transformation follows a somewhat more
circuitous trajectory. The main focus of attention, in this case, is the
societal context in which human cognitive capabilities develop. A number
of authors have drawn attention to the role of the Web and Internet in
effecting various forms of social change [34, 324], and these ideas are
further reinforced once we see the Web as a social technology, i.e., as a
technology that lies at the heart of an ever-expanding array of social
activities and social processes. Inasmuch as we see the Web as playing a
crucial role in the computational realization of social processes [485]—as
part of the material fabric that realizes social phenomena [464]—then it
is easy to see how changes in the social environment could be causally
and constitutively linked to changes in the online world. Ecological
engineering (of the online environment) is, in this sense, a form of
‘social engineering’—a way of altering the structures, institutions, norms,
cultural practices, and so on, that make our society what it is.
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The cognitive significance of this claim comes into clearer view once
we direct our attention to issues of niche construction and the socially-
situated nature of human cognition. For the human social environment
has often been implicated in the ontogenetic processes that give rise to
human intelligence [see 305]. From this perspective, we might expect
changes in society to alter the capabilities of future generations. To see
this, we need only reflect on the way in which other kinds of technological
development have helped to shape both society and ourselves. The
invention of timekeeping devices, for example, led to profound forms
of social, economic and intellectual change [297], with some suggesting
that the transition from medieval clock towers to portable timekeeping
devices played an important role in “propelling us out of the Middle Ages
and into the Renaissance and then the Enlightenment” [81, p. 43]. Much
the same, of course, could be said about the invention of orthographic
practices and writing technology. The main point, here, is that social
change often accompanies technological change, and social change leads
to shifts in the forces and factors from which future minds emerge:
We engineer our own learning environments so as to create
artificial developmental cocoons that impact our acquired
capacities of thought and reason. Those enhanced minds
then design new cognitive niches that train new generations
of minds, and so on, in an empowering spiral of co-evolving
complexity. [99, p. 278]
The concept of ecological engineering is thus an important one.
When applied to the Web, we can see ecological engineering as not
simply a means of changing the online environment (although it is
surely that); we can also see it as a means of changing ourselves and
the societies in which we live. From its humble beginnings as a tool
to support the sharing of scientific data, the Web has emerged as a
critical element of the broader cognitive ecology in which our biological
brains are now situated. As we move into an era in which the Web plays
an ever-more crucial role in shaping the course of our individual and
collective endeavors, so we encounter new opportunities for cognitively-
potent forms of interaction and engagement with the largest space of
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knowledge and information our species has ever seen. It is, as yet, unclear
exactly how the technological and social landscape of the Web will shape
the contours of the human mind. However, as ecological engineers of
the online world, we are at least in a position to influence the things
that shape us. There can be little doubt that we are among the most
capable of species when it comes to altering our environment—indeed,
it seems that human activity has led to the creation of a new epoch of
geological time [533, 560]. But in addition to being prodigious engineers,
we are also among the most metamorphic of creatures. Just like the
butterfly, our true nature is never really fixed. In changing our social
and technological environments we shape the course of our cognitive
destiny, altering our sense as to what we are, what we can do, and,
perhaps most importantly, our sense as to what we might yet become.
9
Conclusion
We have now surveyed a wealth of literature that charts (at least in
broad outline) the points of contact between Web Science, cognitive
science and the philosophy of mind. There is, of course, much more
that could have been done. We have not, for example, covered the
considerable body of work relating to issues of cognitive development
and cognitive ontogeny [38, 205, 206, 355, 356, 391]. Neither have we
made any attempt to examine the Web from the standpoint of other
theoretical positions within cognitive science, such as those afforded by
grounded cognition [28, 29, 386], scaffolded cognition [483], and enactive
cognition [502]. Another important omission relates to recent work on
machine cognition and machine intelligence [452]. In this case, it has been
suggested that the Web may have as much impact on machine cognition
as it does on human cognition, with Web-based forms of contact with
the human social environment helping to bring about state-of-the-art
improvements in machine-based cognitive capabilities [451, 463].
In spite of these omissions, we hope the present review has provided
at least some insight into the nature of the intellectual terrain that lies
at the intersection of Web Science, cognitive science and the philosophy
of mind. Understanding this terrain in more detail is an important goal
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for Web Science. Given that the future of ourselves (and perhaps Planet
Earth as a whole) is tied to the success or failure of our individual
and collective cognitive engines, perhaps there are few other scientific
undertakings that can claim to be as important.
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